Martin Oil v. PHILADELPHIA LIFE INS.
Decision Date | 08 December 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 23813.,23813. |
Citation | 203 W.Va. 266,507 S.E.2d 367 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | MARTIN OIL COMPANY, a West Virginia Corporation, Appellee, v. PHILADELPHIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, Professional Benefits Consultants, Inc., a Corporation, Appellee. |
Charles G. Johnson, Marcia Allen Broughton, Simmerman & Broughton, Clarksburg, West Virginia, Attorneys for Appellee Martin Oil.
Anita R. Casey, Christopher J. Pyles, Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Professional Benefits. C. David Morrison, Michael J. Florio, Steptoe & Johnson, Clarksburg, West Virginia, Attorneys for Philadelphia Life.
Philadelphia Life Insurance ("PLI") appeals from the Circuit Court of Upshur County's decision prohibiting it from asserting a cross-claim against co-defendant Professional Benefits Consultants ("PBC") and a third-party complaint against non-party Rudolph Pellegrini under principles of implied indemnity. PLI also challenges the circuit court's decision not to dismiss this case, arguing that federal jurisdiction is preemptive given the references to an ERISA1 plan in the underlying case. After a thorough review of the record and the law in this area, we affirm the lower court's finding that preemption was not required and we affirm the lower court's decision prohibiting PLI from amending its pleadings.
In 1972, Martin Oil, the plaintiff in the underlying case, decided to establish a retirement plan for its employees. Martin Oil used the services of PLI to set up its ERISA plan. PLI's status was that of a third-party administrator with reference to the Martin Oil pension plan. It appears that PLI's employee, Rudolph Pellegrini, was the individual who actually handled the third-party administration of the Martin Oil plan.2 In June 1983 when it decided that it wanted to get out of the business of pension plan administration, PLI purportedly mailed letters to its clients informing them of its decision3 and recommending that they retain Mr. Pellegrini to handle their accounts. In August 1983, Mr. Pellegrini left PLI and incorporated PBC, naming himself as president. The parties agree that Mr. Pellegrini took the Martin Oil file with him when he started PBC.
In 1985, Martin Oil decided to terminate its pension plan, which was now being serviced by PBC. When Martin Oil informed PBC of its desire to terminate the plan, PBC recommended that Martin Oil hire an accountant to terminate the plan. In attempting to terminate the plan, Martin Oil's accountant discovered that he did not have sufficient financial information to effect the termination.4 After incurring substantial expense, Martin Oil ultimately terminated its pension plan in October 1991.5
On July 31, 1992, Martin Oil filed a complaint in circuit court against PLI and PBC to recover the costs associated with the plan's termination. In the complaint, Martin Oil alleged that PLI and PBC are liable to it for breach of contract.6 Martin Oil entered into a settlement agreement with PBC and Mr. Pellegrini on October 27, 1995. The remaining defendant, PLI, filed a motion on November 30, 1995, seeking leave to file an amended answer and cross-claim against PBC and a third-party complaint against Mr. Pellegrini, individually. By order dated February 27, 1996, the circuit court dismissed PBC with prejudice and denied PLI's motions to file additional pleadings. PLI seeks a reversal of that order, as well as a ruling from this Court that the state court's jurisdiction over this matter is preempted under federal law.7
PLI argues that the jurisdictional language of ERISA, which provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... [,]"8 requires that this matter be heard in federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). Based on the expansive judicial interpretation given to the terms "relate to," PLI maintains that federal jurisdiction is mandated. Id. PBC takes no position with regard to the issue of preemption and Martin Oil argues that its breach of contract claims are not preempted by ERISA.
As support for its position that the terminology "relate[s] to" must be viewed expansively, PLI cites the United States Supreme Court's observation in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987), that this phrase conveys "`its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law "relates to" a benefit plan "in the normal sense of the phrase if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."'" Id. at 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985), quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)). Despite the historically broad interpretation of the relevant statutory language, it has been consistently recognized that state laws or actions that affect a pension plan in "too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner" are not preempted by ERISA. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100, n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2890; accord Hollingsworth Paving, Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 929 F.Supp. 1097, 1100 (W.D.Tenn.1996); Ball v. Life Planning Servs., Inc., 187 W.Va. 682, 421 S.E.2d 223 (1992) ( ).
While the seemingly ubiquitous issue of ERISA preemption has resulted in diverse rulings depending on the deciding tribunal's application of the "relate to" jurisdictional language, certain generalizations can be made with regard to when preemption is and is not required. Where the state law claim seeks the recovery of ERISA benefits, there is no dispute that such claim affects the plan and therefore preemption is necessary. See Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir.1991),cert. dismissed, 505 U.S. 1233, 113 S.Ct. 2, 120 L.Ed.2d 931 (1992) ( ). Similarly, those cases in which the state law claim involves "some aspect of the distribution, processing or entitlement of benefits or administration of claims or funds under a[n] [ERISA] plan[,]" typically are determined to be preempted by federal law. Hollingsworth Paving, 929 F.Supp. at 1101; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 129 (6th Cir.1996),cert. denied sub nom. Pressley v. Pressley, — U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2431, 138 L.Ed.2d 193 (1997) ( ); Tri-State Mach., Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 309 (4th Cir.1994),cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183, 115 S.Ct. 1175, 130 L.Ed.2d 1128 (1995) ( ). In addition to the nature of the claim, the identity of the parties is a critical factor when resolving the issue of preemption. In the prototypical preemption case, as the court observed in Hollingsworth Paving, the parties involved will be "employees or former employees, who challenge some aspect of their status as beneficiaries under a plan." 929 F.Supp. at 1101. Other parties who may be included in a case where preemption is required are the employer, the plan, and the plan fiduciaries. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 556 (6th Cir.1987); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Castonguay, 984 F.2d 1518, 1521 (9th Cir.1993) ( ).
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant case requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) ( ); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div'n, Dep't of Treasury, — U.S.___, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) ( ); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) ( ).
Given the dearth of West Virginia law on this issue,9 we find the district court's approach in Hollingsworth Paving instructive to the issue of preemption before us. In that case, the plan administrator sued the life insurance carrier for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that the carrier's salesman altered the nature of the...
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