Martha K. Widham v. Town of Brattleboro

Decision Date07 February 1933
PartiesMARTHA K. WIDHAM v. TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO
CourtVermont Supreme Court

January Term, 1933.

View of Evidence on Motion for Directed Verdict---Highways---Towns---Liability for Damages Occasioned by Insufficiency or Lack or Repair of Culvert---Lack of Guard Rail as Insufficiency or Lack of Repair of Culvert---G. L 4615, as Amended by Acts 1921, No. 128---Trial---Jury Question---Binding Effect on Supreme Court of Undisputed Physical Facts Shown by Record---Insufficiency of Evidence To Make Question for Jury Whether Accident Took Place at Culvert.

1. On defendant's motion for directed verdict, evidence must be taken in light most favorable for plaintiff.

2. In

ACTION OF TORT against town under G. L. 4615, as amended by Acts 1921, No. 128, to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by insufficiency of culvert. Plea, general issue. Trial by jury at the April Term, 1932, Windham County Bicknell, J., presiding. Verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment thereon. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment reversed, and judgment for the defendant to recover its costs.

Frank E. Barber and Orrin B. Hughes for the defendant.

Carpenter & Clawson for the plaintiff.

Present POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and GRAHAM, JJ.

OPINION
MOULTON

This is an action in tort, brought under the provisions of G. L. 4615, as amended by No. 128, Acts of 1921, to recover for damages claimed to have been sustained by the insufficiency of a culvert which the defendant town was liable to keep in repair. The defects alleged were the lack of capacity of culvert to carry off the water, so that it became clogged with snow and ice and allowed water to flow and freeze upon the highway over the culvert, and the lack of a suitable guard rail. There was a trial by jury, with verdict for the plaintiff, and the case is before us on defendant's exceptions. These exceptions pertain to the refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict, to set aside the verdict, and to charge in accordance with certain written requests.

Taken as it must be, in the light most favorable for the plaintiff, the evidence tended to show the following facts: The culvert consisted of a 12-inch corrugated, galvanized iron pipe, and, at the center of the road, the top of it was 2 1/2 feet below the surface. At the outlet, on the easterly side of the highway, it was about four feet below the level of the traveled track. On this side the ground fell sharply away from the road toward the West River and the culvert pipe protruded from the bank for a distance of six feet and was covered by a rough masonry. On the westerly side, at the intake, there was a stone and cement header, the top of which was ten inches above the top of the pipe, and four inches below the surface of the center of the highway. The ground on this side is higher than the surface of the road, and there was a ditch and basin at the intake. The culvert was for the purpose of taking away the surface water and seepage and there was no defined stream passing through it.

The accident occurred on January 24, 1932, at about noon. The basin and intake of the culvert were filled with snow and ice, and the highway was covered with ice, and sloped from the center toward the east, where the culvert emerged from the bank. There was no guard rail on this side, although, at the edge of the traveled track (which was 18 feet in width) there was a raised shoulder three feet wide. The road was rough and uneven and three ruts or shallow trenches had been cut across it from a point near the intake, by whom did not appear.

The plaintiff was driving a Ford Cabriolet, equipped with chains on the rear wheels, in a northerly direction, at a rate of about 15 miles an hour. Her sister, Lillian Widham, was riding in the rumble seat, on the right-hand side. A Miss Ogren sat in the same seat, on the left side. As the car passed the cement header of the culvert, the front wheels fell into a depression in the road, and the car swayed to the right toward the river. The plaintiff turned the wheel to the left, the rear end of the car swung further to the right. She pressed the accelerator with her foot and the car plunged forward, and after colliding with a post set in the edge of the highway, went over the bank, and, striking some cribwork in its progress fell into the river, coming to rest at point distant 59 feet from the culvert. The details of the evidence, so far as material, will be considered later on.

