Marshall v. Woodruff
| Decision Date | 21 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 20A03-9303-CV-92,20A03-9303-CV-92 |
| Citation | 631 N.E.2d 3 |
| Parties | Marjorie F. MARSHALL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Michael R. WOODRUFF, Donna J. Woodruff, and Norman L. Woodruff, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Donald E. Wertheimer, South Bend, for appellant-plaintiff.
Penny L. Carey-Largent, Annette F. Rush, UAW Legal Services Plan, Kokomo, for appellee-defendant Norman L. Woodruff.
Appellant-plaintiff Marjorie F. Marshall appeals from a judgment for appellee-defendant Norman L. Woodruff dismissing the complaint against him as personal guaranty to a land sale contract.
Marshall raises three issues which we consolidate as one for review: whether the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning Marshall and ultimately dismissing her cause of action against Woodruff for failing to comply with discovery orders pursuant to Ind.Trial Rule 37(B).
The facts relevant to the appeal disclose that Michael and Donna Woodruff executed a land sale contract with Marjorie Marshall for the purchase of real estate. Norman Woodruff signed as personal guaranty to the contract. Subsequently, Michael and Donna Woodruff defaulted on the contract. On December 7, 1988, Marshall filed suit against Michael and Donna Woodruff alleging breach of contract and against Norman Woodruff as personal guaranty. On April 17, 1989, Woodruff propounded his first set of interrogatories and a request for admissions to Marshall. On June 14, 1989, Woodruff filed a motion to expedite time for response to discovery, which was granted by the court. He also propounded a supplemental set of interrogatories to Marshall. On July 17, 1989, Woodruff filed his first motion to compel discovery, contending that Marshall failed to attach various documents as provided in her answers to the first set of interrogatories, specifically interrogatories numbers 2, 5, and 6, despite being twice put on notice that the documents were not forwarded. Woodruff also asserted that Marshall refused to answer questions 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the supplemental set of interrogatories. On August 1, 1989, Marshall filed an objection to the motion to compel or in the alternative a motion for a protective order.
On February 14, 1991, Woodruff filed his second motion to compel discovery or in the alternative requested that the trial court dismiss the action against him. In addition to the basis relied upon in his first motion to compel, Woodruff contended that at the October 26, 1990 deposition of Marshall he had asked for an itemization of all tax benefits regarding the property and for a copy of the deed, which Marshall had failed to provide. Marshall filed a response to the motion to compel on March 13, 1991. Marshall contended that as for the first set of interrogatories, the documents were inadvertently omitted and were subsequently provided in a letter sent to Woodruff's counsel July 31, 1989; that there was no hearing as to the supplemental set of interrogatories; and that Marshall's tax returns for the years in question had not yet been prepared. On March 26, 1991, following a telephonic conference with both parties, the court entered an order compelling discovery. On April 16, 1991, the court denied Woodruff's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with discovery; however, it imposed as a sanction the attorney's fees expended by Woodruff in an attempt to compel discovery. The court further ordered that the action against Woodruff would be dismissed if the requested discovery information was not received by October 15, 1991. Marshall was sanctioned $500.00 in attorney's fees for her failure to comply with discovery.
On January 10, 1992, the court found that Marshall had failed to comply with the discovery orders and ordered her to comply with all discovery requests including the payment of the $500.00 sanction by February 14, 1992. On February 13, 1992, Marshall filed a proof of compliance with outstanding discovery, which stated, in part, that the tax documents could not be produced as they had still not been prepared. On March 23, 1992, the court noted receipt of the letter from Woodruff's counsel requesting release of the $500.00 sanction and a ruling on the motion for dismissal due to non-compliance with discovery. The court ordered the clerk's office to release the $500.00 and deferred ruling on the dismissal as an additional sanction. Thereafter, Woodruff filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 2, 1992, the court denied Woodruff's motion for summary judgment. The court, however, granted Woodruff's motion for dismissal based upon Marshall's non-compliance with discovery. Marshall now appeals.
Marshall alleges that there was never a formal motion or request for production of documents; therefore, there was nothing to base the order compelling discovery upon. In the notice of examination and the subsequent subpoena duces tecum, Marshall was requested to provide tax information and returns for the tax years 1988-1989. Ind.Trial Rule 30(B) states, in part: "If a subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the person to be examined, a designation of the materials to be produced thereunder shall be attached to or included in the notice." T.R. 30(B)(1). Further, notice to a deponent may be accompanied by a request for the production of documents. See T.R. 30(B)(5); see also Subpoena Duces Tecum to Stearns v. Zulka (1986), Ind.App., 489 N.E.2d 146, 148 (). Woodruff's request for the tax documents was proper.
Marshall also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning her for failure to comply with the discovery orders. Specifically, she argues that since the requested tax documents had not been prepared, it was impossible for her to comply with the discovery order.
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the issues of discovery, and this Court will interfere only when an abuse of discretion is apparent. Lucas v. Dorsey Corp. (1993), Ind.App., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1195, trans. denied; Keesling v. Baker & Daniels (1991), Ind.App., 571 N.E.2d 562, 566-68 trans. denied. To obtain reversal of a trial court's discovery order the moving party must show that he was prejudiced. Id. The Indiana rules of discovery are designed to allow a liberal discovery procedure, the purposes of which are to provide parties with information essential to litigation of all relevant issues, to eliminate surprise, and to promote settlement. Canfield v. Sandock (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 526, 528. Discovery is designed to be self-executing with little, if any, supervision of the court. Id.; Lucas, 609 N.E.2d at 1196.
Ind.Trial Rule 37(B) provides trial courts with sanctions they...
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