Martin v. Arnold
Decision Date | 29 April 1994 |
Citation | 643 So.2d 564 |
Parties | Dennis G. MARTIN v. Ira Sherman ARNOLD. 1930197. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Harry M. Renfroe, Jr. of Mountain & Renfroe, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Anthony B. Johnson of Spurrier, Rice & Henderson, Huntsville, for appellee.
During the rainy afternoon of April 26, 1991, Vickie Ann Martin was driving her automobile in a southbound lane of U.S. Highway 431, in Boaz, Alabama. That portion of U.S. Highway 431 is a four-lane highway, with two sets of lanes separated by a median. Mrs. Martin's car was struck from behind by a pickup truck driven by Dwight Rowell. The impact of the collision sent Mrs. Martin's car through a turn lane in the median and into the northbound lanes of the highway. When the collision between Rowell's truck and Mrs. Martin's car occurred, Ira Sherman Arnold was driving a van with a large boat in tow in the northbound lane. Mrs. Martin's car spun across the highway, coming directly in front of Arnold, and Arnold's van collided with Mrs. Martin's car. The impact hurled Mrs. Martin's car into a ditch. Mrs. Martin was killed, and her two children riding with her were injured.
Dennis Martin, husband of Mrs. Martin and administrator of her estate, filed a wrongful death claim against Rowell and Arnold and filed a negligent or wanton entrustment claim against the owner of the vehicle Arnold was driving, John Lyles. As next friend of the minor children, Martin also stated claims of negligence and wantonness against Rowell and Arnold, seeking damages for the children's injuries. The trial court, without mentioning Rowell and Lyles, granted Arnold's motion for a summary judgment, and it certified the judgment as final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P. Martin appeals from this judgment in favor of Arnold.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Martin produced substantial evidence to defeat Arnold's properly supported motion for summary judgment.
A motion for a summary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), A.R.Civ.P.; Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 540 So.2d 732, 734 (Ala.1989).
Rule 56 must be considered with the "substantial evidence rule," § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975, for actions filed after June 11, 1987. See Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). In order to defeat a defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence, i.e., "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).
Arnold supported his motion for summary judgment with various items of evidence, including his own affidavit and portions of a deposition from an eyewitness to the accident. In Arnold's affidavit, he stated:
The eyewitness stated the following in his deposition:
The record indicates that the accident occurred in a 55-mile-per-hour speed zone.
Arnold argued in his summary judgment motion that he did nothing to proximately cause or contribute to the accident, because he said Mrs. Martin's car came into the northbound lane without warning after being hit by Rowell's truck. Arnold made a prima facie showing that he had not acted negligently or wantonly. Therefore, the burden then shifted to Martin to present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Arnold had negligently or wantonly caused the accident. West, supra.
Martin, in opposition to the summary judgment motion, cited various portions of Arnold's deposition, including that part in which Arnold stated that he did not see Mrs. Martin's car until it came into his lane and was...
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