Martin v. Camp

Decision Date03 October 1916
PartiesMARTIN v. CAMP et al.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Action by James G. Martin against Hugh N. Camp, Jr., as executor, and another. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (161 App. Div. 610,146 N. Y. Supp. 1041), affirming a judgment of the Special Term for plaintiff, the defendant named appeals. Reversed.

George Edwin Joseph, of New York City (Henry C. Quinby, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Barclay E. V. McCarty, of New York City, for respondent.

SEABURY, J.

This is an action by the assignee of a firm of attorneys and counselors at law to recover damages for the breach of a contract of professional employment. The plaintiff's assignors were retained by the appellant's testator to recover an award in condemnation proceedings. The contract stipulated that the compensation to be paid should be contingent upon success and fixed the sum that was to be paid in event of success as a proportion of the amount recovered. The plaintiff's assignors rendered substantial services under their contract, and were discharged by the appellant without cause. The first question which we are called upon to determine is whether an attorney employed for a single litigation, who is dismissed by his client without cause, may maintain an action for damages for the breach of that contract, or whether he is limited to a recovery based upon a quantum meruit. The learned Appellate Division were not in agreement upon this question, although the majority were of the opinion that an action for damages might be maintained under such circumstances. While the precise question has not been determined by this court, the nature and character of the contract of employment of an attorney by a client has been clearly defined. It is evident that the question not presented for decision must be determined in accord with the legal principles which define the nature and character of such a contract. The contract under which an attorney is employed by a client has peculiar and distinctive features which differentiate it from ordinary contracts of employment. In ascertaining the nature of such a contract little assistance is to be derived from the consideration of analogous contracts under the English common law.

In the early case of Adams v. Stevens, 26 Wend. 451, 455, the whole subject was learnedly discussed by Chancellor Walworth. After commenting upon the practice existing under the civil and common law the chancellor said:

‘Whatever may be the practice of other countries, however, the principle never has been adopted in this state that the professions of physicians and counsellors are merely honorary, and that they are not of right entitled to demand and receive a fair compensation for their services; especially where there is an agreement to pay them a fixed compensation, or such a reasonable remuneration for their services as those services shall be deemed to be worth.’

Substantially the view which Chancellor Walworth expressed is now embodied in statute form in section 474 of the Judiciary Law. Cons. Laws, c. 30. That section provides that:

‘The compensation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law.’

Notwithstanding the fact that the employment of an attorney by a client is governed by the contract which the parties make, the peculiar relation of trust and confidence that such a relationship implies injects into the contract certain special and unique features. In Marsh v. Holbrook, 3 Abb. Dec. 176, the question whether an attorney could recover upon a quantum meruit merely or might recover in an action for damages for breach of contract was discussed. Two members of the court who participated in the decision of that case were of the opinion that the attorney was entitled to recover the whole contract price. The question was not, however, determined, Judge Woodruff pointing out that the question was not necessarily before the court as the attorney had not appealed from the judgment. Since the decision of that case the nature of the contract existing between attorney and client has been the subject of frequent discussion. Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398, 98 N. E. 914, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 536, and cases cited; Andrewes v. Haas, 214 N. Y. 255, 259,108 N. E. 423.These cases, and many others that might appropriately be cited to the same effect, establish that while so far as the attorney is concerned the contract is entire and the attorney cannot recover unless he completely performs, the client with or without cause may terminate the contract at any time. The substance of the rule declared in these cases was expressed by Judge Hiscock in Matter of Dunn, supra. In that case it was said:

‘It is well established in the case of the client that he may at any time for any reason which seems satisfactory to him, however arbitrary, discharge his attorney.’ 205 N. Y. 402, 98 N. E. 916, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 536.

[1][2] That the client may at any time for any reason or without any reason discharge his attorney is a firmly established rule which springs from the personal and confidential nature of the relation which such a contract of employment calls into existence. Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398, 98 N. E. 914, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 536. If the client has the right to terminate the relationship of attorney and client at any time without cause, it follows as a corollary that the client cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising a right which is an implied condition of the contract. If in such a case the client can be compelled to pay damages to his attorney for the breach of the contract, the contract under which a client employs an attorney would not differ from the ordinary contract of employment. In such a case the attorney may recover the reasonable value of the services which he has rendered, but he cannot recover for damages for the breach of contract. The discharge of the attorney by his client does not constitute a breach of the contract, because it is a term of such contract, implied from the peculiar relationship which the contract calls into existence, that the client may terminate the contract at any time with or without cause.

We are aware that in certain jurisdictions a contrary rule has been adopted, and that it has been held that where the attorney is employed to perform services for an agreed sum and is discharged without cause and thereby prevented from the performance of the contract, the attorney may recover the full contract price. Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, 84 Ohio St. 425, 95 N. E. 913, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 737;Bartlett v. Odd Fellows Sav. Bank, 79 Cal. 218, 21 Pac. 743,12 Am. St. Rep. 139;French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N. E. 797;Moyer v. Cantieny, 41 Minn. 242, 42 N. W. 1060;Kersey v. Garton, 77 Mo. 645;Myers v. Crockett, 14 Tex. 257;Mt. Vernon v. Patton, 94 Ill. 65.

In Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, supra, it was held that because the attorney had performed no services under his contract, and the client had not been in any way benefited, the rule of quantum meruit was...

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