Martin County v. Yusem

• Decision Date: 27 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 87078,87078
• Citation: Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1997)
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly S156 MARTIN COUNTY, Petitioner, v. Melvyn R. YUSEM, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1288

690 So.2d 1288

22 Fla. L. Weekly S156

MARTIN COUNTY, Petitioner, v. Melvyn R. YUSEM, Respondent.

No. 87078.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 27, 1997.

Robert D. Guthrie, Martin County Attorney and Gary K. Oldehoff, Assistant County Attorney, Stuart, for Petitioner.

Thomas E. Warner and Tim B. Wright of Warner, Fox, Seeley, Dungey & Sweet, P.A., Stuart, for Respondent.

Thomas G. Pelham and Shaw P. Stiller of Apgar & Pelham, Tallahassee; and Jane Hayman, Deputy General Counsel, Florida League of Cities, Inc., Tallahassee, for Florida League of Cities, Inc., Amicus Curiae.

Sherry Spiers, Assistant General Counsel, and Terrell K. Arline, Legal Director, Tallahassee, for Department of Community Affairs and 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc., Amici Curiae.

Lonnie N. Groot and Robert A. McMillan, Sanford; and Donna L. McIntosh of Stenstrom, McIntosh, Colbert, Whigham & Simmons, P.A., Sanford, for Seminole County and Seminole County Council of Local Governments, Amici Curiae.

John J. Copelan, Jr., Broward County Attorney; and Anthony C. Musto and Tamara A. McNierney, Assistant County Attorneys, Fort Lauderdale, for Broward County, Amicus Curiae.

Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade County Attorney; and Joni Armstrong Coffey and Robert L. Krawcheck, Assistant County Attorneys, Miami, for Metropolitan Dade County, Amicus Curiae.

Michael L. Rosen, Executive Director, Florida Legal Foundation, Inc., Tallahassee, for Florida Legal Foundation, Inc., Amicus Curiae.

James S. Burling and Stephen E. Abraham, Sacramento, CA, for Pacific Legal Foundation, Amicus Curiae.

WELLS, Justice.

We have for review a decision addressing the following question certified to be of great public importance:

CAN A REZONING DECISION WHICH HAS LIMITED IMPACT UNDER SNYDER, BUT DOES REQUIRE AN AMENDMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN, STILL BE A QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISION SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW?

Martin County v. Yusem, 664 So.2d 976, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (on motions for rehearing and certification). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the negative and hold that amendments to a comprehensive land use plan which was adopted pursuant to chapter 163, Florida Statutes, are legislative decisions subject to the "fairly debatable" standard of review. Accordingly, we quash in part the decision of the district court to the extent that it is inconsistent with the following analysis. In reaching our conclusion, we have been greatly aided by Judge Pariente's well-reasoned dissenting opinion. We approve in part the district court's decision to the extent that it permitted Yusem to file a new application for amendment without prejudice and remand to the trial court for consideration of claims which have not been considered.

Melvyn Yusem owns fifty-four acres of land in Martin County. In 1982, Martin County (County) adopted by ordinance a comprehensive plan for land use planning in the county. Subsequently, in 1990, the County replaced its earlier plan by adopting a comprehensive land use plan (Plan) pursuant to the 1985 Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act. See generally § 163.3184, Fla. Stat. (1985). Under the Plan, Yusem's fifty-four acres are part of a 900-acre tract which was included within the Plan's Primary Urban Service District (PUSD). Although up to two units per acre were allowed in the PUSD under the Plan, the future land use map, a component of the Plan, restricted this 900-acre tract to only one residential unit per two acres. See § 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989).

Yusem requested an amendment to the future land use map for his property from "Rural Density," which allows development of .5 units per acre, to "Estate Density," which allows development of up to two units per acre. In conjunction with this amendment, Yusem requested a rezoning of his property from "A-1" (agricultural) to "Planned Unit Development" (residential). ¹

Yusem advocated adoption of the proposal at a hearing before the Martin County Board of County Commissioners (Board). After considering the different arguments on the proposal, a majority of the Board, by a vote of three to two, voted to begin the amendment-adoption process by transmitting a copy of the complete proposed amendment to the Department of Community Affairs (Department). See § 163.3184, Fla. Stat. (1989). ² The Department analyzed the data and analysis received and recommended that the County either abandon the amendment or revise the data and analysis to demonstrate that the proposed amendment is a logical extension of a more intensive land use in the nearby area.

