Martello v. Hawley

• Decision Date: 23 February 1962
• Docket Number: No. 16258.,16258.
• Citation: 300 F.2d 721,112 US App. DC 129
• Parties: Joseph MARTELLO et al., Appellants, v. Thelma HAWLEY, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

112 US App. DC 129, 300 F.2d 721 (1962)

Joseph MARTELLO et al., Appellants, v. Thelma HAWLEY, Appellee.

No. 16258.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued November 10, 1961.

Decided February 23, 1962.

Mr. John F. Gionfriddo, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Mr. Robert H. Reiter, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before WILBUR K. MILLER, Chief Judge, and FAHY and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges.

BASTIAN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal, granted by this court, from a decision of the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 168 A.2d 529 (1961). As stated by that court, the case presents "one of the questions raised but not answered in McKenna v. Austin." 77 U.S. App.D.C. 228, 134 F.2d 659, 148 A.L.R. 1253 (1943). The court proceeded to that unanswered question. Appellant in that court is appellee here.

The facts of the case are briefly stated in the opinion of the Municipal Court of Appeals:

"Hawley, while a passenger in an automobile operated by Robert Caughman, was injured when that automobile collided with one owned by Iler M. Martello and driven by Joseph Martello. Caughman\'s insurer paid Hawley $700 in settlement and obtained a release. Thereafter Hawley brought this action against the Martellos. As one defense they pleaded the release given Caughman, and by third-party complaint they asked judgment against Caughman `for all or a contributable portion of any judgment\' rendered against them. A jury found in favor of Hawley against the Martellos for $2000, and in favor of the Martellos against Caughman `for contribution,\' it being stipulated by all parties that the amount of contribution should be set by the court. The court entered judgment for Hawley against the Martellos for $1000 and ruled that Caughman was not liable for contribution."

We interpret the last sentence of this quotation to mean that the release for $700 wiped out Caughman's obligation with respect to the payment of any additional sum, either to Hawley or to the Martellos, by reason of the jury's verdict. This comports with our policy of according protective finality to out-of-court settlements by tort-feasors. McKenna v. Austin, supra.

It is to be noted that the issue as to contribution was submitted to the jury to determine only whether Caughman should be compelled to contribute, that is, the jury was to determine whether or not Caughman was actually at fault with the Martellos in bringing about the injury to Hawley. The trial court obviously determined, in the face of the jury's finding that Caughman should contribute, that the verdict should be modified by one-half and entered a judgment of $1000 for Hawley against the Martellos.

The Municipal Court of Appeals stated the problem before it thus:

"In ordering judgment fixed at one half of the verdict, the trial court undoubtedly was guided by certain language found in McKenna. The exact holding in McKenna was `no more than that "Partial satisfaction taken in compromise and release of liability of one or some of the wrongdoers does not discharge the others"\'; but there was a lengthy discussion of what effect such holding might have on the question of contribution between joint tort-feasors when one settles and judgment is had against the other.

"McKenna suggested that no difficulty would arise when the judgment is less than twice the amount of the settlement, saying that the settler could recover from the other wrongdoer, by way of contribution, the amount necessary to equalize their payments. This suggestion has apparently been followed and approved in Otis v. Thomas, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 262 F.2d 232, where after a verdict for $3500 judgment was entered for one half of the verdict because of previous settlement with one of the tort-feasors."

This court recognizes the fact that the suggestion in McKenna is dictum, and the court there recognized that fact by stating: "What we have said is not for the purpose of deciding these questions in advance of presentation or of foreclosing other possible solutions. Final consideration and determination may be left for the time when these issues are presented immediately."¹ Nor is Otis v. Thomas to the contrary. There we modified a judgment by eliminating a remittitur in favor of a releasing tort-feasor who was not before the court. The fact is that a determination of this precise issue must await a case directly in point.

The Municipal Court of Appeals continued its statement:

"McKenna, however, recognized the problem which would arise where the judgment exceeds twice the settlement. Two possible solutions were suggested; one, that the defendant pay the full amount of the judgment after deducting the amount paid in compromise; two, that the judgment be credited with one half of its amount and the defendant pay one half. The objection to the first solution was said to be that it would result in unequal contribution between tort-feasors, and the objection to the second that its result would be to cut down plaintiff\'s recovery. The choice between the solutions was left for future decision. We must now make that choice."

The Municipal Court of Appeals answered the question — incorrectly we think — by reversing, and directed the entry of judgment on the original verdict of $2000. It in effect held that the right to contribution was limited to credit for the amount paid by the tort-feasor settling but, because the jury was aware of the $700 settlement, concluded that the jury "must have awarded the $2000 as additional damages necessary to fully compensate Hawley."

It should be noted that the question posed by this case is not easily answered. Involved are basic principles not readily susceptible...