Marshall v. Snider-Blake Pers.

• Decision Date: 08 November 2022
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-3736
• Parties: STEPHANIE MARSHALL, Plaintiff, v. SNIDER-BLAKE PERSONNEL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

STEPHANIE MARSHALL, Plaintiff,
v.
SNIDER-BLAKE PERSONNEL, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-3736

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

November 8, 2022

Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. Judge

ORDER AND INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, moves this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is now before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety. Further, Plaintiff's request for oral argument is DENIED.

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

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In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.'” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)^[1] as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or ....

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court's determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

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Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,' . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.'” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 Fed.Appx. 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II.

The nature of Plaintiff's claim is not clearly stated. Construing her pro se Complaint liberally, however, Plaintiff appears to be attempting, in part, to assert a claim under the Fair

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Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), for the untimely payment of wages.^[2]Additionally, she appears to be asserting a claim for a violation of 41 U.S.C. § 6503 and the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. The Complaint also mentions in passing a breach of a contract between Plaintiff and Snider-Blake.

As the Court understands Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Snider-Blake is a temporary staffing agency. Through Snider-Blake, Plaintiff worked for Big Lots in November 2020. On November 21, 2020, Plaintiff worked 12 hours for Big Lots and, under the terms of her agreement with Snider-Blake, she was to be paid for that work on Friday November 27, 2020.^[3]Plaintiff does not allege that she has not been paid for the work she performed on November 21, 2020, but she alleges that “[a] late payment is considered the same as no payment.” (ECF No. 11 at 9.) Beyond this, several of Plaintiff's allegations indicate that she pursued claims arising from these facts in a “lower court” proceeding. (Id. at 7.)

Consistent with these allegations, Plaintiff did, in fact, pursue such claims in state court. The state appellate court decision confirms this Court's understanding of Plaintiff's factual allegations, explaining and concluding, in relevant part, as follows.

On December 1, 2020, Marshall filed a complaint against Snider-Blake asserting claims of willful nonpayment and breach of contract.1 Snider-Blake is a temporary staffing agency. The allegations in the complaint related to the timing of Snider-Blake's payment to Marshall for her work at Big Lots on November 21, 2020, for which Snider-Blake placed Marshall. More specifically, Marshall alleged that, pursuant to the terms of her agreement with Snider-Blake, she should have been

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paid for her November 21, 2020 work on Friday, November 27, 2020 but was not actually paid until Monday, November 30, 2020. Marshall alleged the untimely payment was a breach of the contract she had with Snider-Blake and sought $250,000 in damages.

The matter then proceeded to a bench trial on November 30, 2021. At trial, Marshall testified that when she worked for Snider-Blake and was placed at Big Lots, she should have received a paycheck on Friday, November 27, 2020. The expected paycheck related to work Marshall did at Big Lots on behalf of Snider-Blake on Saturday, November 21, 2020. Marshall testified that she received her paycheck three days later, on Monday, November 30, 2020, but that the delay in payment time was stressful. After the delay in payment, Marshall said she stopped working for Snider-Blake.

Following the trial, the trial court issued a December 1, 2021 decision and judgment entry rendering judgment in favor of Snider-Blake on all of Marshall's claims.

The parties agree Marshall had a contract of employment with Snider-Blake. The issue at trial was whether Marshall demonstrated a breach of that contract when Snider-Blake paid her for her November 21, 2020 work at Big Lots. The pertinent contract language is found in Snider-Blake's Rules and Regulations of employment and provides:

8. I understand that the workweek at Snider-Blake runs from Monday through Sunday and that I must record all time worked and report my time to Snider-Blake by the following Tuesday. I understand that it is my responsibility to have my supervisor sign and verify the hours on my time sheet each week.

9. If I encounter a payroll error or a delay in receiving my pay, I will notify Snider-Blake within 7 days of the week in which the payroll error occurred.

(Def's Ex. A.)

The evidence at trial indicated that Big Lots failed to properly document Marshall's hours worked and submit them to Snider-Blake in a timely fashion. When Marshall notified Snider-Blake of the error, Snider-Blake paid Marshall the day after it received the proper documentation from Big Lots in accordance with the employment Rules and Regulations. Thus, we agree with the trial court that Marshall did not demonstrate a breach of the contract.

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Moreover, Marshall did not present any evidence of

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