Martha Washington Creamery Buttered Flour Co. v. Martien

Decision Date15 February 1889
Citation37 F. 797
PartiesMARTHA WASHINGTON CREAMERY BUTTERED FLOUR CO. v. MARTIEN.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Walter D. Edmonds, for complainant.

Horace Pettit, for defendant.

BUTLER J.

In disposing of motions for preliminary injunction it is not usual to assign reasons, where the motion is disallowed. To avoid misunderstanding, however, in this case, it is proper to say that the unanswered allegation of the respondent (found in his deposition,) that he purchased machines of the complainant's predecessor, Thorpe, at large expense designed for manufacturing the flour referred to in the bill and suited to no other purpose, stands in the way of allowing the motion, without reference to other important questions raised by the record and presented on the argument. It does not appear that the purchase of these machines had any connection with the contract of license referred to in the bill, nor that their use was subject to restriction or revocation. On the contrary, judging by what is before me the purchase was entirely independent of this contract, and conferred the same rights on the respondent that he would have taken if no such contract existed. These rights are to use the machines until worn out, in the manufacture of flour which they are designed to make, and to sell the same in the market. This flour the respondent may lawfully represent to be the flour described in the bill, by the use of labels, and otherwise. In so doing he imposes on no one, and transgresses no one's rights. The privilege of using the labels originally adopted by Thorpe, the inventor, extends to every one who acquires his right to manufacture and vend the flour. These labels were not intended to designate the flour manufactured by the inventor personally, or any particular individuals to whom he transfers rights, but the especial kind and quality of flour covered by his invention. To allow the motion would therefore be improper. At final hearing the case may present a different aspect. As presented, the complainant might possibly be entitled to an injunction so limited and confined as to avoid the difficulty above stated. This, however, I have not felt called upon to consider in disposing of the motion before me. I would suggest the propriety of preparing the case, as well as the two others pending, intimately connected with it, speedily, for final hearing, when the court may enter a decree with full...

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2 cases
  • Nelson v. J.H. Winchell & Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 24, 1909
    ...v. Thomson, 93 F. 660, 35 C. C. A. 532; Greacen v. Bell (C. C.) 115 F. 553; Martha Washington Co. v. Martien (C. C.) 44 F. 473, and 37 F. 797; Filkins v. Blackman, 13 Blatchf. Fed. Cas. No. 4,786. Of course the plaintiff's temporary disuse of the trade-mark during the period of such license......
  • Underwood v. Gerber
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • March 6, 1889

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