Martin-Trigona, In re
Citation | 9 F.3d 226 |
Decision Date | 05 November 1993 |
Docket Number | M,MARTIN-TRIGON,Nos. 93-5008,93-3041,s. 93-5008 |
Parties | In re Anthony R.ovant. In re George SASSOWER, Movant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
Anthony R. Martin, submitted pro se papers in No. 93-5008.
George Sassower, submitted pro se papers in No. 93-3041.
Before: JON O. NEWMAN, Chief Judge, WINTER and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges.
The unfortunate tendency of some individuals to abuse the litigation process has prompted courts to adopt a variety of techniques to protect both themselves and the public from the harassing tactics of vexatious litigants. Usually these techniques are rules of general application, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizing sanctions for groundless lawsuits, and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, authorizing damages for taking a frivolous appeal. Occasionally, however, the tactics of certain individuals so far exceed the bounds of tolerable litigation conduct that courts have responded with specially crafted sanctions that impose severe limitations on the opportunity of such individuals to pursue their penchant for vexatious litigation.
In two unrelated matters initiated by two such sanctioned litigants, Anthony R. Martin (formerly known as Anthony R. Martin-Trigona) and George Sassower, we consider various procedural issues that arise from the imposition of such sanctions. Both litigants have been prohibited from filing any papers in this Court unless leave of court has first been obtained. They have submitted to the Clerk of the Court inquiries that challenge the procedures for determining whether such leave should be given. Treating these inquiries as motions, we conclude that proper procedures have been followed and deny the motions. Because the precise issues raised have not previously been discussed in the opinions of this Court, however, we deem it appropriate to set forth our views in a published opinion.
As a result of an extraordinary pattern of vexatious and harassing litigation pursued over several years by Martin and Sassower as pro se litigants, each was enjoined by this Court from filing any papers in this Court unless leave of court was first obtained. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1263-64 (2d Cir.1984) (preliminary injunction), injunction made permanent, 795 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir.1986), modified sub nom. Martin-Trigona v. Cohen, 876 F.2d 307, 308 (2d Cir.1989); Sassower v. Sansverie, 885 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1989) (warning of injunction); Sassower v. Mahoney, No. 88-6203 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 1990) (permanent injunction).
Thereafter, the Court determined the procedure that would be followed for considering applications for leave to file pursuant to these and all other injunctions imposing "leave to file" requirements. The procedure has several components: (1) all applications of any sanctioned litigant who is subject to a "leave to file" requirement are submitted for decision by one judge of this Court; (2) a particular judge is assigned to consider all the applications submitted by any one sanctioned litigant; (3) the judge to whom applications from a particular sanctioned litigant are assigned is selected by a procedure related to the seniority of the judges, further details of which will not be disclosed for reasons set forth in this opinion; and (4) the ruling of the assigned judge granting or denying leave to file is entered by the Clerk as an order of the Court, without disclosure of the identity of the judge who made the ruling.
Martin's application. On March 1, 1993, Martin filed a motion for leave to appeal a ruling of the District Court for the District of Connecticut. Pursuant to the procedures outlined above, that motion was referred for decision to the judge to whom Martin's "leave to file" motions have been assigned. The motion was denied on July 28, 1993, as reflected in an order entered for the Court by the Clerk. See In re Martin-Trigona, No. 93-5008 (2d Cir. July 28, 1993). On August 17, 1993, Martin wrote the Clerk requesting the names of the judges who acted on the appeal in No. 93-5008.
Sassower's application. On April 23, 1993, Sassower filed a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus and prohibition directed to a judge of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Pursuant to the procedures outlined above, that motion was referred for decision to the judge to whom Sassower's "leave to file" motions have been assigned. The motion was denied on August 4, 1993, as reflected in an order entered for the Court by the Clerk. See In re Sassower, No. 93-3041 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 1993). On September 10, 1993, Sassower wrote to a Deputy Clerk requesting the identity of the panels that had directed the entry of the denial order in No. 93-3041 and prior docket numbers in which "leave to file" motions had been denied.
The Court subsequently decided to adhere to the procedures previously adopted concerning "leave to file" motions submitted by sanctioned litigants, and to treat the letter requests of Martin and Sassower as motions to be considered by a three-judge panel.
Normally a court of appeals hears and adjudicates appeals sitting in a panel of three judges. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 46(b) (1988). It is also normal procedure for one judge of a court of appeals to adjudicate procedural motions, though normally one judge may not "dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or other proceeding." See Fed.R.App.P. 27(c). The ultimate issue posed by the pending motions is whether the procedure adopted by this Court for the disposition of "leave to file" motions submitted by sanctioned litigants is a permissible exception to the normal appellate procedures.
The procedures authorized by statute and rule for the conduct of appeals contemplate appeals taken by litigants, whether appearing by counsel or acting pro se, who are proceeding in good faith to vindicate legitimate appellate rights. These procedures were never intended to be available for manipulation by individuals who have demonstrated an uncontrollable propensity repeatedly to pursue vexatious and harassing litigation.
The Supreme Court and numerous courts of appeals have recognized that courts may resort to restrictive measures that except from normally available procedures litigants who have abused their litigation opportunities. This year, for example, the Supreme Court prohibited Sassower from obtaining in forma pauperis status, see 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(a) (1988), with respect to petitions for certiorari and extraordinary writs in civil cases. In re Sassower, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2, 126 L.Ed.2d 6 (1993). The Court has ordered similar prohibitions with respect to other vexatious litigants. See Demos v. Storrie, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1231, 1232, 122 L.Ed.2d 636 (1993) (petitions for certiorari); Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 397, 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (same); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180, 111 S.Ct. 596, 597-98, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991) (extraordinary writs); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 180-85, 109 S.Ct. 993, 993-97, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989) (same). Several circuits have similarly excepted vexatious litigants from the normal availability of in forma pauperis status in civil cases. See, e.g., Visser v. Supreme Court of California, 919 F.2d 113, 114 (9th Cir.1990) (mandamus petitions); Maxberry v. S.E.C., 879 F.2d 222, 223-24 (6th Cir.1989) (appeals); Johnson v. Cowley, 872 F.2d 342, 344 (10th Cir.1989) (extraordinary writs).
Some courts have responded to vexatious litigants by completely foreclosing the filing of designated categories of cases. See Villar v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 990 F.2d 1489, 1499 (5th Cir.1993) ( ); Demos v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, 925 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir.) (barring litigant from filing any new petitions seeking extraordinary writs directed at the district courts of Washington), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1123, 111 S.Ct. 1082, 112 L.Ed.2d 1186 (1991); Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 408-10 (1st Cir.1985) ( ); In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir.1979) (in banc) ( ).
Alternatively, courts have adopted the less drastic remedy of subjecting a vexatious litigant to a "leave of court" requirement with respect to future filings. See, e.g., In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 3-4 (4th Cir.1992) ( ); Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir.1992) ( ); Cofield v. Alabama...
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