Martell v. Gen. Motors LLC

• Decision Date: 06 October 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:20-cv-284-SI
• Citation: 492 F.Supp.3d 1131
• Parties: William MARTELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

492 F.Supp.3d 1131

William MARTELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 3:20-cv-284-SI

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

Signed October 6, 2020

John E. Tangren, Daniel R. Ferri, and Adam J. Levitt, Dicello Levitt Gutzler llc, Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor, Chicago, IL 60602; Kim D. Stephens, Tousley Brain Stephens pllc, 1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200, Seattle, WA 98101; and W. Daniel "Dee" Miles III, H. Clay Barnett III, and J. Mitch Williams, Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles pc, 272 Commerce Street, Montgomery, AL 36104. Of Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class.

April N. Ross and Kathleen Taylor Sooy, Crowell & Moring llp, 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004; and Jennifer L. Campbell and Stephanie C. Holmberg, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt pc, 1211 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1900, Portland, OR 97204. Of Attorneys for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge Plaintiff William Martell brings this putative class action against General Motors LLC (GM or Defendant), alleging breach of express warranty, violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), fraudulent omission, violation of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practice Act (UTPA), and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff asserts all claims on behalf of an Oregon statewide class, except the MMWA claim, which he brings on behalf of a nationwide class. Plaintiff seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. GM moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim and to strike the class allegations. For the reasons below, GM's motion to dismiss and to strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc. , 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co. , 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) ; Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n , 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint "may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The court must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solution , 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The court need not, however, credit the plaintiff's legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to "plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Starr , 652 F.3d at 1216. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell , 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).

B. Standing

The U.S. Constitution confers limited authority on the federal courts to hear only active cases or controversies brought by persons who demonstrate standing. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546-47, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) ; Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. , 568 U.S. 85, 89-90, 133 S.Ct. 721, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013). Standing "limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong." Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1547. To have standing, a plaintiff must have "personal interest ... at the commencement of the litigation." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). The required personal interest must satisfy three elements throughout the litigation: (1) an injury in fact, i.e. , an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury-in-fact and the defendant's challenged behavior; and (3) likelihood that the injury-in-fact will be redressed by a favorable ruling. Id. at 180-81, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693 ; see also Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1547.

A plaintiff "must show standing with respect to each form of relief sought." Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 657 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2011). To establish Article III standing to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must "allege either ‘continuing, present adverse effects’ " of a defendant's past illegal conduct, "or ‘a sufficient likelihood that [he] will again be wronged in a similar way.’ " Villa v. Maricopa Cty. , 865 F.3d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton , 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), and City of L.A. v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ). Additionally, standing to seek equitable relief requires "a showing of an inadequate remedy at law and ... a serious risk of irreparable harm." Pulliam v. Allen , 466 U.S. 522, 537, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) ; see also O'Shea , 414 U.S. at 499, 94 S.Ct. 669.

When a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief, threat of repeated future injury may suffice to provide standing. See Nordstrom v. Ryan , 762 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2014). As explained by the Ninth Circuit:

A plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive relief "must demonstrate ‘that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of [the violation].’ " Armstrong v. Davis , 275 F.3d 849, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. California , 543 U.S. 499, 504–05, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005). A threat of repetition can be shown "at least two ways." Id. at 861. "First, a plaintiff may show that the defendant had, at the time of the injury, a written policy, and that the injury ‘stems from’ that policy." Id. "Second, the plaintiff may demonstrate that the harm is part of a ‘pattern of officially sanctioned ... behavior, violative of the plaintiffs' [federal] rights.’ " Id. (alterations in original) (quoting LaDuke v. Nelson , 762 F.2d 1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985) ).

Id. (emphasis and alterations in original). The threat of repeated future injury, however, may not be "conjectural or hypothetical."

O'Shea , 414 U.S. at 494, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974) (quotation marks omitted).

BACKGROUND

In 2011, Plaintiff bought a 2011 Chevrolet Silverado equipped with a Generation IV 5.3 Liter V8 Vortec 5300 LC9 engine (Subject Engine) from a Chevrolet dealership in The Dalles, Oregon (Dealership). Plaintiff's car was covered by GM's standard five-year warranty. In 2015, Plaintiff noticed that his vehicle was consuming excessive engine oil. Plaintiff continued to have related engine problems, causing him to need repeated service from the Dealership. Throughout 2015 and 2016, the Dealership repeatedly told Plaintiff that his oil consumption level was normal.

In late 2016, Plaintiff's counsel investigated a suspected Oil Consumption Defect. In July 2017, Plaintiff's Dealership conducted an oil consumption test on Plaintiff's car. Upon receiving the results of this test—confirming the vehicle was using excessive oil—Plaintiff joined a class action lawsuit in the Northern District of California (the Sloan Action) on August 31, 2017. See Sloan v. General Motors LLC , Case No. 3:16-cv-07244-EMC (N.D. Cal.). Plaintiff was dismissed from the Sloan Action on February 11, 2020 because, after several decisions applying the U.S. Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017), the court in the Sloan Action found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. See Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC , 438 F.Supp.3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 19, 2020, alleging that the Subject Engine is defectively designed. Compl. (ECF 1). Plaintiff alleges that the primary cause of the Oil Consumption Defect is that the "piston rings that GM installed within the [Subject Engines] do not maintain sufficient tension to keep oil in the crankcase." Compl. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff also alleges other problems, including issues with the Active Fuel Management System, the Positive Crankcase Ventilation (PCV) system, the Oil Life Monitoring System, and the oil pressure gauge indicator on the dashboard. He contends that GM knew of and intentionally concealed the Oil Consumption Defect and that GM has failed to compensate Plaintiff and the putative class members.

DISCUSSION

GM moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. GM further argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to request injunctive relief and also moves to dismiss Plaintiff's nationwide MMWA claim under Rule 12(b)(1). In the alternative, GM moves to strike Plaintiff's class...