Martellini v. Little Angels Day Care, Inc.

Decision Date18 March 2004
Docket NumberNo. 2002-597-Appeal.,2002-597-Appeal.
Citation847 A.2d 838
PartiesPaul M. MARTELLINI et al. v. LITTLE ANGELS DAY CARE, INC., et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

William M. Dolan, III, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Daryl Dayian, Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and FLANDERS, GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY and SUTTELL, JJ.

OPINION

FLAHERTY, Justice.

The fate of a family day care home in a residential subdivision in the town of Johnston and the enforcement of a restrictive covenant threatening its continued operation are the subjects of this dispute. A justice of the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant day care home and its operators. Two aggrieved neighbors appealed that judgment. We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

Several neighbors living on or around Paula Lane, Johnston, brought suit against defendants, a family day care home called the Little Angels Day Care, Inc., its sole officer and care provider, Carol M. Breault, and her husband, Michael A. Breault (hereinafter defendants). The Breaults reside at 6 Paula Lane, where the family day care home operates from a finished basement and fenced-in yard. Little Angels is approved to care for "8 children, no more than 4 under 18 months" pursuant to a license issued by the Department of Children, Youth, and Families.1 In June 2001, Carol Breault applied to the Town of Johnston for a license to operate a business.2 Several neighbors opposed issuance of the license. They submitted a petition to the town voicing concern over the alleged violation of the protective covenant recorded in their residential subdivision. The town council tabled the matter and, to date, no vote has been taken on the license application. In the meantime, however, Little Angels continues to operate.

Looking for relief from the courts, approximately fourteen neighbors sought a Superior Court injunction ordering the cessation of "all business activities," including family day care services, on the Breault property. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of the restrictive covenant governing the parties' property, which states that "[s]aid premises shall be used solely and exclusively for single family private residence purposes."3 A justice of the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants after the parties agreed that no issues of material fact remained in dispute.4 In so ruling, the justice determined that "this is a plain old, regular daycare facility, caring for up to eight children as permitted by the zoning laws and that it is sufficiently analogous to the Gregory case for the [c]ourt to conclude the restrictive convenant [sic] does not apply as a matter of public policy." The motion justice relied on this Court's decision in Gregory v. State Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, 495 A.2d 997 (R.I.1985), in which a proposed group home for six mentally retarded adults was held not to contravene a restrictive covenant limiting the real estate lot to "only a single one family dwelling house * * * [to be used] for private residential purposes only." Id. at 998. In that case, the Court determined that the home had the primary purpose and function of a family housekeeping unit and that compensation for services performed there did not render its activities commercial in nature. Moreover, the Court held that the group home did not threaten the day-to-day activities of the surrounding homes and that the quality of life and character of the neighborhood would still be preserved. Id. at 1001-02.

In addition to Gregory, the motion justice relied on the state zoning law that affirmatively allows operation of family day care homes in residential areas. General Laws 1956 § 45-24-37, entitled "General provisions — Permitted uses," states the following in subsection (b) concerning zoning ordinances for towns and cities:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the following uses are permitted uses within all residential zoning use districts of a municipality and all industrial and commercial zoning use districts except where residential use is prohibited for public health or safety reasons: (1) Households; (2) Community residences; (3) Family day care homes." (Emphasis added.)

Section 45-24-31(18) defines "Family Day Care Home" as "Any home other than the individual's home in which day care in lieu of parental care or supervision is offered at the same time to six (6) or less individuals who are not relatives of the care giver, but may not contain more than a total of eight (8) individuals receiving day care."5 Based on public policy demonstrated by decisional and statutory law, the motion justice deemed the restrictive covenant inapplicable to Little Angels. We do not agree, and hold that defendants' family day care home is subject to the straightforward language of the restrictive covenant at issue in this case.

