MARSHALL V. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 28 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-15419,D. C. Docket No. 09-14065-CV-CMA,09-15419 |
| Parties | MATTHEW MARSHALL,Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,Walter A. McNeil,Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
Death-sentenced Florida prisoner Matthew Marshall appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After review and oral argument, we affirm.
On November 1, 1988, Marshall, then an inmate at Martin Correction Institute in Florida with nine prior violent felony convictions, 1 murdered fellow inmate Jeffrey Henry. As described by the Florida Supreme Court:
[W]itnesses heard muffled screams and moans emanating from Henry's cell and observed Marshall exiting the cell with what appeared to be blood on his chest and arms. Within a few minutes, Marshall reentered the cell, and similar noises were heard. After the cell became quiet, Marshall again emerged with blood on his person. Henry was found dead, lying in his cell facedown with his hands bound behind his back and his sweat pants pulled down around his ankles to restrain his legs. Death was caused by blows to the back of his head.
Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. 1992) ("Marshall I"). Henry "received no less than twenty-five separate wounds," including six blows to the back of his head, and "was at least partially conscious during the second attack." Id. at 80506. Witnesses heard Henry plead for mercy. Id.. at 805.
Marshall was charged with first-degree murder. At trial, Marshall claimed he killed Henry in self-defense. The jury found Marshall guilty.
At the penalty phase, the State admitted copies of Marshall's prior violent felony convictions. Marshall expressly waived the right to present evidence of, or obtain a jury instruction on, statutory mitigating circumstances. Marshall relied solely on non-statutory mitigation.
Marshall intended to call his father, Perciful Marshall, to testify. However, Perciful Marshall did not show up for the penalty phase. Consequently, Marshall and the State entered into a stipulation, which was read to the jury, as to what Perciful Marshall's testimony would have been. The parties stipulated that Perciful Marshall would have testified:
That he is Matthew Marshall's father. That Matthew was born on July 23rd, 1964.... That Matthew was his second born child. Matthew was born and raised in Miami, his father's present home. Matthew has one older brother and three younger brothers. Mr. Perciful Marshall worked hard all his life at one job at Modernage Furniture, and provided the best he could for his children and his wife. Matthew was the smartest of the children and made quote, "beautiful" unquote grades until he was in his early teens. Matthew was influenced by his older brother, Brendly..., who encouraged him to run the streets and break the law. Matthew's mother did not discipline the boys in Perciful's absence and led them to believe that there would... not be any consequences for their behavior. Matthew's mother allowed her lack of discipline to affect their marriage, as well as their children, to the extent that she and the boys were on one side and Perciful was on the other side. Mr. Perciful Marshall expressed that despite the bad things that Matthew has done and his problems earlier with him heloves him very much. Mr. Perciful Marshall expressed that he would tell the jury of his love for Matthew and his request that they recommend to the Judge a life sentence rather than death. Mr. Perciful Marshall promised to be here but was unable to be here.
Other than this stipulation, Marshall presented no other evidence in the penalty phase.
In his closing argument, Marshall's counsel admitted that two statutory aggravating circumstances existed (the murder was committed while Marshall was under a sentence of imprisonment, and Marshall previously was convicted of violent felonies). But Marshall's counsel argued that the three other statutory aggravating circumstances that the State contended existed-the murder was committed during a burglary; was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and was cold, calculated, and premeditated-were not present.
As non-statutory mitigation, Marshall's counsel argued that a death sentence was not appropriate, pointing out that: (1) Marshall and Henry had socialized with each other in the prison and there were no prior problems between them; (2) there was no evidence Marshall had any plan to kill Henry when he first entered Henry's cell; (3) Henry was a violent person and had offensive wounds on his hands, indicating the murder occurred during the course of a fight; (4) Marshall and Henry were of equal size and physical strength; (5) Marshall entered Henry's cell unarmed and bludgeoned Henry using a battery pack he found in Henry's cell; (6) Marshall did not inflict further wounds after Henry was unconscious and did not steal Henry's gold chain, indicating the murder was not committed for financial gain and that Marshall had no intent to torture Henry; (7) Marshall's age at the time of the crime (24 years old) and his background (including the young age at which Marshall went to prison) were mitigating; and (8) Marshall was already serving a 46-year sentence, and an additional life sentence, even with the possibility of parole, would keep Marshall in prison for a long time.2
The jury recommended a sentence of life without parole.3 The state trial court, however, overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced Marshall to death. The state trial court found four statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) Marshall committed the murder while under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) Marshall was convicted of nine prior felonies involving the use or threat of violence; (3) Marshall committed the murder while he was engaged in or attempting to commit a burglary;4 and (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. In support of its finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, the state trial court found:
The victim was attacked twice and remained at least partially conscious until the second attack. During the first attack he cried for mercy and was aware of the gravity of the situation. He was beaten and struck six times on the back of the head with two D-cell batteries and suffered for a period of several minutes until he finally lost consciousness and died. The attacks resulted in blood being sprayed and spattered about the room and the victim receiving some twentyfive separate wounds. The murder of this victim was extremely wicked and shockingly evil, with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of the suffering of the victim. The murder was both conscienceless and pitiless.
While, as noted earlier, Marshall did not claim any statutory mitigating circumstances existed, the state trial court found two non-statutory mitigating circumstances: Marshall entered prison at a young age, and he behaved acceptably at trial. The state trial court expressly rejected as mitigating circumstances that Marshall's "older brother influenced him and led him astray to run the streets and break the law[,] [and Marshall's] mother failed to discipline him and caused him to believe there were no negative consequences for his bad behavior." In support of its decision to override the jury's recommendation and impose a death sentence, the state trial court stated,
Marshall appealed. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Marshall's firstdegree murder conviction and death sentence. Marshall I, 604 So. 2d 799. As to the death sentence, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the state trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a death sentence over the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment because there was "insufficient evidence to reasonably support the jury's recommendation of life":
Marshall... alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Marshall to death where the jury had made a recommendation of life imprisonment. It is well settled in Florida that a judge imposing sentence in a capital case must accord the jury recommendation great weight. E.g., Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). Where a jury has recommended a life sentence, the court must follow that recommendation unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Id. Where the record contains no evidence supporting a life recommendation, the trial court does not err in declining to follow that recommendation.
In this case, the record contains insufficient evidence to reasonably support the jury's recommendation of life. Marshall's father was unable to attend the trial, but the defense and prosecution stipulated that he would have testified that Marshall did well in school until his early teens when his older brother influenced him to run the streets and break the law; that Marshall's mother did not discipline Marshall and allowed him to believe there would be no consequences for his behavior; and that Marshall's father loved him and requested a life sentence for his son. The trial court determined these facts werenot mitigating, but did find Marshall's behavior at trial as well as his entering prison at a young age to be mitigating. We find no error in the court's assessment of this mitigation and conclude that it does not provide a reasonable basis for the jury's recommendation of life in this case. Even viewing this mitigation in the light most favorable to Marshall,...
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