Martin Cnty. Conservation Alliance v. Martin Cnty.

Decision Date04 November 2011
Docket NumberNo. 1D09–4956.,1D09–4956.
Citation73 So.3d 856
PartiesMARTIN COUNTY CONSERVATION ALLIANCE and 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc., Appellants, v. MARTIN COUNTY, Department of Community Affairs, Martin Island Way, LLC, and Island Way, LC, Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Richard Grosso, Jason Totoiu, and Robert Hartsell of Everglades Law Center, Inc., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellants.

Stephen Fry, County Attorney, and David A. Acton, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Stuart, for Appellee Martin County.

Richard Shine and L. Mary Thomas, Assistant General Counsels, Department of Community Affairs, Tallahassee, for Appellee Department of Community Affairs.William L. Hyde of Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellees/Intervenors Martin Island Way, LLC, and Island Way, LC.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

THOMAS, J.

This cause is before us on Appellants' motion for rehearing and motion for rehearing en banc. We deny Appellants' motions, withdraw our order of December 14, 2010, and substitute the following in its place.

We previously dismissed this appeal, holding [t]he appellants have not demonstrated that their interests or the interests of the substantial number of members are ‘adversely affected’ by the challenged order, so as to give them standing to appeal.” Martin County Conservation Alliance v. Martin County, Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, ––– So.3d ––––, 2010 WL 2472197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting § 120.68, Fla. Stat. (2009)). We then ordered Appellants and their counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed upon them pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes, for filing an appeal where standing was clearly not present.

Upon our own initiative, we now hold that this appeal was filed in violation of section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes. We impose sanctions against Appellants and their counsel for filing an appeal without citing material facts to support standing or “then existing law” to support an appeal based on the material facts as found below. We award attorneys' fees to Martin County, the Department of Community Affairs, Martin Island Way, LLC and Island Way, LC, as required by the statute, to reimburse Appellees for the fees expended by them to defend this meritless appeal. Under the statute, the legislature has expressed its unequivocal intent that where a party files a meritless claim, suit or appeal, the party who is wrongfully required to expend funds for attorneys' fees is entitled to recoup those fees.

Based on the facts of this case and the applicable law on appellate standing under section 120.68, Florida Statutes, we find that under section 57.105, Appellees are clearly entitled to recoup their attorneys' fees. Appellants' appeal was dismissed by this court, because they failed to assert or establish material facts and controlling law demonstrating they are a party who is adversely affected by final agency action.” § 120.68(1), Fla. Stat.; see Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Clark, 668 So.2d 982, 986–87 (Fla.1996); Fla. Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Suwannee Am. Cement Co., Inc., 802 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Daniels v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm'n, 401 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Under the legislatively designed structure of chapter 120, Appellants were afforded broad standing to raise all issues before an administrative law judge and the agency; having failed to factually establish how an adverse ruling harmed their interests, Appellants were not afforded further appellate review.

Because Appellants pursued appellate review without any foundation in law or fact, they are properly subject to sanctions under section 57.105, Florida Statutes. Appellants' asserted basis for standing on appeal, that a future circuit court may interpret the land use plan amendments at issue differently than Martin County or the Department to somehow result in future adverse impact, is speculative and completely without merit in law and fact to establish appellate standing.

Section 57.105 does not require a finding of frivolousness to justify sanctions, but only a finding that the claim lacked a basis in material facts or then-existing law. See Long v. AvMed, Inc., 14 So.3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (noting section 57.105 does not require a party to show complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law).

The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that courts will not adversely affect legitimate advocacy by imposing sanctions under section 57.105, Florida Statutes. See Boca Burger, Inc., v. Forum, 912 So.2d 561, 569 (Fla.2005) ( “allowing appellate courts to impose sanctions on appellees ... will not chill representation, but instead will emphasize that counsels' obligations as officers of the court override their obligations to zealously represent their clients.”) (emphasis added). Thus, we respectfully disagree with the dissent's policy concerns that such sanctions would unduly chill zealous advocacy, just as this court rejected such concerns in de Vaux v. Westwood Baptist Church:

This case is not an instance of a court chilling creative lawyering. Certainly, lawyers are expected to be zealous advocates for the interests of their clients. They are also officers of the court, however, even though these two roles may sometimes appear to be in conflict.... A lawyer who files a ... meritless appeal ... without informing the client of the weakness of the claim is violating both a duty to serve the client's interests and a duty to the judicial system.

...

We believe that applying sanctions in cases such as this will protect this court's ability to serve litigants with meritorious cases ... and will discourage lawyers from raising meritless appellate arguments on the chance they will “stick.”

953 So.2d 677, 684–85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis added).

Furthermore, as does the dissent, we find positive policies embodied in the statute, because the statute protects those who are wrongfully required to pay attorneys' fees for meritless legal actions. Here, Appellees were wrongfully required to defend an appeal that should never have been filed. Although the imposition of sanctions does impose a cost on one party, it does so to protect the wronged party. Regardless of whether the positive policy implications of the statute outweigh any negative impacts, however, that decision has properly been made by the appropriate branch—the legislature.

We are not at liberty to disregard this legislative mandate that courts “shall” impose sanctions in cases without foundation in material fact or law. In Westwood Baptist Church, we noted our prior case law finding that “the word ‘shall’ in section 57.105 evidences ‘the legislative intent to impose a mandatory penalty ... to discourage baseless claims, by placing a price tag on losing parties who engage in these activities.’ 953 So.2d at 685 (quoting Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So.2d 5, 8–9 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (emphasis in original)). We also stated in that decision that [w]e again remind the bar that section 57.105 expressly states courts ‘shall’ assess attorney's fees for bringing, or failing to dismiss, baseless claims or defenses.” Id.

As to the constitutional concerns regarding access to courts, raised by the dissent, this issue was not raised by Appellants; thus, we decline to address it here. We note, however, that no appellate court has found that an application of sanctions for filing a meritless appeal under section 57.105 violates the Florida Constitution. Appellants engaged in substantial and lengthy administrative litigation, exercising their broad standing rights under chapter 120 to challenge the plan amendments at issue. The issues raised below were thoroughly reviewed by an Administrative Law Judge, who made extensive factual findings that were further reviewed by the Department of Community Affairs. In other words, at no time were Appellants denied access to the applicable legal process. Instead, under well-established case law, Appellants could not show any real, defined adverse impacts from the ruling below to justify appellate litigation.

To further explicate our decision, we present the facts and the procedural history, followed by an analysis of sections 120.68 and 57.105, Florida Statutes.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2007, the Martin County Commission passed two ordinances amending the Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan (the Plan). The first amendment, known as the Land Protection Incentives Amendment (Land Protection Amendment), was submitted to create opportunities for permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land, and agricultural land use while maintaining residential capacity. The Land Protection Amendment created an optional development design for parcels of 500 acres or more, by authorizing clusters of residential units on smaller lots than the current minimum, while maintaining the density status quo, and permanently setting aside at least 50% of the parcel for preservation, continued agricultural use, or surface water management projects.

Significantly, the Land Protection Amendment requires future use of the 500–acre parcel to be modified through an additional amendment to the Plan in combination with a planned unit development agreement. The future amendment would address the permanently set aside portion of the parcel (minimum of 250 acres), while the planned unit development agreement would address the portion of the parcel that would contain the clustered development.

In addition, the Land Protection Amendment requires any clustered development to be fiscally neutral regarding public expenditures, specifies that lots must be larger than two acres, and prohibits development in environmentally sensitive areas. The amendment further requires acknowledgment of a permanent restriction against any future density increase. Finally, a policy within the amendment mandates that Martin County...

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