Martha Raphael v. Spencer Trask
Decision Date | 02 May 1904 |
Docket Number | No. 229,229 |
Citation | 24 S.Ct. 647,194 U.S. 272,48 L.Ed. 973 |
Parties | MARTHA RAPHAEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Nathaniel Raphael, Deceased, Appt. , v. SPENCER TRASK, George Foster Peabody, Edwin M. Bulkley, Charles J. Peabody, and Acosta Nichols |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This suit was begun by filing a bill in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, seeking an injunction restraining the defendants, Spencer Trask & Company, from selling certain shares of capital stock of the Rio Grande & Western Railway Company to the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company, unless a sufficient sum of money was deposited to indemnify the complainant upon the demand hereinafter set forth.
It appears from the allegations of the bill that Nathaniel W. Raphael, since deceased, now represented by Martha Raphael as administratrix, on January 7, 1901, filed a bill in the United States circuit court for the district of Utah against the Wasatch & Jordan Valley Railroad Company and the Rio Grande & Western Railway Company and the Union Trust Company of New York, the object being to foreclose a mortgage given by the Wasatch & Jordan Valley Railroad Company, and to redeem from two independent mortgages certain branch railroads in the possession of, and claimed to be owned by, the Rio Grande & Western Railway Company.
While that suit was pending the present action was begun. The bill averred that the defendants, composing the firm of Spencer Trask & Company, had undertaken to obtain stock of the Rio Grande & Western Railway Company, and to sell the same to the representatives of the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company, which company was proceeding to acquire the railroad of the Rio Grande & Western Railway Company by acquiring the common and preferred stock of that company.
It is averred that Spencer Trask & Company, while negotiating the sale of said stock, learning of the foreclosure proceedings commenced by Raphael in the Utah court, made the following public advertisement:
The bill further avers:
'That the members of said firm of Spencer Trask & Company are not parties to the suit pending in Utah, and that there is no agreement existing between complainant and the other holders of the outstanding bonds similar to complainant's bonds, and Spencer Trask & Company, by which the said proposed 'fund' shall be applied toward the satisfaction of complainant's bonds and the other outstanding bonds.'
There are further allegations that the complainant——
'Is informed and believes that if said consolidation, as set forth in the scheme contemplated by the advertisements re- ferred to, is allowed to be carried out, without some stipulation between your orator and the members of the said firm of Spencer Trask & Company, as to the custody of the said fund, proposed to be created as aforesaid, the rights of remote purchasers of the mortgage premises, upon which complainant claims a lien, will have intervened pending complainant's suit in Utah, so that, if complainant succeeds at the final hearing of his suit in Utah, it will require the bringing into the suit, as defendants, such remote purchasers as the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Company and their proposed successors.'
The prayer for relief is:
'That a preliminary injunction be issued restraining the said members of the firm of Spencer Trask & Company from selling the said shares of the capital stock of the Rio Grande Western Railway Company to the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Company, as set forth in the said advertisements of Spencer Trask & Company, and which injunction your orator prays may be made perpetual upon the final hearing of this suit, unless the firm of Spencer Trask & Company shall agree to turn over to some trust company in the city of New York, at and before the completing of said sale of said shares, a sum of money which may be determined by this court, out of the proceeds of said sale, as will be sufficient to satisfy complainant's claim and the other outstanding bondholders, similar to his own, upon the final hearing of complainant's suit in Utah.'
The bill also refers to the affidavit of one of the defendants, George Foster Peabody, filed in the Utah suit. This affidavit is annexed to the bill of complaint, and is in part as follows:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Mulcahy
...that appointment of an "ancillary" receiver needed no separate basis of federal jurisdiction, seems unsound. Raphael v. Trask, 194 U.S. 272, 278, 24 S.Ct. 647, 48 L.Ed. 973; Kelley v. Queeney, D.C.W.D. N.Y., 41 F.Supp. 1015, 1018.2 My law-school teachings were that a judgment showing on its......
-
Salem Trust Co v. Manufacturers Finance Co, 74
...BRANDEIS concur on the ground that the rights of the parties are governed by the law of Massachusetts. 1 Raphael v. Trask, 194 U. S. 272, 277, 24 Sup. Ct. 647, 48 L. Ed. 973; Gage v. Carraher, 154 U. S. 656, 14 Sup. Ct. 1190, 25 L. Ed. 989; Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187, 192, 5 Sup. Ct. 9......
-
Kelley v. Queeney
...Co., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85; Sweeney v. Carter Oil Co., 199 U.S. 252, 26 S.Ct. 55, 50 L.Ed. 178; Raphael v. Trask, 194 U.S. 272, 24 S.Ct. 647, 48 L.Ed. 973. Jurisdiction is lacking if any indispensible defendant is a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff. Blake v. McKim,......
-
U.S. v. Franklin National Bank
...laws or Constitution of the United States merely because of the presence of a federally appointed receiver. In Raphael v. Trask, 194 U.S. 272, 24 S.Ct. 647, 48 L.Ed. 973 (1904), the question presented was whether an action could be maintained in the Southern District of New York without div......