Martin Daytona v. Strickland Const. Serv.

• Citation: 941 So.2d 1220
• Decision Date: 17 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 5D05-2432.,5D05-2432.
• Parties: MARTIN DAYTONA CORPORATION, etc., Appellant, v. STRICKLAND CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, etc., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

941 So.2d 1220

MARTIN DAYTONA CORPORATION, etc., Appellant, v. STRICKLAND CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 5D05-2432.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

November 17, 2006.

John H. Dannecker and Jennifer P. Sommerville of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Orlando, for Appellant.

Rosemary Hanna Hayes and Tina L. Caraballo of Hayes & Caraballo, PL, Orlando, for Appellees.

SAWAYA, J.

This case presents the issue whether rule 1.525, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that motions for attorneys' fees and costs be served "within 30 days after filing of the judgment," applies to motions filed in the circuit court based on awards emanating from arbitration proceedings and, if so, whether a motion served before entry of the judgment is timely under the rule. We believe that the rule is applicable in this instance and that a motion served prior to entry of the judgment is timely.¹ The facts and procedural background are important to our analysis, so we will begin our discussion there.

Facts and Procedural Background

Martin Daytona Corporation (Martin) filed suit against Strickland Construction Services (Strickland) in circuit court seeking to recover an unpaid debt pursuant to a contract that had been entered into between the parties. The contract contained an arbitration clause, which provided that the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees.² On January 4, 2005, the arbitration award was issued in favor of Martin, which was declared to be the prevailing party. On January 6, 2005, Martin moved to confirm the arbitration award in the circuit court pursuant to section 682.12, Florida Statutes (2005), and sought entry of a final judgment with a reservation of jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees and costs. Simultaneously, Martin filed and served its motion to tax attorneys' fees and costs based on its prevailing party status. The order confirming the arbitration award was entered by the circuit court on April 18, 2005, and a few days later, the final judgment reserving jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees and costs was entered.

Strickland filed an objection to the motion for fees and costs, arguing that it had been prematurely filed before the final judgment had been entered in violation of the time requirements of rule 1.525. Martin responded that rule 1.525 does not apply to arbitration proceedings and that its motion was timely. The circuit court found that the motion for attorneys' fees and costs was premature, that rule 1.525 applied, and that Martin's failure to comply with the time requirement of this rule was the result of attorney error, not excusable neglect.³ Therefore, it denied the motions for attorneys' fees and costs. Martin appeals. Because the parties do not agree on the proper standard of review we must apply to resolve the issue before us, we will make that determination before proceeding further.

Standard of Review

The parties do agree on the facts regarding when the motion for fees and costs was filed and served in relation to rendition of the judgment. Therefore, we must interpret the provisions of rule 1.525 to determine whether the rule applies and whether the motion for fees and costs was timely served. This is a legal issue that requires application of the de novo standard of review. See Gosselin v. Gosselin, 869 So.2d 667, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("Because the trial court's determination that the Wife's amended motion for attorney's fees was barred by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 is a legal determination, we review it de novo.") (citing Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000)).

Applicability of Rule 1.525 to Motions for Fees and Costs Based on Awards Emanating from Arbitration Proceedings

In order to determine whether rule 1.525 applies to the instant case, we must analyze how attorneys' fees and costs are awarded in arbitration proceedings. Unless the parties specifically agree that the arbitrator will decide the issues of entitlement to, and amount of, attorneys' fees, those issues must be decided by the circuit court.⁴ Here, the parties agreed that the arbitrator would decide who the prevailing party was.⁵ Therefore, the arbitrator decided Martin's entitlement to fees by finding Martin to be the prevailing party, but properly declined to award the amount of fees because the parties did not agree that the arbitrator would make that determination. Hence, the issue for the circuit court to decide was the amount of fees and costs Martin was entitled to recover.

