Martin v. Cent. R. Co. of N.J.

Decision Date28 March 1935
Docket NumberNo. 242.,242.
Citation178 A. 82
PartiesMARTIN v. CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Proceeding by Jennie Y. Martin to recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of Joseph Y. Martin, employee, opposed by the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, employer. An award of compensation by the workmen's compensation bureau was affirmed by a judgment of the court of common pleas, and the employer brings certiorari.

Judgment reversed.

Argued October term, 1934, before HEHER and PERSKIE, JJ.

Charles E. Miller, of New York City, for prosecutor.

Harvey Rothberg, of Plainfield, for respondent.

HEHER, Justice.

Respondent's decedent, Joseph Y. Martin, suffered death, on November 2, 1932, by an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the prosecutor. The workmen's compensation bureau awarded compensation to his dependents under the state compensation act. Pamph. L 1911, p. 134, as amended (Comp. St. Supplements 1924, 1930, N. J. St. Annuals 1931, 1932, § **236— 1 et seq.). The Hudson common pleas affirmed the judgment; and the employer sued out a writ of certiorari.

The question at issue is whether the deceased, at the time he sustained the fatal injuries, was employed in interstate commerce within the intendment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 USCA §§ 51-59.

The facts are stipulated. Prosecutor is the operator of a railroad in this state. It engages in both interstate and intrastate cominerce. In the transaction of such business, it maintains a train shed at its terminal in the city of Jersey City. It employed the deceased as a painter. While engaged in repairing the skylight on the roof of the terminal train shed, he fell through an opening to the railroad tracks below, and thereby sustained the fatal injuries.

Tested by the apposite rule, the service at which the deceased was engaged when the accident befell him falls into the category of interstate commerce. The criterion of employment in such commerce is, Was the employee, at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it? Rossi v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 115 N. J. Law, 1, 178 A. 77. It is essential that the carrier be engaged in interstate commerce at the time the injury is sustained, and that the Injured employee be then employed by the carrier in such commerce. The nature of the particular employment on other occasions is of no moment. The act has reference to the service being rendered when the injury was sustained, and it necessarily follows that one may be employed in what is technically interstate commerce, and yet not be a member of the class entitled to the benefits of the federal statute. Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the federal Supreme Court, said: "The federal act gives redress only for injuries received in interstate commerce. But how determine the commerce? Commerce is movement, and the work and general repair shops of a railroad, and those employed in them, are accessories to that movement,—indeed, are necessary to it, but so are all attached to the railroad company,—official, clerical, or mechanical. Against such a broad generalization of relation we, however, may instantly pronounce, and successively against lesser ones, until we come to the relation of the employment to the actual operation of the instrumentalities for a distinction between commerce and no commerce. In other words, we are brought to a consideration of degrees, and the test declared, that the employee at the time of the in Jury, must be engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it, in order to displace state jurisdiction and make applicable the federal act. And there is a difference in the instrumentalities. In some, the tracks, bridges, and roadbed and equipment in actual use, may be said to have definite character, and give it to those employed upon them." Industrial Accident Commission v. Davis, 259 U. S. 182, 42 S. Ct. 489, 491, 66 L. Ed. 888. The formula for the classification of such cases has been stated thus: Was the work being done independently of the interstate commerce in which the defendant was engaged, or was it so closely connected therewith as to be a part of it? Was the performance of this work a matter of indifference so far as that commerce was concerned, or was it in the nature of a duty resting upon the carrier? Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 S. Ct. 648, 649, 57 L. Ed. 1125. Mr. Justice Van Devanter said: "Tracks and bridges are as indispensable to interstate commerce by railroad as are engines and cars; and sound economic reasons unite with settled rules of law in demanding that all of these instrumentalities be kept in repair. The security, expedition, and efficiency of the commerce depends in large measure upon this being done. Indeed, the statute now before us proceeds upon the theory that the carrier is charged with the duty of exercising appropriate care to prevent or correct 'any defect or insufficiency * * * in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment' used in Interstate commerce. But independently of the statute, we are of opinion that the work of keeping such instrumentalities in a proper state of repair while thus used is so closely related to such commerce as to be in practice and in legal contemplation a part of it. * * * Of course, we are not here concerned with the construction of tracks, bridges, engines, or cars which have not as yet become instrumentalities in such commerce, but only with the work of maintaining them in proper condition after they have become such instrumentalities and during their use as such. True, a track or bridge may be used in both interstate and intrastate commerce, but when it is so used it is none the less an instrumentality of the former; nor does its double use prevent the employment of those who are engaged in its repair or in keeping it in suitable condition for use from being an employment in interstate commerce."

A terminal train shed is an indispensable adjunct of interstate passenger transportation; it is clearly an instrumentality used in the conduct of such commerce. That being so, it is incumbent upon the railroad to keep it in repair, and to adopt the measures necessary to safeguard its users; and it is a corollary of this that the work done in the performance of this duty, while it is used in such commerce, is so closely and immediately related to interstate...

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4 cases
  • Fury v. N.Y. & L. B. R. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • October 20, 1941
    ...& N. W. R. Co. v. Bolle, 284 U.S. 74, 52 S.Ct. 59, 76 L.Ed. 173; Martin v. Central R. R. Co., 116 N.J. L. 162, 182 A. 897, reversing 115 N.J.L. 11, 178 A. 82) and conceding further that respondent, when actually at his work at the time of his injury, may also be said to be included within t......
  • Martin v. Cent. R. Co. of N.J.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • January 31, 1936
    ...Pleas affirming a determination of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau awarding compensation was reversed by the Supreme Court (115 N.J.Law, 11, 178 A. 82), and claimant Judgment of the Supreme Court reversed. Sydney Schwartz and Harvey Rothberg, both of Plainfield, for appellant. William F. ......
  • Coviello v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • September 25, 1940
    ...Bureau in dismissing the petition was correct. See Martin v. C. R. R., 116 N.J.L. 162, 182 A. 897, reversing judgment reported in 115 N.J.L. 11, 178 A. 82. Compare Rossi v. P. R. R., 115 N.J.L. 1, 178 A. 77, affirmed 117 N.J.L. 148, 187 A. The judgment of the Pleas will be affirmed ami the ......
  • Furferi v. Pa. R. Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Court of Common Pleas
    • July 15, 1935
    ...bins coal to be used by locomotives engaged in interstate commerce is not within the federal statute. Martin v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 115 N. J. Law, 11 at page 16, 178 A. 82. If decedent had been injured while moving one of these ties from the pile, after they were unloaded from the......

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