Martell v. White

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: HAMMOND
• Citation: 69 N.E. 1085,185 Mass. 255
• Parties: MARTELL v. WHITE et al.
• Decision Date: 01 March 1904

185 Mass. 255
69 N.E. 1085

MARTELL
v.
WHITE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

March 1, 1904.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Norfolk County; Robt. R. Bishop, Judge.

Action of tort by one Martell against one White and others for conspiracy to injure plaintiff's business. Verdict was ordered for defendants, and plaintiff excepted. Exceptions sustained.

INJURY TO BUSINESS-CONSPIRACY-COERCION-FINES.

1. Defendants, granite manufacturers of a city, formed an association, a by-law of which provided that any member having business transactions with any other such manufacturer of the city in relation to granite should, for each such transaction, contribute to the association's expenses from $1 to $500; the amount to be determined by the association. By means of fines from $10 to $100 on members for dealings with plaintiff, his business was ruined. Held, that though the association's object was competition, which is not illegal, the means-coercion by fines-were illegal, so that defendants were liable for the injury.

Charles W. Bartlett and Elbridge [185 Mass. 255]R. Anderson, for plaintiff.

James E. Cotter and John W. McAnarney, for defendants.

HAMMOND, J.

The evidence warranted the finding of the following facts, many of which were not in dispute: The plaintiff was engaged in a profitable business in quarrying granite and selling the same to granite workers in Quincy and vicinity. About January, 1899, his customers left him, and his business was ruined, through the action of the defendants and their associates. The defendants were all members of a voluntary association known as the Granite Manufacturers' Association of Quincy, Mass., and some of them were on the executive committee. The association was composed of ‘such individuals, firms, or corporations as are, or are about to become manufacturers, quarriers, or polishers of granite.’ There was no constitution, and, while there were by-laws, still, except as hereinafter stated, [185 Mass. 256]there was in them no statement of the objects for which the association was formed. The by-laws provided, among other things, for the admission, suspension, and expulsion of members, the election of officers, including an executive committee, and defined the respective powers and duties of the officers. One of the by-laws read as follows: ‘For the purpose of defraying in part the expense of the maintenance of this organization, any member thereof having business transactions with any party or concern in Quincy or its vicinity, not members hereof, and in

[69 N.E. 1086]

any way relating to the cutting, quarrying, polishing, buying or selling of granite (hand polishers excepted) shall for each of said transactions contribute at least $1 and not more than $500. The amount to be fixed by the association upon its determining the amount and nature of said transaction.’ Acting under the by-laws, the association investigated charges which were made against several of its members that they had purchased granite from a party ‘not a member’ of the association. The charges were proved, and, under the section above quoted, it was voted that the offending parties ‘should respectively contribute to the funds of the association’ the sums named in the votes. These sums ranged from $10 to $100. Only the contribution of $100 has been paid, but it is a fair inference that the proceedings to collect the others have been delayed only by reason of this suit. The party ‘not a member’ was the present plaintiff, and the members of the association knew it. Most of the customers of the plaintiff were members of the association, and after these proceedings they declined to deal with him. This action on their part was due to the course of the association in compelling them to contribute as above stated, and to their fear that a similar vote for contribution would be passed, should they continue to trade with the plaintiff. The jury might properly have found, also, that the euphemistic expression, ‘shall contribute to the funds of the association,’ contained an idea which could be more tersely and accurately expressed by the phrase ‘shall pay a fine,’ or, in other words, that the plain intent of the section was to provide for the imposition upon those who came within its provisions of a penalty in the nature of a substantial fine. The bill of exceptions recites that ‘there was no evidence of threats or intimidation [185 Mass. 257]practiced upon the plaintiff himself, and the acts complained of were confined to the action of the society upon its own members.’ We understand this statement to mean simply that the acts of the association concerned only such of the plaintiff's customers as were members, and that no pressure was brought to bear upon the plaintiff, except such as fairly resulted from action upon his customers. While it is true that the by-law was not directed expressly against the plaintiff by name, still he belonged to the class whose business it was intended to affect, and the proceedings actually taken were based upon transactions with him alone, and in that way were directed against his business alone. It was the intention of the defendants to withdraw his customers from him, if possible, by the imposition of fines upon them, with the knowledge that the result would be a great loss to the plaintiff. The defendants must be presumed to have intended the natural result of their acts. Here, then, is a clear and deliberate interference with the business of a person, with the intention of causing damage to him, and ending in that result. The defendants combined and conspired together to ruin the plaintiff in his business, and they accomplished their purpose. In all this, have they kept within lawful bounds? It is elemental that the unlawfulness of a conspiracy may be found either in the end sought, or the means to be used. If either is unlawful, within the meaning of the term as applied to the subject, then the conspiracy is unlawful. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine into the nature of the conspiracy in this case, both as to the object sought and the means used.

The case presents one phase of a general subject which gravely concerns the interests of the business world, and, indeed, those of all organized society, and which in recent years has demanded and received great consideration in the courts and elsewhere. Much remains to be done to clear the atmosphere, but some things, at least, appear to have been settled; and certainly at this stage of the judicial inquiry it cannot be necessary to enter upon a course of reasoning or to cite authorities in support of the proposition that, while a person must submit to competition, he has the right to be protected from malicious interference with his business. The rule is well stated in [185 Mass. 258]Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 564, in the following language: ‘Every one has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill, and credit. He has no right to be protected against competition, but he has a...