In order that there may be liability on the part of the defendant town, under the statute upon which this action is predicated, it must appear that the accident which caused the injury occurred while the plaintiff was passing over the culvert in question, and that the insufficiency or want of repair of the structure itself was the direct cause of the injuries sustained. Ford v. Town of Braintree, 64 Vt. 144, 146, 23 A. 633. And, of course, it must also appear that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. Bigelow, Admr. v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 92 Vt. 423, 431, 105 A. 34. The lack of a guard rail, suitable to the place and condition, may constitute an insufficiency or want of repair of the culvert within the meaning of the act. Bigelow, Admr. v. Town of St. Johnsbury, supra; Bancroft v. Town of East Montpelier, 94 Vt. 163, 165, 109 A. 39; Maynard v. Town of Westfield, 87 Vt. 532, 537, 90 A. 504; Castle v. Town of Guilford, 86 Vt. 540, 546, 86 A. 804. Although written in regard to the former, and now repealed, law concerning the liability of towns for insufficiency of the highway, the words of Rowell, J., in Drew v. Sutton, 55 Vt. 586, 589, 590, 45 Am. Rep. 644, are applicable to the case of a culvert: "If a railing is lacking where one is necessary to the safety of travellers, the travelled way itself is thereby rendered unsafe and out of repair. And it makes no difference whether this necessity for a railing is created by the condition of things within the limits of the way or without the limits, but in dan- gerous proximity to the way. In either case the question is, Does the safety of the traveller require a railing? Is the road reasonably safe and sufficient without one?"

It is not claimed that the ice and inequalities on the roadway immediately over the culvert were the direct cause of the accident, but it is argued that this condition made the lack of a suitable guard rail such an insufficiency as imposed liability upon the defendant. Indeed, the evidence does not tend to show that the ice was the result of the condition of the culvert. True, there was ice in the ditches and basin and obstructing the pipe; but it did not rise above the cement header, which, according to all the witnesses who testified regarding it, projected one to one and one-half inches above the ice, and the top of the header itself was 4 inches below the surface of the road at the center of the highway. So the ice at the side of the road and at the intake of the culvert was at least 5 inches lower than the center of the traveled track, and, therefore, it is impossible to suppose that the obstruction of the culvert had anything to do with the icy condition of the roadway above it at least on the side toward the river. And so, too, there was no evidence connecting the culvert with the roughness and ruts in the highway at that point. The culvert pipe was not broken. In fact, so far as the ice and ruts were concerned, there seems to have been no difference between the highway at the culvert and the highway for some distance on either side of it.

Before considering whether this condition was such as required the erection and maintenance of a guard rail on the easterly side of the culvert, we may inquire whether there was evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the accident took place at that point, which, as we have seen, is a necessary element in establishing the liability of the defendant. In order to make a jury question it is not enough that there is some evidence tending to support the plaintiff's case; it must also be evidence of such quantity and character as to justify the jury, acting reasonably, to predicate a verdict in favor of the party having the burden of proof, and "though there is some evidence in the record tending to establish the claim, if the countervailing evidence so preponderates over it that it would be an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to set aside a plaintiff's verdict founded thereon, a motion for a defendant's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Village of St. Johnsbury v. Philip Cenedalla, Sr.,
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 5 Octubre 1937
    ... ... al. v. Grimes et al. , 100 Vt. 99, 105, 135 A ... 15; Town of Bennington v. Fillmore & Slade et ... al. , 98 Vt. 405, 417, 130 A ... inconsistent therewith. Widham v. Town of ... Brattleboro , 105 Vt. 210, 215, 166 A. 22; ... Riggie ... ...
  • Russell S. Page v. Thomas J. Mcgovern
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 3 Enero 1939
    ... ... that the undisputed physical facts, which as we have said in ... Widham v. Town of Brattleboro, 105 Vt. 210, ... 215, 166 A. 22, and other cases, ... ...
  • Zeno's Bakery, Inc. v. State
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 2 Mayo 1933
    ... ... same extent that a town is liable under the provisions of G ... L. 4615, 4617, and 4618. There ...          To the ... same effect are Widham v. Brattleboro, 105 ... Vt. 210, 166 A. 22, and Mobus v ... Waitsfield, ... ...
  • Wagner v. Village of Waterbury
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 1 Febrero 1938
    ... ... Woodcock's Admr. v. Hallock, supra, at ... page 289; Town of Sharon v. Anahama Realty ... Co., 97 Vt. 336, 123 A. 192; Hunter v ... particular case. Mobus v. Waitsfield, 75 ... Vt. 122, 53 A. 775; Widham v. Brattleboro, ... 105 Vt. 210, 166 A. 22; Zeno's Bakery v ... State, ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT