Martel v. Stafford

Decision Date08 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-126,90-126
Citation603 A.2d 345,157 Vt. 604
PartiesScott MARTEL v. George F. STAFFORD, Administrator of the Estate of Wilhelmina S. Parker and Ronald J. Gould.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Patricia S. Orr and Robert E. Manchester of Manchester Law Offices, P.C., Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant.

Barbara E. Cory of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington, for defendant-appellee.

Before GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ., and MANDEVILLE, District Judge, Specially Assigned.

DOOLEY, Justice.

On April 18, 1985, plaintiff, Scott Martel, was a passenger in a car being driven by Ronald Gould when it collided with a car driven by Wilhelmina Parker. Ms. Parker died from injuries incurred in the accident. Alleging that he had incurred injuries as a result of the drivers' negligence, plaintiff sued Gould and defendant George Stafford, executor of Parker's estate, on April 18, 1988. The Rutland Superior Court dismissed the action as filed beyond the limitation period imposed by 12 V.S.A. § 557(a), and this appeal followed. 1 We affirm.

It is undisputed that if the limitation period in 12 V.S.A. § 557(a) controls, this action is barred. That statute provides that if a person, against whom an action may be brought, dies before the expiration of the time within which the action may be commenced, the normal limitation period ceases to operate as of the date of death. Then:

[a]fter the issuance of letters testamentary ... such action, if the cause of action survives, may be commenced ... against the executor or administrator within two years, and not after.

Wilhelmina Parker died two days after the accident, and the normal limitation period for tort actions ceased to operate on that date. Letters of Administration were issued to defendant Stafford by the Orphans' Court in Montgomery County, Maryland, on May 21, 1985. 2 The two-year period set by § 557(a) expired in May of 1987. This action was commenced some eleven months after that period expired. 3

Plaintiff argues, however, that the limitation period has not expired for two reasons: (a) the limitation period contained in 12 V.S.A. § 557(a) is tolled by virtue of 14 V.S.A. § 1202; (b) 12 V.S.A. § 557(a) denies plaintiff due process of law unless actual notice is given to plaintiff of the issuance of letters testamentary to defendant Stafford. We take these claims in order.

The statute on which plaintiff relies provides in part The running of any statute of limitations measured from some event other than death and advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspended during the four months following the first publication of notice under section 1201 of this title but resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the sections which follow.

14 V.S.A. § 1202. Plaintiff argues that § 1202 applies since 12 V.S.A. § 557(a) is a statute of limitations and it is measured from an event other than death or the advertisement of claims. As a result, plaintiff argues, the running of the two-year period set forth in 12 V.S.A. § 557(a) was tolled from the opening of the estate until four months after notice to creditors was given under § 1201. Since no notice was given, as detailed below, plaintiff argues that § 1202 continues to toll the statute of limitations period to this day.

Section 1202 is part of a group of statutes governing the presentation of claims to the executor of an estate and is ancillary to a statute commonly referred to as a "nonclaim statute." The nonclaim statute set forth in 14 V.S.A. § 1203 bars certain claims that are not formally presented to the estate within a specified time. The process begins with a notice to creditors under Rule 64(a) of the Vermont Rules of Probate Procedure. That notice includes notice by publication and notice by first class mail "to any creditor known to or reasonably ascertainable by the executor." Id. However, the probate court can excuse the executor from giving notice because, among other reasons, "there are no debts existing against the decedent." 14 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(1). Defendant certified on August 27, 1985 that no debts existed against the decedent, and the Rutland Probate Court on August 30, 1985 ordered that defendant was excused from publishing a notice to creditors. 4

The core of plaintiff's argument is that defendant improperly certified that no debts existed when he knew or should have known of plaintiff's negligence claim. If we accept this premise, then defendant should have given notice to plaintiff within thirty days of being issued letters testamentary, presumably by first class mail. See V.R.P.P. 64(a). Plaintiff asserts that the only possible remedy for this violation of defendant's duty is to toll the limitation period until notice is given.

A weakness in plaintiff's argument arises from treatment of tort claims under Vermont's nonclaim statute. The central statutory provision is 14 V.S.A. § 1203(a), which provides that most claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent are barred unless presented to the executor within four months following the first notice to creditors, or presented within three years if no notice to creditors has been published. However, the statute does not apply to "claims for injury to the person and damage to property suffered by the act or default of the deceased." Id. The negligence claim that plaintiff asserts against defendant fits within this exclusion. Thus, defendant argues that in view of the exclusion, the tolling period set forth in § 1202 does not apply at all.

The parties' arguments hinge on several elements of a complicated statutory scheme. As we must consider all of the statutes together, State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, ----, 594 A.2d 426, 428 (1991), and implement the intent of the Legislature as best it can be determined, In re Walker, 156 Vt. 639, ----, 588 A.2d 1058, 1059 (1991), we will evaluate the arguments in light of the overall statutory scheme. The superstructure of these statutes is taken from Part 8 of Article III of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC). See 8 U.L.A. §§ 3-801--3-803. However, Vermont adopted the UPC provisions only with some significant amendments. While the UPC's nonclaim statute applies to all claims, including tort claims, see UPC §§ 1-201 (definition of claims), 3-803(a) (nonclaim statute), Vermont's version excludes certain tort claims as well as claims for possession of or title to real estate. 14 V.S.A. § 1203(a). The UPC four-month tolling period begins at death, UPC § 3-802, while Vermont's otherwise identical version commences on proper notice to creditors. 14 V.S.A. § 1202.

Despite the differences between the Vermont and UPC versions, it is helpful to examine the intent of the UPC drafters. Cf. State v. D'Amico, 136 Vt. 153, 156, 385 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1978). Under the Code, "four months is added to the normal period of limitations by reason of a debtor's death before a debt is barred." Comment to Uniform Probate Code § 3-802. The section also mandates that the claimant look to the applicable statute of limitations as well as the nonclaim provisions in § 3-803. Id. The clear purpose is to give the claimant an opportunity to seek satisfaction from the estate's personal representative before bringing suit. The breadth of the UPC claims limitation statute explains the breadth of the Code's tolling provision. Since all claims must be presented, the UPC tolls all statutes of limitation for a four-month period to allow claims to be presented to and resolved by the personal representative. The Vermont exceptions to the claims required to be presented to the executor render a blanket tolling provision unnecessary although the draftsmen of 14 V.S.A. § 1202 failed to constrict the version they adopted in § 1203(a).

That omission is particularly apparent when we examine the notice-to-creditors provisions of § 1201 and V.R.P.P. 64. The rule provides that the notice state that creditors must "present their claims within four months after the date of first publication of the notice or be forever barred from their claims." V.R.P.P. 64(a). Official Form 32 implements this provision by informing the creditor that a claim must be presented within four months or it "will be forever barred." The notice is clearly wrong with respect to one whose claim is excluded from the operation of 14 V.S.A. § 1203(a).

Unfortunately, the statutes in this area are hardly a "seamless web." 5 Defendant urges that we reconcile them by holding that a tort claimant is not a creditor for purposes of 14 V.S.A. §§ 1201, 1202. This approach is tempting because it responds directly to the statutory inconsistencies. The terminology comes from the UPC, however, and is clearly intended to cover tort claimants. The UPC equates the term "creditor" with one who holds a claim against the estate, and the term "claim" is specifically defined to include tort claims. See UPC § 1-201(4) (claims include liabilities arising in tort); General Comment to UPC Article III, Part 8 (purpose of the part is to achieve uniformity in the law "regarding creditors' claims"); 14 V.S.A. § 1203(a) (section covers all claims against an estate including tort claims); Corlett v. Smith, 106 N.M. 207, 210, 740 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Ct.App.1987) (under New Mexico version of UPC, claim includes tort claim). 6 We hold that plaintiff is a claimant or creditor for purposes of 14 V.S.A. §§ 1201 and 1202.

On the plain meaning of § 1202, the result on these facts is the same. Plaintiff argues that the section tolls the statute of limitations until four months after the notice is given to creditors, an event that has not yet occurred. The language of § 1202, however, adds four months to the applicable statute of limitations only where notice is given to creditors under 14 V.S.A. § 1201. In this case, there was no notice to creditors, and the tolling provision did not apply. 7 We...

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    ...absolute. Because our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to implement the intent of the Legislature, Martel v. Stafford, 157 Vt. 604, 608, 603 A.2d 345, 347 (1991), we must construe the term "personal documents" in a limited sense to apply only when the privacy of the individual is i......
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
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    ...Costs to appellees. 1 Appellant also appealed the superior court's entry of judgment, but to no avail. See Martel v. Stafford, 157 Vt. 604, 605-06, 603 A.2d 345, 346 (1991) (affirming dismissal of Vermont action).2 During the pendency of the proceedings, Stafford died and Marilyn S. Elias, ......
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