Two of the fourteen plaintiffs below, Paul M. Martellini and Karen L. Luis,6 appealed to this Court on the limited legal issue of whether the operation of the family day care home violated the restrictive covenant, which limits the use of the Paula Lane properties for "single family private residence purposes." They take issue with the motion justice's construction of the covenant and her decision regarding its application and enforceability. The plaintiffs assert that the restrictive covenant is unambiguous and that it bars the operation of any business from property on Paula Lane. They argue that the Breault home is not being used "solely and exclusively" as a single-family private residence, as required by covenant, and that the restriction legitimately prevents defendants from using their property as fully as zoning laws might allow. Finally, plaintiffs deny defendants' suggestion that enforcement of the restriction would be inequitable due to the unclean hands of other Paula Lane residents who allegedly maintain business addresses or activities at their homes. The defendants maintain that the restrictive covenant is unenforceable and inapplicable for a number of reasons. They contend that it is inapplicable as to them because they did not receive actual or constructive notice of the restrictive covenant from their deed. Moreover, they allege that other Paula Lane residents operate business activities out of their homes and that plaintiffs therefore are barred from enforcing the restriction based on the doctrine of unclean hands. While they characterize the language of the covenant as ambiguous, they nonetheless contend that operation of the family day care home is consistent with the covenant, is authorized by zoning law, and is consistent with applicable case law. They further commend the hearing justice's articulation of public policy and urge us to agree that children are best raised in a family setting such as that found at Little Angels on Paula Lane.

The Restrictive Covenant

Before determining if the restrictive covenant impacts the operation of Little Angels, we first must consider whether the covenant is valid and applicable to these defendants. We conclude defendants' claim of lack of notice and unclean hands to be without merit. Although defendants may have been without actual notice of the restrictive covenant from their deed, they were certainly on constructive notice of the restrictive covenant for the subdivision that was duly recorded in September 1996 and that specifically affected their property. Any competent title search would have revealed these restrictions on the use of the properties in the subdivision. The defendants' assertions of arbitrary enforcement and unclean hands are likewise of no assistance to them. First, based on the record before us, the so-called business activities of other Paula Lane neighbors, plaintiffs below who are not party to this appeal, appear at best to be merely incidental to the residential use of their homes. Moreover, the appellants are correct that lilt is only when the plaintiff's improper conduct is the source, or part of the source, of his equitable claim, that he is to be barred because of this [bad] conduct." Rodrigues v. Santos, 466 A.2d 306, 311 (R.I.1983) (quoting Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 46 (1973)). Hence, because plaintiffs' alleged business activities are not in any way the source of their equitable claim, the doctrine of unclean hands is unavailing for defendants as a bar to plaintiffs' claim.

Propriety of Summary Judgment

Having disposed of those arguments, we now look to see, if summary judgment was properly denied to plaintiffs and granted to defendants. We review the grant of summary judgment on a de novo basis, see Johnson v. Newport County Chapter for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 799 A.2d 289, 291 (R.I.2002)

(citing Marr Scaffolding Co. v. Fairground Forms, Inc., 682 A.2d 455, 457 (R.I.1996)). We look only to the legal issues before us, as the parties agree that no genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute. We must decide whether the valid restrictive covenant affecting Paula Lane precludes the operation of a family day care home such as Little Angels and, if so, whether such a restriction is unenforceable as against public policy.

We begin our analysis by interpreting the terms of the restrictive covenant at issue. In so doing, it is worthy of mention that although we may look for guidance from other cases in which restrictive covenants are interpreted, we must decide this case on an ad hoc basis because each case presents "such a wide spectrum of differing circumstances[,]" see Hanley v. Misischi, 111 R.I. 233, 238, 302 A.2d 79, 82 (1973),

and because "the specific effects of applying restrictions can vary, depending on the land and covenants involved[.]" Ridgewood Homeowners Association v. Mignacca, 813 A.2d 965, 971 (R.I.2003); see also Belliveau v. O'Coin, 557 A.2d 75, 77 (R.I.1989); Gregory, 495 A.2d at 1000-01. Notwithstanding the somewhat elastic nature of this analysis, there are principles to...

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    ...Kingston Hill Acad. v. Chariho Reg'l Sch. Dist., 21 A.3d 264, 270 (R.I. 2011) (citing Martellini v. Little Angels Day Care, Inc., 847 A.2d 838, 842 (R.I. 2004)). "However, '[i]t is only when the [defendant's] improper conduct is the source, or part of the source, of [its] equitable claim, t......
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