Martin v. BELDEAN

Decision Date10 January 2002
Docket NumberDocket No. 222960.
PartiesRobert MARTIN and Cathy Martin, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. David A. Beldean, Lisa A. Beldean, Carol Ann Roota, James R. Steffan, Kathryn E. Steffan, Lois Hall, a/k/a Lois A. Hall, Don M. Proctor, Trustee, Robert P. Craft, Linda M. Craft, David A. Kamulski, Donald E. Nelson, Shirley M. Nelson, Peter R. Cavan, Kathy A. Degasperis, William E. Stanisci, Teresa M. Stanisci, Milton R. Brittain, Kathleen M. Brittain, Jeffrey M. Woollard, Lynne M. Woollard, Terry M. Weir, Christine M. Weir, Rodger D. Hall, Ersa M. Hall, Robert O. Platz, Sandra Platz, John E. Kargetta, Janet B. Kargetta, Edna Smith, Barton J. Hodge, and Suzan K. Hodge, Defendants, and John R. REDMOND, Barbara E. Redmond, Edward Davies, Karen A. Davies, Samuel D. Brandt, and Lois A. Brandt, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Ernest R. Bazzana), Detroit, for the plaintiffs.

UAW GM Legal Services Plan (by Christine A. Waid), Pontiac, for the defendants.

Before: DOCTOROFF, P.J. and SAAD and WILDER, JJ.

SAAD, J.

Defendants appeal as of right, and plaintiffs cross appeal, from the trial court's order granting summary disposition to plaintiffs in this residential property dispute. We affirm.

I. Facts and Proceedings

Most of the essential facts in this case are not in dispute. In November 1969, Jarl Corporation, developers of the Tan Lake Shores Subdivision in Oxford Township, recorded a plat for the subdivision. The plat documents contain a dedication of the subdivision streets to the public, a designation of easements, and a specification that "Outlot A is reserved for the use of the lot owners...." According to the parties, Outlot A originally consisted of two lots abutting Tan Lake and located at the end of a cul-de-sac on Brookfield Road.1 The ownership of one of the Outlot A lots is at the center of this dispute.

At the time the developers filed the plat, they also recorded certain restrictions for the subdivision, including one restriction at issue on appeal:

17. All the restrictions, conditions, covenants, charges, easements, agreements and rights herein contained shall continue for a period of twenty-five years from date of recording this instrument.

Officers of the Jarl Corporation signed the dedication and restrictions, as did other lot owners, including James Fritch, whom the parties do not dispute owned both the disputed part of Outlot A and the adjacent lot, lot 21, when the plat was filed. Thereafter, James Fritch sold lot 21 and the disputed part of Outlot A together, as did prior and subsequent sellers. Plaintiffs purchased the property from Anthony and Lori Pasko in October 1996 and their deed reflects their ownership of both lot 21 and "part of Outlot A," the size and location of which is also set forth in their deed.2 Plaintiffs filed this action on July 22, 1998, as the current owners of lot 21 and part of Outlot A, seeking to have the "Outlot A is reserved for the use of the lot owners" specification removed, or declared null and void, for that portion of Outlot A that they own. According to plaintiffs, they learned about the language in the plat when they applied for a permit to build a home on lot 21 and their portion of Outlot A. The thirty-seven defendants in this case are other lot owners in the subdivision, only six of whom have appealed. Defendants claim that the reservation of Outlot A constitutes a valid dedication of the lot for the use of other lot owners in the subdivision as a place from which to launch boats and swim.

On February 4, 1999, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Relying on ¶ 17 of the restrictions for the subdivision plat, plaintiffs argued that the restriction on the use of Outlot A expired because twenty-five years had elapsed since the 1969 platting of the subdivision. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed another motion and argued that the doctrines of laches and estoppel bar defendants' claims to the use or ownership of plaintiffs' portion of Outlot A. Plaintiffs further asserted that they lawfully own the property because the plat does not contain a valid public dedication.

