Marshbanks v. City of Calumet City, 13 C 2978
| Decision Date | 10 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 13 C 2978,13 C 2978 |
| Parties | ANTHANETTE MARSHBANKS, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Archie Lee Chambers, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CALUMET CITY; OFFICER LUCIOUS, STAR NO. 230, OFFICER GERSTNER, STAR NO. 188, OFFICER FISHER, STAR NO. 168, OFFICER LASTER, STAR NO. 206, OFFICER T. MOTTL, STAR NO. 214, OFFICER HINTZ, STAR NO. 148, LT. DIFIORI, STAR NO. 150, OFFICER BLAND, STAR NO. 234, CHIEF EDWARD GILMORE, Star no. 227 and UNKNOWN OFFICERS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On April 19, 2013, Plaintiff Anthanette Marshbanks filed a ten-count Complaint against Defendants City of Calumet City (the "City"), and numerous officers, including Lieutenant DiFiori and Chief Edward Gilmore, (collectively, the "Defendants"). (R. 1, Compl.) The Complaint alleges the following: Count I - excessive force against all Defendants; Count II - a Monell claim against the City; Count III - conspiracy against all Defendants; Count IV - failure to intervene against all Defendants; Count V - failure to supervise against Chief Gilmore and Lt. Difiori; Count VI - intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants; Count VII - wrongful death against all Defendants; Count VIII - violation of the Survival Act against allDefendants; Count IX - respondeat superior against the City; Count X - indemnification. The City, Lieutenant Difori, and Chief Gilmore (collectively, the "Moving Defendants") moved to dismiss Ms. Marshbanks' Complaint, except for Counts IX and X, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6), and to strike certain immaterial, impertinent, and redundant allegations pursuant to Rule 12(f). (R. 17, Mot.) Defendants Bland, Fisher, Gerstner, Hintz, Laster, Lucious, and Mottl joined in and adopted the Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 20, 22.)
Ms. Marshbanks alleges the following facts which the Court deems true for purposes of this motion.
On or about April 21, 2012, one of more Calumet City police officers shot and killed Archie Chambers, Jr., Ms. Marshbank's son. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5.) Mr. Chambers was attending a car show at What's Up Bar and Grill that evening. (Id. ¶ 8.) While at the bar, someone - not Mr. Chambers - shot his friend, Willie Randall White, Jr. in the parking lot. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) After the shooting, Mr. Chambers attempted to leave the parking lot by jumping a fence. (Id. ¶ 14.) Officers who arrived on the scene, and who had no information implicating Mr. Chambers, began shooting at Mr. Chambers when he was at the top of the fence. (Id. ¶ 15.) Three shots hit Mr. Chambers, resulting in his death. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 20.) There was no gun or other weapon recovered from Mr. Chambers' body. (Id. ¶ 19.) Officers, other than those who discharged their weapons, completed a police report of the incident. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Calumet Chief of Police did not discipline any officer in connection with Mr. Chambers' death. (Id.)
Calumet City police officers were involved in another shooting incident in early 2012, months before Mr. Chambers' death. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-30.) In that incident, officers shot a fifteen-year-old autistic boy, Stephon Watts, twice, including a shot to the head. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Ms. Marshbanks believes that the Chief of the Police Department failed to discipline any officer, or send any officer to remedial training, after that incident. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.)
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, [courts] view it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff's favor." AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011).
"Rule 12(f) provides that a district court 'may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.'" Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.12(f)). Motions to strike are appropriate if they serve to expedite litigation. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder, 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992) (). District courts have considerable discretion to strike allegations under Rule 12(f). See Delta, 554 F.3d at 1141-42.
Defendants move to dismiss Ms. Marshbanks' Complaint, except for Counts IX and X, and strike her punitive damages claim, paragraph 77, and portions of paragraph 70. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
In Count II, Ms. Marshbanks asserts a Monell claims against the City alleging that "the unreasonable use of lethal force was proximately caused by the policies and practices of the City of Calumet's Police Department." (Compl. ¶ 37.) See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). As the Seventh Circuit teaches, "Monell recognized that the premise behind a § 1983 action against a government body is the allegation that official policy is responsible for the deprivation of rights." Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Milestone v. City of Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011)) ("There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; the Supreme Court 'distinguish[es] acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality.'") (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). To establish liability against the City on a Monell claim, Ms. Marshbanks must show that: (1) Mr. Chambers suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right, (2) as a result of either an express municipal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act of a decision-maker with finalpolicymaking authority, that (3) proximately caused their constitutional injuries. See Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Obrycka v. City of Chi., No. 07 C 2372, 2012 WL 601810, at * 6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2010).
Defendants contend that Ms. Marshbanks has not sufficiently pled a Monell claim because she has pled mere conclusory allegations supported by only one other prior shooting. (Mem. at 4-5.) The Court disagrees. Ms. Marshbanks has alleged that "widespread practices are allowed to flourish because the City directly encourages and is thereby the moving force behind the very type of misconduct at issue by failing to adequately train, supervise, and control its officers and by failing to adequately punish and discipline prior instances of similar misconduct, thus directly encouraging future abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff." (Compl. ¶ 38.) Notably, Ms. Marshbanks did not simply allege the existence of a practice, she offered a specific example of another similar incident which occurred prior to officers shooting Mr. Chambers, and which did not result in any training or discipline for the officers involved. Specifically, Ms. Marshbanks alleges that officers shot and killed Stephon Watts "only months before" officers killed Mr. Chambers. (Id. ¶¶ 25-30.) According to Ms. Marshbanks, the City failed to discipline or train the officers as a result of the Watts shooting, thus furthering this conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) Ms. Marshbanks also alleges that the City "exhibited deliberate indifference to the problem," thereby allowing it "to exist and thrive." (Id. ¶ 39.) Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Marshbanks, and making all reasonable inferences in her favor, these allegations pass the plausibility test imposed by Iqbal and Twombly for a Monell claim of failure to train, supervise, or control. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989).
In Count III, Ms. Marshbanks alleges that all the Defendants conspired to protect one another from liability for Mr. Chambers death. Specifically, she alleges that they reached an agreement and took certain overt steps, such as creating false reports of the shooting or failing to prepare reports related to the shooting. (Compl. ¶¶ 42-45.) According to Ms. Marshbanks, "[a]s a direct and proximate result of the illicit prior agreement [], [Mr. Chambers'] rights were violated and he suffered injuries." (Id. ¶ 47.) Defendants contend that the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine bars Ms. Marshbanks' conspiracy claim.
The intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine precludes conspiracy claims against members of the same entity acting within the scope of their authority. Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's...
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