Marshall v. State

• Decision Date: 28 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. A90A1418,A90A1418
• Citation: Marshall v. State, 399 S.E.2d 555, 197 Ga.App. 762 (Ga. App. 1990)
• Parties: MARSHALL v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 555

399 S.E.2d 555

197 Ga.App. 762

MARSHALL v. The STATE.

No. A90A1418.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 28, 1990.

Murray M. Silver, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Doris L. Downs, Carl P. Greenberg, and Joseph J. Drolet, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.

COOPER, Judge.

Appellant appeals her conviction by a jury of trafficking in cocaine. Based on information obtained from a confidential informant that appellant was selling cocaine out of her beauty supply store, the police obtained a search warrant for appellant's business and car. During the search of the store, the police discovered a shoe box containing 100 grams of cocaine of greater than 80 percent purity worth up to $40,000 in clear plastic bags, a briefcase with $3,250, $1,774 in a bank bag and appellant's handbag containing $1,076 and a small amount of marijuana. Appellant and an employee were charged with trafficking in cocaine. At trial, at the close of the State's case, the trial court discharged the co-defendant on a motion for directed verdict.

1. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court's failure to discharge the entire jury panel after prospective jurors made prejudicial remarks in the presence of other jurors during voir dire. The co-defendant's attorney asked the venire whether anyone believed that because the co-defendant was charged in the indictment, he could not be fair and objective. One prospective juror replied, "I don't think it's because he is charged. I think it's because of preconceived notions of what a drug dealer looks like, and he fits the bill." Another prospective juror replied, "Well, I used to stay in the projects, and I hated guys like him, and my cousin got killed. He got killed, and I have been trying to set it aside, but I can't." Counsel questioned further, "You are going to assume that somebody that's charged with a crime is guilty of it; is that right?" The juror responded, "Yeah. Because I know him. I used to stay in places like that. So I know." Both persons were excused for cause. The co-defendant and appellant then moved the court to excuse the entire panel. Denying the motion, the court took no corrective action but commented that it was the court's impression in cases involving cocaine that the sentiments expressed by the prospective jurors were common. The co-defendant's attorney then asked the remaining jurors whether there was anyone who did not understand that they should reserve making a decision until all the evidence was presented and not base their decision solely on the State's evidence. The jury's silence indicated that they understood their role and could function accordingly. See Pruitt v. State, 176 Ga.App. 317(1), 335 S.E.2d 724 (1985).

Appellant argues on appeal that the court should have conducted individual voir dire of each prospective juror out of the presence of the others to eliminate the danger of prejudice; however, the record does not reflect that a request was made for such a procedure. "The conduct of voir dire ... lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Cit.]" Hughey v. State 180 Ga.App. 375(2), 348 S.E.2d 901 (1986). In the instant case, the remarks were directed at the co-defendant exclusively and did not involve appellant's guilt or innocence. Compare Moore v. State, 156 Ga.App. 92, 274 S.E.2d 107 (1980); Lingerfelt v. State, 147 Ga.App. 371, 249 S.E.2d 100 (1978). "While not approving of the trial court's inaction in this situation, we do not find the potential juror[s'] reference[s] ... so inherently prejudicial as to deny [appellant] a fair trial." Hughey, supra at p. 378, 348 S.E.2d 901. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to discharge the panel. See Sexton v. State, 189 Ga.App. 331(2), 375 S.E.2d 661 (1988).

2. Appellant contends the court's charge on the lesser included offenses and its repetition of the form of the verdict overemphasized its guilty aspect. "It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error. [Cits.]" Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 822, 825(3), 295 S.E.2d 293 (1982). Appellant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine, and the jury was charged on that offense and the lesser included offenses, possession with intent to distribute and simple possession. The court read the verdict form to the jury once, and "for the purpose of clarity, but not for the purpose of emphasis," repeated the verdict form. We find that the charge was a correct statement of the law, and viewing the entire charge as a whole, it is apparent that the charge "was a full and fair charge covering all issues to be resolved by the jury." Id. at 825-826, 295 S.E.2d 293. Further, guilt was not overemphasized by the charge or the verdict form. This enumeration is without merit.

3. Appellant next argues that the affidavit which supported the search warrant did not establish sufficient probable cause for the search of appellant's business, and the court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress. The affidavit provided that the affiant, the officer who supervised the search, was notified by a confidential informant that appellant had recently returned from Florida in a burgundy Camaro with a large amount of...