Martin v. Bowen

• Decision Date: 09 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. Civ. S-84-1704 MLS.,Civ. S-84-1704 MLS.
• Citation: 670 F. Supp. 295
• Parties: Myrtis D. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

670 F. Supp. 295

Myrtis D. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

No. Civ. S-84-1704 MLS.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

September 9, 1987.

Ann Cerney, Law Offices of Ann Cerney, Stockton, Cal., for plaintiff.

David F. Levi, U.S. Atty., Evelyn M. Matteucci, Asst. U.S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MILTON L. SCHWARTZ, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on plaintiff's application for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). Plaintiff seeks fees of $4,372.50 for 26.2 hours of legal services performed in the above-captioned matter.¹

The application for fees under EAJA is based on the fact that plaintiff was the prevailing party in her suit against defendant to obtain social security benefits. Under EAJA, a successful party in a suit against the United States is entitled to attorney's fees and costs if the government's position is not substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (except for cases sounding in tort).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's application for fees was heard by Magistrate Mix pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(b)(13). On September 19, 1986, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), she filed proposed findings and recommendations. She found that the reasoning in Albrecht v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.1985), precluded an award of attorney's fees under EAJA. She therefore recommended that the application be denied.

On October 2, 1986, plaintiff filed objections to the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations. Plaintiff contended that Albrecht is distinguishable from this case because in this case the Secretary "unlawfully" relied on plaintiff's driver's license in determining whether plaintiff was categorically disabled (due to obesity) instead of relying on the records of plaintiff's treating physician. According to plaintiff, the issue in this case is one of law, not fact; therefore, because Albrecht dealt with whether the Secretary's position was substantially justified factually, Albrecht is not controlling.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 305, this court conducted a de novo review of the magistrate's findings and recommendations. In so doing, the court discovered that Albrecht had been decided prior to the effective date of the 1985 amendments to EAJA, See Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub.L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 ("1985 Amendments"), and that the 1985 Amendments apply to this case.² The court noted that the legislative history to the 1985 Amendments suggests that Congress believes that courts have been misconstruing the term "substantially justified." See H.R.Rep. No. 99-120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 132, 138 ("House Report"). The court also noted that at least one district court has concluded that Albrecht is no longer good law in light of this legislative history. See Derby v. Bowen, 636 F.Supp. 803, 806-08 (E.D. Wash.1986).

Because neither party had addressed the issues raised by the legislative history to the 1985 Amendments and Derby, the court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs. The parties have done so and the case has been resubmitted for decision. The following constitutes the court's decision on the issues raised by plaintiff's application.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Background on Albrecht

Albrecht was a social security case in which the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") was reversed for failing to identify clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the reports of plaintiff's treating physicians in denying plaintiff disability benefits. 765 F.2d at 915. As a result, the district court concluded that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 916. The court denied, however, plaintiff's application for fees under EAJA, finding that the existence of some evidence supporting the Secretary's position precluded a finding that the Secretary's position was substantially unjustified. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, noting that "when the ALJ is reversed for failure to weigh conflicting medical evidence properly, an award of fees is inappropriate." Id.

B. 1985 Amendments to EAJA

The House Report prepared in conjunction with the 1985 Amendments to EAJA says that agency action found to be unsupported by substantial evidence is "virtually certain" not to have been substantially justified under EAJA. House Report, at 9-10, 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 138. The text of the relevant passage reads as follows:

Another problem which has developed in the implementation of the Act has been the fact that courts have been divided on the meaning of "substantial justification." Several courts have held correctly that "substantial justification" means more than merely reasonable. Because in 1980 Congress rejected a standard of "reasonably justified" in favor of "substantially justified," the test must be more than mere reasonableness.

Especially puzzling, however, have been statements by some courts that an administrative decision may be substantially justified under the Act even if it must be reversed because it was arbitrary and capricious or was not supported by substantial evidence. Agency action found to be arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence is virtually certain not to have been substantially justified under the Act. Only the most extraordinary special circumstances could permit such an action to be found to be substantially justified under the Act.

The Committee expects that the determination of what is "substantially justified" will be decided on a case-by-case basis due to the wide variety of factual contexts and legal issues which make up government disputes.

Id. This language caused the district court in Derby to conclude that Congress intended to displace the prior judicial construction of the term "substantially justified." 636 F.Supp. at 807; accord, Oliveira v. Bowen, 664 F.Supp. 1320 (N.D.Cal.1986) (Western District Court database). The Derby court also acknowledged that such an interpretation of substantial justification moves EAJA "pretty close" to being an automatic fee-shifting statute whenever the Secretary loses. Id.; but see Oliveira, 664 F.Supp. at 1322 (it does not necessarily follow that cases not supported by substantial evidence are not substantially justified).

In reaching this conclusion, the Derby court noted that the House Report's pronouncement of intent "was most assuredly not unanimous," referring to the "vehement objections" of "several individual congressmen." Id. at 808 n. 10. The court concluded, however, that the remarks of individual legislators which conflict with the general intent of Congress as expressed in committee reports will not generally be given a great deal of weight. Id. (citing to and quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76, 105 S.Ct. 479, 483, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984), reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1235, 84 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)).

C. Status of the House Report

The Supreme Court in Garcia did hold that the authoritative source of legislative intent lies in the committee reports on a bill, which represent the collective understanding of those congressmembers involved in drafting and studying the proposed legislation. 105 S.Ct. at 483. The Court also noted that it has traditionally eschewed reliance on "the passing comments of one member" and "casual statements from the floor debates." Id. Consistent with this, the Court concluded that committee reports are "more authoritative" than comments from the floor. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1683, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900, 89 S.Ct. 63, 21 L.Ed.2d 188 (1968), and Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 187, 90 S.Ct. 314, 325, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969)); see also Donovan v. Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders' Union, Local 19, 700 F.2d 539, 544 n. 7 (9th Cir.1983) (also citing Zuber).

The difficulty in applying the rules enunciated in Garcia to this case is that the 1985 Congress was not involved in drafting and studying the term "substantially justified" as used in section 2412 of EAJA. Moreover, to the extent that these congressmembers did "study" EAJA in the process of reenacting it, they chose to leave the language virtually the same as it was enacted in 1980.³ This is so even though the stated purpose of the 1985 Amendments was to make "clarifying technical and substantive amendments" to EAJA and to make EAJA, as amended, permanent. See House Report, at 1, 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News at 132.⁴

The Supreme Court has held that the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2060, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). Of course, subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction, id. at 118 n. 18 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 380-81, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969)), because Congress has proceeded formally through the legislative process.⁵Id. A mere statement as to what a committee believes an earlier statute meant is "obviously less weighty." Id.; see also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1517, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982) ("such post hoc statements of a Congressional committee are not entitled to much weight."). Thus, even when it would be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its enactment. 447 U.S. at 117, 100 S.Ct. at 2060.

With respect to the meaning of the term "substantially justified," the Ninth...