Martachowski v. Orawitz

• Decision Date: 26 July 1900
• Docket Number: 1-1898
• Parties: Martachowski v. Orawitz
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

14 Pa.Super. 175

Martachowski v. Orawitz

No. 1-1898

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 26, 1900

Argued January 11, 1898

Reargued January 9, 1899. [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter]

Appeal by defendant in suit of Joseph Martachowski, against Frank Orawitz, from judgment of C.P. Luzerne County-1893, No. 184, on verdict for plaintiff.

Trespass. Before Woodward, P. J.

The material facts appear in the opinion of the court.

At the trial the court admitted in evidence the record showing the conviction and imprisonment of plaintiff for selling liquor without a license.

The court charged the jury, inter alia, as follows:

[We say to you that if the plaintiff and his witnesses have stated the truth, the whole truth of the case and nothing but the truth, he is in our judgment entitled to a verdict at your hands for such damages as he has suffered.] . . . .

[If that be the truth of the case and the whole truth he will be entitled to recover such damages as you think proper.] . . . .

[If you decide to find for the plaintiff we instruct you briefly as to the measure of damages: that, in the first place, there is no fixed, unbending rule on this subject; that depends largely on the discretion of the jury enlightened as they have been by the testimony in the case. The fundamental idea of damages in such cases in compensation to make the party whole -- to do him justice under all the circumstances of the case; it is to compensate him for what he has suffered in all the ways in which he has suffered. If you find for the plaintiff of course you will say in what sum.]

[The rule of law in cases similar to the one now on trial is to some extent a modification of the general principle or maxim to which I call your attention, and the rule is this, as we understand it to be: if a party who himself knows the law should deceive another by misrepresenting the law to him, or knowing him to be ignorant of it should take advantage of it, relief will be granted on the ground of fraud, and such a case is not within the rule or maxim, that ignorance of the law excuses no one.]

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $ 877.50. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned among others were to ruling on evidence. To portions of the judge's charge, reciting same. Refusal of binding instructions in favor of defendant.

Geo. H. Troutman and John T. Lenahan, for appellant. -- Special damages are required to be stated in the declaration for notice to the defendant and to prevent surprise at the trial. Where the action is for the conversion or destruction of property or any tortious act or omission involving its loss, the law infers an injury measured by its value, and the injured party may recover by that standard under the general averment of damage. But if he is entitled to recover other damages, they are special and exceptional, arising from peculiar circumstances which must be alleged and proved: 1 Sutherland on Damages, secs. 419, 420. See also 3 Sedgwick, sec. 1261; Robinson v. Stokely, 3 Watts, 270; and Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479.

If the language of the court, taken in connection with the circumstances of the case, may have misled the jury as to the law, or if the tendency of the charge was to mislead them, it is ground for reversal, though there was no request to charge upon any particular point: Bisbing v. Bank, 93 Pa. 79; Norton v. Lehn, 2 Penny. 297.

As to the fifth assignment of error, while the learned judge recognized the general principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one, he made an exception to this rule not warranted by the facts in this case.

In Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts, 372, Mr. Justice Rogers says: " It is an unquestionable principle, which applies to civil as well as criminal cases, that ignorance of the law will not furnish an excuse for any person, either for a breach or omission of duty. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat is a maxim which is as much respected in equity as in law. This doctrine is among the settled elements of the law, for every man, at his peril, is bound to take notice of what the law is, as well the law made by statute as the common law.

This declaration of the law is followed in Good v. Herr, 7 W. & S. 253, and M'Aninch v. Laughlin, 13 Pa. 371.

Wherever the law imposes a penalty for making a contract it impliedly forbids parties from making such a contract, and when a contract is prohibited, whether expressly or by implication, it is illegal and cannot be enforced. Of this there is no doubt: Holt v. Green, 73 Pa. 198.

The test whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced by law, is whether the plaintiff requires the aid of the illegal transaction to establish his case: Swan v. Scot, 11 S. & R. 155; Thomas v. Brady, 10 Pa. 164; Scott v. Duffy, 14 Pa. 18. If the plaintiff cannot open his case without showing that he has broken the law, a court will not assist him.

