Martel v. HG Staffing, LLC
| Decision Date | 11 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 82161 |
| Citation | 515 P.3d 318 |
| Parties | Eddy MARTEL, a/k/a Martel-Rodriguez ; Mary Anne Capilla; Janice Jackson-Williams; and Whitney Vaughan, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, v. HG STAFFING, LLC; and MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC, d/b/a Grand Sierra Resort, Respondents. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Thierman Buck LLP and Joshua D. Buck, Mark R. Thierman, Joshua R. Hendrickson, and Leah L. Jones, Reno, for Appellants.
Littler Mendelson, P.C., and Diana G. Dickinson and Montgomery Y. Paek, Las Vegas, for Respondents.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.
Appellants filed a class action complaint against their former employer to obtain unpaid minimum and overtime wages. For various reasons, their claims were dismissed and denied. In this appeal from the district court's orders, we clarify five matters of employment law. First, a two-year limitations period applies to appellants’ wage claims. Second, a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is valid so long as the employer and the union objectively manifest their assent to the agreement. Third, when a valid CBA exists, individual employees lack standing to represent union members in a class-action lawsuit unless they allege that the union failed to fairly represent its members. Fourth, claims under NRS 608.040, which penalizes employers for failing to timely pay earned wages to former employees, cannot be utilized to recover wages that are time-barred under other statutes. And fifth, an employer that is a party to a CBA is exempt from Nevada's overtime statute, NRS 608.018, when the CBA provides overtime in a manner different from the statute. Because the district court adhered to this law in its orders and appellants failed to show a genuine issue of material fact, we affirm.
Between 2011 and 2015, appellants Eddy Martel, Mary Anne Capilla, Janice Jackson-Williams, and Whitney Vaughan (collectively, the Martel employees) worked at the Grand Sierra Resort (GSR) in Reno. Their employers, respondents HG Staffing, LLC, and MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC (collectively, HG Staffing), own and operate the GSR. All four Martel employees allege that during their employment they were required to complete tasks—such as attending meetings or classes, getting into uniform, or reconciling cash amounts—without pay. The Martel employees further allege that similarly situated employees were not paid for completing the same tasks. Employees at the GSR are generally members of the Culinary Workers Union Local 226 (the Culinary Union), which maintains a CBA with HG Staffing.
In 2016, the Martel employees filed a putative class action asserting four claims. They alleged that HG Staffing failed to pay them for the work they completed in violation of (1) NRS 608.016 (); (2) the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) of Nevada's Constitution, Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16 (); (3) NRS 608.018 (); and (4) NRS 608.020 through NRS 608.050 ().
In the aggregate, the district court issued three orders in HG Staffing's favor that the Martel employees now challenge: (1) an order granting in part HG Staffing's motion to dismiss, (2) an order granting HG Staffing's motion for summary judgment, and (3) a clarification order explaining that the previous order for summary judgment extended to Jackson-Williams's individual claims. The procedural history underlying each of these orders is discussed below. In sum, all claims asserted by the Martel employees were resolved in favor of HG Staffing and did not proceed to trial. This appeal followed.
The district court did not err by granting in part HG Staffing's motion to dismiss
"A dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) is reviewed de novo." Eggleston v. Stuart , 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 51, 495 P.3d 482, 487 (2021). "A decision to dismiss a complaint under NRCP 12(b)(5) is rigorously reviewed on appeal with all alleged facts in the complaint presumed true and all inferences drawn in favor of the complainant." Id. Further, "[w]hen the facts are uncontroverted, ... the application of a statute of limitations to bar a claim is a question of law that this court reviews de novo." JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC , 136 Nev. 596, 598, 475 P.3d 52, 55 (2020).
