Martarella v. Kelley

Decision Date16 October 1972
Docket NumberNo. 71 Civ. 3159.,71 Civ. 3159.
Citation349 F. Supp. 575
PartiesRobert MARTARELLA, by his next friend and Law Guardian Charles Schinitsky, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Florence KELLEY, Administrative Judge, and The Family Court Judges of the State and City of New York, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles Schinitsky, The Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, N. Y., for plaintiffs; James D. Silbert, and Mara T. Thorpe, Brooklyn, N. Y., of counsel.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of New York, New York City, for defendants; Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Maria L. Marcus, and John G. Proudfit, New York City, of counsel.

J. Lee Rankin, Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendant Sugarman; Yvette Harmon, New York City, of counsel.

LASKER, District Judge.

The rapid urbanization of the United States in this century and the heavy influx of the poor to the cities in the last two decades have produced a numerous class of children whose conduct, although not criminal in character or legal designation, results in their incarceration.

Robert Martarella and his fellow plaintiffs1 are members of that group —alleged or adjudicated to be "Persons In Need of Supervision" (PINS) pursuant to § 732 of the Family Court Act of New York (The Act). They bring this civil rights action for a declaration that their temporary detention in the "maximum security" facilities,—Spofford, Manida and Zerega, juvenile centers operated by the City of New York— deprives them of due process and equal protection and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the conditions prevailing at those institutions.2

The plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunctive relief. Pursuant to Rule 65 (a) (2), Fed.R.Civ.Pr., the trial of the action was consolidated with the hearing of the application.3

A "Person In Need of Supervision" is defined in § 712(b) of the Act as "a male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school in accordance with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education law or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority."

The boys at Spofford range in age from 7 through 15; the girls at Manida and Zerega from 7 through 17.

The Family Court Judges are authorized, by § 739 of the Act, to direct that a PINS be detained if "(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on the return date; or (b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date do an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime."

The Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division are responsible for the designation of appropriate detention centers for PINS.

The Director of the Office of Probation was, at the time this suit was in-instituted, responsible for the administration and operation of the centers. In November 1971, the supervision of the centers was transferred to the Department of Social Services of the City of New York, and Jule M. Sugarman, Commissioner of Social Services, has been added as a defendant.

The injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs is to prevent the Family Court Judges from remanding PINS to the centers, to order the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division to designate non-secure facilities which comply with New York law and the Federal Constitution as to the care and treatment of children in custody, and to order the administrator of the centers to close Manida and Zerega permanently, and Spofford until it is made "safe, sanitary and decent for its inmates."

They also move for determination of the case as a class action.

Spofford, Manida and Zerega ("the centers", except where reference is made to a specific facility) are institutions at which PINS and juvenile delinquents are, (on what is theoretically termed a "temporary" basis), detained together pending the permanent disposition of their cases by long term custody or otherwise. The term "theoretically" must be emphasized because in a significant number of cases, as we shall see below, the "temporary" nature of the detention is lengthened to as much as 100 days or more.

Generally speaking, children who have been adjudicated as PINS are truants, or runaways, or have been ungovernable at home. The acts for which they may be brought before a court, detained at the centers and thereafter held in custody for a term would not constitute crimes if committed by an adult.

The acts committed by juvenile delinquents (JDs) are criminal in character (in contrast to the acts of PINS). A JD is defined by § 712(a) of the Act as "a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime".

Plaintiffs' major contentions may be summarized as follows:

(1) The incarceration of non-criminal children in maximum security detention under conditions which plaintiffs describe as punitive, hazardous and unhealthy, and in the absence of rehabilitative treatment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of due process under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments respectively.

(2) Classifying and housing PINS together with juvenile delinquents (JDs) (rather than with neglected children) for purposes of temporary detention is arbitrary and capricious and violates the equal protection clause.

The defendants deny that the conditions at the centers are punitive or (with exceptions) hazardous or unhealthy, and assert that the program provided for the plaintiff class provides treatment and rehabilitation to the extent possible in the context of temporary detention. Consequently, they assert that no cruel and unusual punishment or deprivation of due process exists. As to the issue of equal protection, they claim that housing of PINS with JDs is a rational and professionally accepted method of classification for temporary detention, so that no constitutional violation exists.

Finally, defendants argue that the court lacks jurisdiction and that in any event, since the placement of each child involves different factors and circumstances, the case should not be declared a class action under Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.

* * *

Before we commence an exploration of the facts and the questions of law which they present, it is essential that the issues be focused. The plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of the Family Court Act or the authority of Family Court judges to remove a non-delinquent child from his home on proper grounds. They do not contest the propriety of confining non-delinquent children in any secure setting. The issue they raise is limited to whether PINS may constitutionally be confined in the three named detention centers: Manida, Zerega and Spofford, and whether they may be held in custody in the same facilities as juvenile delinquents.

The Centers

On July 17th, 1970, the Appellate Divisions of the New York Supreme Court ordered an inquiry into the conditions, maintenance and management of Spofford, Manida and Zerega. Joseph Stone, Judge of the Criminal Court of New York City, Robert K. Ruskin, Commissioner of Investigation of the City, and Donald H. Goff, General Secretary of the Correctional Association of New York, were named as panel members. Their exhaustive and authoritative report, issued January 20th, 1971, commonly known as the Stone Report, states at its outset:

"The history of New York City's juvenile detention centers is a history of dead-end studies and investigations. Although many reports have been written and inadequacies, abuses and brutalities have been spotlighted, meaningful improvement has not been achieved."

There follows a description of nearly a score of inquiries (commencing with investigation of earlier facilities as far back as 1906) cataloguing countless deficiencies, but ending constantly in the frustration which has brought the constitutionality of those conditions before this court. The Stone Report recommended that Manida and Zerega be closed and that Spofford be used temporarily only for children who require maximum security detention. A contemporaneous study, "Juvenile Detention Problems in New York City," by the Citizens' Committee for Children of New York, Inc., recommended that "all the buildings now used for detention purposes should be closed or converted with reasonable speed."

We will refer hereafter to other relevant findings and recommendations of the Stone and Citizens' Committee Reports. We proceed to a resume of the facts as to the present physical conditions at the shelters, the restraints imposed on the children, and whether rehabilitative treatment is furnished them.

Physical Facilities and Restraints

Spofford: Spofford is "secure" not only from the outside world, but internally as well. The building is surrounded by a high wall. Although individual sleeping rooms are left open at night unless the particular child poses a risk to himself or others, the children (boys) are otherwise locked in their dormitories, recreation rooms or classrooms (Stipulation No. 2 and admitted allegations of Par. 20A (1) of the complaint). Each corridor of the building that leads to the dormitories, classrooms, dining halls or offices has metal doors at each end that are locked at all times. An electronically locked metal door controls movement in and out of the buildings. The windows are secured from inside by a screen made of institutional netting. Each screen is secured to the window by a frame which is hooked to the window frame, (Stipulation No. 2).

When boys arrive at Spofford their personal clothing is taken from them and they are issued uniforms of blue jeans and T-shirts on whose fronts is an institutional legend (admitted allegations of Par. 20A(6) of the complaint).

Manida: Manida is also surrounded by a high wall. The girls there are under lock and key: specifically, the doors to each unit, which contains an "op...

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