B. McManus and John McGahren, for appellee. -- If the declaration did not set forth a legal cause of action the defendant might have demurred to it; if the averments contained in it were not sufficiently definite and specific, he might have asked for a bill of particulars under our rule of court, or he might have obtained a rule upon the defendant to file a more specific statement: Bradley v. Potts, 155 Pa. 418; Dow v. Williams, 4 Pa. Dist. 659.

While in such action it may be more regular to set out such elements of damages in the narr., yet where the cause has been tried properly on its merits, a reversal will not be ordered because of the absence of such averments: Hawes v. O'Reilly, 126 Pa. 440.

The plaintiff is not required to set out specifically or in detail the elements or grounds of the damages which he seeks to recover, but only the substantial facts necessary to constitute a cause of action: Prentiss v. Barnes, 88 Mass. 510.

It was perfectly legitimate for the plaintiff to prove such acts and matters in support of his case as were the legal and natural consequences of the injury done. Matters that naturally arise from the act complained of may be given in evidence: 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 357; Chitty on Pleading, 412 *.

We did offer evidence of special damage on the trial, to wit: that after the plaintiff was sent to prison, the defendant evicted his family, and converted to his own use all the personal property which the plaintiff had bought and paid for, and obtained $ 35.00 from his wife with which he promised to secure his release and freedom and never used it for said purpose and never intended to. This evidence was excluded by the court, and the plaintiff was rigidly restricted to simple proof of his conviction and imprisonment, without anything more: Ward v. Smith, 11 Price (Eng.), 19.

The doctrine of this case was fully affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Roberts v. Graham, 73 U.S. 578.

Tested by this elementary principle, we think the charge of the learned judge on the measure of damages was correct and adequate in every particular. The very nature of the case was not susceptible of a more explicit or conservative statement of the law. It has been decided by our Supreme Court, in many cases, that the general rule for the measure of damages in cases of tort may be said to be that which aims at actual compensation for the injury, and whatever ascertains this is proper evidence to be submitted to the jury: Seely v. Alden, 61 Pa. 302; McKnight v. Ratcliff, 44 Pa. 156; Forsyth v. Palmer, 14 Pa. 98.

While the weight of authority is clearly against granting relief merely on account of a mistake of the law, it seems to be conceded in nearly all the cases and expressly decided in many of them that there are exceptions to this rule: Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 26 U.S. 1; Bank of United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. 32.

And in Matlock v. Todd, 19 Ind. 131, it was decided " that a contract might be set aside for fraudulent misrepresentations, though the means of obtaining information were fully opened to the party deceived, where from the circumstances he was induced to rely upon the other party's information."

Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, Orlady, Smith, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.

OPINION

W. D. PORTER, J.

This action is in trespass and the plaintiff's statement contains all the elements essential to an action on the case for deceit. The plaintiff's statement sets forth that the defendant " unlawfully, fraudulently and deceitfully did represent and state to the said plaintiff that he, the said defendant, had a license, duly granted to him by the court of quarter sessions of Luzerne county, for the sale of liquors etc., by retail in a house which he claimed to own in the Diamond Edition of Hazelton, in said county, which said license would not expire until the 1st day of April, 1898. And that if the said plaintiff would pay him, the said defendant, the sum of $ 70.00 for said license, and the sum of $ 321.85 for barroom fixtures, liquors, wines and other stock in said house, including wagons, harness, sleigh and horse upon the premises mentioned in connection with said house, he would transfer the said license to him in due form of law. That the said plaintiff, relying upon the promises, assurances and stipulations of the said defendant, made as aforesaid, paid to the said defendant the sum of $ 391.85, demanded as the consideration for the transfer of said license and sale of said property. The plaintiff further declares that the said defendant did not have any license granted to him for said house during said year, as he well knew, and by reason of his misrepresentations and deceit and the violation of his agreement to transfer said license, the plaintiff was induced to part with his money, as aforesaid, and sustained great...