A two-year limitations period applies to the Martel employees’ claims arising under NRS Chapter 608
Collectively, the Martel employees worked at the GSR from 2011 to 2015. Relevant to our statute-of-limitations analysis, it is undisputed that the Martel employees ceased working at the GSR after the following dates: June 2013 (Vaughan), September 2013 (Capilla), June 2014 (Martel), and December 2015 (Jackson-Williams). The Martel employees filed their complaint on June 14, 2016. As noted, they asserted causes of action under NRS 608.016, NRS 608.018, and NRS 608.020 through NRS 608.050. HG Staffing moved to dismiss all claims that accrued before June 14, 2014, on the ground that they were subject to a two-year limitations period. The district court agreed and dismissed all claims asserted by Vaughan and Capilla, all but one day of Martel's claims, and all but 18 months of Jackson-Williams's claims.
The Martel employees argue that the district court erred by dismissing the foregoing statutory claims because they are subject to a three-year limitations period. They argue that NRS 608.260, which governs claims for statutory minimum wages, expressly provides that an action must be brought within two years, whereas the other wage statutes are silent in this regard. Thus, they argue that NRS 11.190(3)(a) claims under the doctrine of analogous limitations. We agree with HG Staffing.
While we previously held that claims under NRS 608.016, NRS 608.018, and NRS 608.020 through 608.050 can be asserted as private causes of action, see Neville v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 133 Nev. 777, 782-83, 406 P.3d 499, 504 (2017), we have yet to address which limitations period applies to claims brought under these statutes. We now clarify that the Martel employees’ claims under these statutes are governed by a two-year limitations period under the doctrine of analogous limitations, which provides that "when a statute lacks an express limitations period, courts look to analogous causes of action for which an express limitations period is available either by statute or by case law." Perry v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 132 Nev. 767, 770-71, 383 P.3d 257, 260 (2016) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute as stated, in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Props., Inc., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 3, 503 P.3d 299 (2022).
In Perry , we applied the doctrine of analogous limitations and held that minimum-wage claims brought under the MWA are subject to a two-year limitations period.
Id. at 773-74, 383 P.3d at 262. We recognized that although the MWA includes no express limitations period, such a claim "remains most closely analogous to one statute, NRS 608.260, which [] carries a two-year limitations period."1 Perry, 132 Nev. at 773, 383 P.3d at 262 (emphasis added); see also Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16 (B) (). This is because a minimum-wage claim under the MWA "closely resembles, if it is not in fact, an action for back pay under NRS 608.260." Perry, 132 Nev. at 771, 383 P.3d at 260.
The doctrine of analogous limitations, however, was recently superseded by statute. See Thunder Props., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 3, 503 P.3d at 304 n.3 (citing 2021 Nev. Stat., ch. 161, § 2, at 723-24 ( NRS 11.220 )). Yet, as we explained, this statutory amendment applies only prospectively. Id. ; see 2021 Nev. Stat., ch. 161, § 3, at 724 (). Thus, claims that were commenced before the 2021 amendatory provisions of NRS 11.220 became effective—such as the Martel employees’ claims—are still subject to the doctrine of analogous limitations.
Having considered the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the district court properly applied the doctrine of analogous limitations and that a two-year limitations period applies to the Martel employees’ statutory claims. A two-year limitations period creates consistent application of the law, chiefly because " NRS 608.115 requires employers to maintain an employee's record of wages for [only] two years." Perry, 132 Nev. at 773, 383 P.3d at 262. Like the analysis in Perry , if we accepted the Martel employees’ invitation to apply a three-year limitations period to this dispute, "an employee could bring a claim after the employer is no longer legally obligated to keep the record of wages for the employee."2 Id. Thus, uniformity of law requires the application of a two-year limitations period to the Martel employees’ claims under NRS 608.016, NRS 608.018, and NRS 608.020 through 608.050.
The Martel employees’ claims under NRS 608.016 are similar to back-pay claims under NRS 608.260 because they both seek to recover unpaid wages. Further, their claims are analogous to claims under the MWA because, if an employee is not paid wages, they have not received the minimum wage. See Nev. Const, art. 15, § 16 (A) . Because the Martel employees are seeking wages that were allegedly not paid, i.e., they received less than the minimum wage, they are functionally asserting claims under NRS 608.260 and the MWA, both of...
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