If the court must decide either entitlement to or the amount of fees, or both, typically a motion to confirm the award and a motion to tax fees and costs are served, often at the same time.⁶ This is what Martin did. These motions place the issue of fees and costs before the court for determination at the same time confirmation is decided. The court conducts a judicial proceeding to resolve the issues raised in the motions, and we believe that rule 1.525 is applicable to provide time limitations for serving the motion for fees and costs. We are not alone in adopting this view; recent case law from another district court has applied rule 1.525 to a motion for fees and costs based on an award emanating from arbitration proceedings. See Certified Marine Expeditions v. Freeport Shipbuilding, Inc., 914 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Martin's argument that rule 1.525 does not apply to arbitration proceedings is premised on rule 1.010, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the civil procedure rules "apply to all actions of a civil nature." Martin contends that pursuant to Miele v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 656 So.2d 470 (Fla.1995), the term "actions of a civil nature" does not include arbitration proceedings. The court in Miele considered the issue whether section 768.73, Florida Statutes (1991), which addressed limitations on punitive damage awards, applied to arbitration proceedings. That statute provided, in pertinent part, that it applied to "any civil action" that fell within certain categories of tort actions. § 768.73, Fla. Stat. (1991). The court held that the term "civil action," as used in the statute, did not include arbitration proceedings. Miele, 656 So.2d at 472. Hence, Martin argues that the term "actions of a civil nature" in rule 1.010 does not include arbitration proceedings and, therefore, rule 1.525 does not apply.

Subsequent to the decision in Miele, the Legislature enacted section 768.737 Florida Statutes (1999), which provides that sections 768.72, 768.725, and 768.73 do apply when punitive damages are available as a remedy in arbitration proceedings. "It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with judicial decisions on the subject concerning which it subsequently enacts a statute." Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So.2d 471, 475 (Fla.1984). Generally, courts are permitted to consider subsequently enacted legislation in determining the meaning of a statute.⁷ It is clear that the Legislature's enactment of section 768.737 indicates that the Legislature has a different view from that adopted by the court in Miele regarding the issue whether arbitration proceedings are "civil actions" within the meaning of section 768.73. We believe that enactment of section 768.737, in light of the decision in Miele, militates in favor of the view that the term "actions of a civil nature" in rule 1.010 includes motions for fees and costs filed in the circuit court that are based on awards emanating from arbitration proceedings.

Having determined that rule 1.525 applies, we must next decide whether serving the motion for fees prior to entry of the judgment violated the time limitations of the rule. We believe that service was timely, and we will explain why.

Serving the Motion for Fees and Costs Prior to Entry of the Final Judgment does Comply with the Time Requirements of Rule 1.525

Rule 1.525 establishes a deadline for parties to serve motions for attorneys' fees and costs after a judgment has been entered. At the outset we note, parenthetically, that although many cases discuss the requirements of the rule in terms of filing the motion, the rule specifically requires timely service of the motion. See Certified Marine Expeditions. Here, there is no doubt that the motion was filed and served prior to entry of the judgment.

Rule 1.525 was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court and became effective on January 1, 2001. Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 773 So.2d 1098 (Fla.2000). Prior to that time, the courts generally required that any such motion be filed and served within a reasonable time after the judgment is entered. See Carter v. Lake County, 840 So.2d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). However, the reasonable time rule was vague and produced inconsistent results in similar cases. As a result, the court adopted rule 1.525 "to eliminate the reasonable time rule and establish a time requirement to serve motions for costs and attorney's fees." Id.

The initial version of rule 1.525 required the motion to be served within 30 days of the filing of the judgment. Yet, requiring the motion to be served within 30 days still caused confusion because it was difficult to discern whether the language constituted a deadline or a narrow window of opportunity. Cases decided by the First, Third, and Fourth District Courts construing the initial version of rule 1.525 held that the rule set an outside deadline for serving a motion for attorneys' fees and costs and that motions served prior to entry of the judgment were timely. See Byrne-Henry v. Hertz Corp., 927 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Swift v. Wilcox, 924 So.2d 885, 887 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("[W]e hold that Rule 1.525 `establishes the latest point at which a prevailing party may serve a motion for fees and costs.'") (quoting Norris v. Treadwell, 907 So.2d 1217, 1218 (...