Thereafter, the Board held another hearing on the proposed amendment. Other than the Department's report, no new evidence was presented. Rather than resubmitting the proposal with data and analysis supporting it, the Board voted three to two to deny Yusem's proposal.

Yusem then sought relief in the circuit court. Yusem first filed a petition for certiorari but voluntarily dismissed it, choosing instead to file a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. In finding in Yusem's favor, the trial court relied upon Snyder v. Board of County Commissioners, 595 So.2d 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (Snyder I ), quashed, 627 So.2d 469 (Fla.1993). The trial court noted that Snyder I involved a rezoning question; however, it found the basic rationale of that case to apply in the plan-amendment context. The trial court then found that when a planning decision has an impact on a limited number of persons or property or identifiable parties and is contingent on a fact or facts, the action is quasi-judicial. Consequently, the trial court framed the issue in the case as follows: "whether or not the requested land use amendment is consistent with the Martin County Comprehensive Plan and whether or not the requested land use amendment is a logical and consistent extension of present uses in the general area of Plaintiff's land." Since resolution of the issue was contingent upon facts, the court applied the strict-scrutiny standard of review and concluded that the County improperly denied Yusem's requested amendment.

On appeal, the Fourth District reversed the trial court's ruling based upon a determination that the court was without jurisdiction to decide the merits of the action. However, in its opinion, the panel divided, with the majority agreeing that the County's decision was subject to a strict-scrutiny standard of review. Martin County v. Yusem, 664 So.2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The district court relied upon our decision in Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469 (Fla.1993) (Snyder II ), in which this Court held that rezoning actions that have a limited impact on the public and that can be seen as policy applications, rather than policy setting, are quasi-judicial decisions. The district court, similar to the trial court, concluded that the County's action was essentially a quasi-judicial rezoning decision because to increase the density on Yusem's fifty-four acres would have a limited impact on the public.

The district court distinguished this case from Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County, 642 So.2d 609, 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), review denied, 654 So.2d 920 (Fla.1995). In Section 28 Partnership, the district court found the denial of a comprehensive plan amendment involving the development of a 638-acre tract was legislative. In contrast to Yusem's requested amendment, the tract which was the subject of the proposed amendment in Section 28 Partnership was surrounded by pristine land (it was situated at the headwaters of the Loxahatchee River and was bordered on two sides by the Jonathan Dickinson State Park), and the amendment would have created a new category of property under the Plan. Yusem, 664 So.2d at 977.

Further, the district court found support for its decision in City of Melbourne v. Puma, 630 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1994). In Puma, we accepted jurisdiction over the Fifth District's decision involving a rezoning from a low-density residential to a commercial classification. See Yusem, 664 So.2d at 977-78. We remanded Puma for further consideration in light of our opinion in Snyder II. Puma, 630 So.2d at 1097. Neither our opinion nor the Fifth District's opinion in Puma set forth the fact that the rezoning in that case required an amendment to the comprehensive land use plan. ³ However, because the rezoning in Puma did require an amendment to the comprehensive plan, the district court in Yusem found that this Court's resolution of Puma was consistent with its conclusion that amendments to comprehensive plans are not necessarily legislative. Yusem, 664 So.2d at 978. ⁴ The district court's majority found support for its logic in respect to the meaning of our Puma decision in an article by Thomas G. Pelham. See Thomas G. Pelham, Quasi-Judicial Rezonings: A Commentary on the Snyder Decision and the Consistency Requirement, 9 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 243 (1994).

Judge Pariente dissented, writing that the adoption of a comprehensive land use plan, which required the county to determine whether it should alter its overall plan for managed growth, local services, and capital expenditures as embodied in the future land use map, was a legislative act; therefore, decisions concerning the amendment of a comprehensive plan should similarly be treated as legislative acts. 664 So.2d at 979. Further, Judge Pariente distinguished this case from our decision in Snyder, in which we found the denial of a request to rezone a particular parcel of land to a designation which was consistent with the policies of the plan was a quasi-judicial decision, because the rezoning request in this case was inconsistent with the plan and required a plan amendment. Judge Pariente noted that a bright-line rule finding that all plan amendments were legislative acts would provide clarity to the procedures involved in this otherwise confusing area of the law. Id. at 982. Therefore, Ju...