Several defendants responded to the summary disposition motions and argued that the twenty-five-year limitation did not apply to the 1969 dedication of Outlot A. The defendants who ultimately appealed the trial court's ruling filed a separate motion for summary disposition on March 23, 1999, arguing that Outlot A was validly dedicated to the lot owners in the subdivision plat, that the restrictions did not apply to Outlot A because it was dedicated before the restrictions were filed, and that plaintiffs could not establish ownership of part of Outlot A through adverse possession.3

On September 24, 1999, the trial court entered an order granting summary disposition to plaintiffs on the basis of laches and estoppel. On October 11, 1999, the court entered another order describing plaintiffs' exclusive right to the disputed portion of Outlot A.

II. Analysis

We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998).4 The central issue in this case involves the legal ownership of the one-third portion of Outlot A. Plaintiffs assert that they own the parcel through a valid deed and defendants claim ownership by statutory dedication under M.C.L. § 560.253 of the Land Division Act, previously known as the Subdivision Control Act, M.C.L. § 560.101 et seq. Though the trial court did not expressly decide that issue, the parties raised it below and we must address it for a proper resolution of this appeal.5Peterman v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 446 Mich. 177, 183, 521 N.W.2d 499 (1994).

We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to plaintiffs; however, we affirm for reasons other than those articulated by the trial court.6 Rather than rest our decision on equitable principles alone, we find that plaintiffs own the disputed portion of Outlot A as a matter of law and that the plat documents do not convey title of the disputed property by statutory dedication to defendants or other owners of lots within the subdivision.

Plaintiffs established evidentiary support for their claim of title to the disputed portion of Outlot A by showing the chain of title that began before the recording of the plat dedication in 1969. To counter that evidence, defendants relied on subsections 253(1) and (2) of the Land Division Act, previously known as the Subdivision Control Act, M.C.L. § 560.101 et seq.:

(1) When a plat is certified, signed, acknowledged and recorded as prescribed in this act, every dedication, gift or grant to the public or any person, society or corporation marked or noted as such on the plat shall be deemed sufficient conveyance to vest the fee simple of all parcels of land so marked and noted, and shall be considered a general warranty against the donors, their heirs and assigns to the donees for their use for the purposes therein expressed and no other.
(2) The land intended for the streets, alleys, commons, parks or other public uses as designated on the plat shall be held by the municipality in which the plat is situated in trust to and for such uses and purposes. [MCL 560.253 (emphasis added).]

Defendants suggest that we construe subsection 253(1) to permit a "dedication" to private individuals. However, a thorough review of the case law convinces us that, before and after the platting and subdivision statutes were enacted, "dedication" clearly referred to an appropriation of land for public use. Attorney General ex rel Dep't of Natural Resources v. Cheboygan Co. Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm'rs, 217 Mich.App. 83, 88, 550 N.W.2d 821 (1996)

; see also Patrick v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Kalamazoo,7 120 Mich. 185, 191, 79 N.W. 208 (1899).

First, our case law clearly states that, to accomplish a dedication, the property owner's intent to dedicate the land to the public must be unequivocal. Kraus v. Dep't of Commerce, 451 Mich. 420, 424, 547 N.W.2d 870 (1996). To that end, "a valid dedication of land for a public purpose requires two elements: a recorded plat designating the areas for public use, evidencing a clear intent by the plat proprietor to dedicate those areas to public use, and acceptance by the proper public authority." Id. Acceptance by the public authority must be timely, and it "must be disclosed through a manifest act by the public authority `either formally confirming or accepting the dedication, and ordering the opening of such street, or by exercising authority over it, in some of the ordinary ways of improvement or regulation.' "Id., quoting Tillman v. People, 12 Mich. 401, 405 (1864).

Defendants have not presented evidence of either element to support their statutory dedication claim. The statement, "Outlot A is reserved for the use of the lot owners" does not show a clear intent by the property owner to dedicate the lot to the "public." The declaration specifies that the property is for the use of lot owners. Thus, were we to read the term "reserved" in the plat as a "dedication," no evidence shows that the grantors intended Outlot A to be used by the general public rather than a specified class of persons. Further, the plat contains other language specifically stating "that the streets as shown on said plat are hereby dedicated to the use of the public...." This language clearly shows that, had the developer intended to establish a valid dedication of Outlot A for public use, it could have easily done so. Finally, any intent to dedicate the disputed portion of Outlot A to the public or to other lot owners was negated by the original owner's subsequent, inconsistent act of privately selling the disputed property.

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