Marso v. Safespeed, LLC
| Decision Date | 04 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 19-2671-KHV |
| Parties | ANDREW MARSO, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. SAFESPEED, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Andrew Marso brings individual and putative class action claims against Safespeed, LLC and the Village of North Riverside, Illinois for violations of Kansas law and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Amended Complaint (Doc. #15) filed January 10, 2020. This matter is before the Court on Defendant Safespeed, LLC's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. #19) filed February 21, 2020, and Defendant Village Of North Riverside, Illinois' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. #34) filed April 8, 2020. For reasons stated below, the Court overrules both motions.
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges as follows:
Plaintiff is a resident of Kansas and a disabled individual within the meaning of the ADA. The Village of North Riverside (the "Village") is a municipality in Illinois. SafeSpeed is an Illinois limited liability company that provides red light enforcement systems to more than 30 municipalities in Illinois, including the Village. SafeSpeed offices and operations are in Illinois, and it does not provide services to municipalities outside of Illinois. SafeSpeed operations affect travel, transportation and commerce between Kansas and Illinois.
When a driver speeds or runs a red light, the SafeSpeed system captures an image of the vehicle. If the image is clear, SafeSpeed (with authorization from the Village) uses the license plate number to identify the owner of the vehicle, using information from the Illinois Secretary of State and Nlets, a network with motor vehicle and driver data. A SafeSpeed subcontractor then prepares, prints and mails a violation notice to the owner. SafeSpeed and the Village have a financial incentive to send out violation notices.
The Kansas Department of Revenue issues Disabled Parking Placards to disabled drivers. Each Disabled Parking Placard has a number which is separate from the license plate number of the disabled driver. Plaintiff has a Disabled Identification Placard Number for his vehicle.
On May 23, 2019, a truck with a Kansas license plate ran a red light in the Village. Its license plate number was identical to plaintiff's Disabled Identification Placard Number, and SafeSpeed and the Village mistakenly issued the violation notice to plaintiff. Plaintiff disputed the notice and the Village dismissed it.
Plaintiff believes that he may not be the only disabled individual who has mistakenly received a violation notice from SafeSpeed and the Village. He alleges that by failing to properly verify vehicle information, SafeSpeed sends erroneous violation notices to disabled Kansans, and perhaps residents of other states as well.
Plaintiff alleges that SafeSpeed discriminates against individuals with disabilities by failing to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices and procedures to correct this problem. He asserts that unless the Court requires SafeSpeed to cease sending violation notices based on Disability Identification Placard Numbers, disabled individuals in Kansas and other states couldsuffer irreparable harm (i.e., wrongful criminal citations, impaired driving records, etc.).
Plaintiff seeks to represent a class that includes all persons residing in the United States who are disabled within the meaning of the ADA and whose state government or agency has issued Disability Identification Placard Numbers or other disability-related identification numbers. On behalf of the class, plaintiff asserts that: (1) SafeSpeed violated Section 12182 of the ADA and (2) the Village violated of Section 12132 of the ADA.
Plaintiff also seeks to represent two subclasses: (1) persons in Kansas who have Disability Identification Placard Numbers (the "Kansas Subclass")1 and (2) individuals who have received wrongfully-issued violation notices (the "Wrongfully-Issued Subclass"). On behalf of the Wrongfully-Issued Subclass, plaintiff asserts that SafeSpeed and the Village (1) were negligent and (2) committed malicious prosecution.2
Plaintiff asserts that this Court has federal question jurisdiction based on the ADA.3 As to personal jurisdiction, plaintiff does not allege that the Court has general jurisdiction over defendants. As to specific jurisdiction, plaintiff alleges as follows:
This Court has specific personal jurisdiction over SafeSpeed and the Village because they regularly conduct business in Kansas by causing notices of violation to be mailed into Kansas, and because SafeSpeed and the Village's purposeful establishment of significant contact with Kansas gave rise to Plaintiff's cause of action. SafeSpeed and the Village have caused notices of violation to be mailed into Kansas even when the recipient has not traveled to Illinois.
SafeSpeed argues that the Court should dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, misjoinder of parties, improper venue, failure to state a claim and, if the Court dismisses plaintiff's ADA claim, lack of diversity jurisdiction. SafeSpeed argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction because it does not have minimum contacts with Kansas. In addition, SafeSpeed asserts that under its contract with the Village, SafeSpeed conducts only an initial review of potential violations and the Village has final decision-making authority regarding who receives a violation notice. After the Village makes the final decision, a SafeSpeed subcontractor prints and mails the notices. Accordingly, SafeSpeed argues that the Village—not it—is the proper defendant in this case.
In support of its motion to dismiss, SafeSpeed provides a declaration from its Chief Executive Officer Chris Lai, which states that SafeSpeed conducts all of its business in Illinois and has no dealings with Kansas. SafeSpeed also provides the following documents: (1) its contract with the Village; (2) an authorization from the Village to obtain motor vehicle data from Nlets; and (3) a copy of the violation notice sent to plaintiff, which states that the notice is from the Village and does not include SafeSpeed's name.
The Village argues that the Court should dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint for lack ofpersonal jurisdiction, improper venue and, as to plaintiff's request to certify a class, failure to state a claim.4 The Village asserts that it does not have minimum contacts with Kansas and that in enforcing its traffic laws in Illinois, the Village did not anticipate being haled into court in Kansas. The Village further asserts that requiring it to litigate in Kansas would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Finally, the Village claims that venue is improper in Kansas because a substantial portion of the events occurred in Illinois.
In support of its motion to dismiss, the Village provides a declaration from its Acting Administrator and Financial Director/Treasurer Susan Scarpiniti, which states that the Village dismissed the erroneous violation notice on an expedited timeline after one phone call from plaintiff. Scarpiniti further states that to her knowledge, this situation has not happened before and was the result of a reporting error to SafeSpeed by the Kansas Secretary of State. The Village also includes a copy of plaintiff's violation notice.
As noted, SafeSpeed and the Village separately urge the Court to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P., and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.
A court without jurisdiction over the parties cannot render a valid judgment. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, before addressing the merits of the case, the Court must determine whether it has personaljurisdiction over defendants. See id.; see also First Magnus Financial Corp. v. Star Equity Funding, LLC, No. 06-2426-JWL, 2007 WL 635312, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 27, 2007) ().
Rule 12(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., governs motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants. At this stage of the litigation, he need only make a prima facie showing and that burden is light. Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1069-70 (10th Cir. 2008); Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995). To the extent that defendants' affidavits do not controvert the well-pleaded allegations of the amended complaint, the Court accepts plaintiff's allegations as true. Wenz, 55 F.3d at 1505. If defendants sufficiently challenge the jurisdictional allegations, plaintiff must support them with competent proof of supporting facts. Pytlik v. Prof'l Res., Ltd., 887 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1989). He may do so by demonstrating, by affidavit or other written materials, facts that if true would support jurisdiction over defendants. TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007). At this stage, the Court resolves any factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. Wenz, 55 F.3d at 1505.
Determining whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in a federal question case requires two steps. First, the Court examines whether the applicable statute potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process on defendants. Peay v. BellSouth Med. Ass't Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). The Court then...
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