Martin v. City of Linden
| Decision Date | 15 September 1995 |
| Citation | 667 So.2d 732 |
| Parties | Judy MARTIN v. CITY OF LINDEN, Alabama. CITY OF LINDEN v. Judy MARTIN. 1940251, 1940374. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeals from Montgomery Circuit Court, No. CV-91-1346; Eugene Reese, Judge.
William G. McKnight, Montgomery, for appellant/cross appellee Martin.
John T. Alley, Jr. of Crumpton, McGregor, Davis & Alley, Montgomery and W.W. Dinning, Jr. of Lloyd, Dinning, Boggs & Dinning, Dempolis, for appellee/cross appellant City of Linden.
These consolidated appeals involve a dispute between a municipality and a landowner over the reasonable use of a common aquifer, or bed of groundwater, that lies beneath the property of both. The specific question is whether the City of Linden can drill a permanent well on a one-acre tract of land it owns outside its municipal limits, and pump the water by pipeline at an estimated rate of 700 gallons per minute or 500,000 gallons per day to the City, which is located approximately 15 miles from the site of the well, for use by its consumers. In addition to the issue whether the City should be permitted to use the groundwater off of the lands from which it is taken, a secondary issue is whether the trial court erred in holding that the appellant must wait until the well is drilled and show actual harm to her water supply before she can apply for an injunction. However, before we can address either issue, we must determine whether previous litigation on this matter, Hereford v. City of Linden, 540 So.2d 49 (Ala.1988), is a bar to this action under either the doctrine of res judicata or the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
For reasons discussed below, this action is not barred under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. We hold that the City's proposed use of the water is impermissible under judicial interpretations of the rule of reasonable use, and we also hold that the trial judge erred in determining that the appellant must wait until her lands have been damaged before she can bring this action. Consequently, we reverse the judgment and remand the case.
In reaching this result, we distinguish the case of Adams v. Lang, 553 So.2d 89 (Ala.1989), in which this Court, using the rule of "reasonable use," held that a landowner was not liable for damages to his neighbor's land resulting from the landowner's drawing water from under his land for beneficial use of the water on the land from which it was taken, in that case, to supply a catfish farm, even though this use depleted the water underneath the surface to such an extent that his neighbor's wells periodically ran dry.
The City of Linden's water supply is contaminated with saltwater and is unfit for consumption. The City presently purchases the water it furnishes to its citizens from the City of Uniontown. In 1983, the City purchased a one-acre tract of land next to Judy Martin's farm. The City's sole purpose in purchasing the land was to drill a deep-water well from which it would extract water for use by its residents; the water would be carried 15 miles by pipeline to the city and would be used for any and all purposes, including resale. In 1983, the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") granted the City a permit to drill a test well. Following litigation, the well was drilled and samples were taken. It was then capped.
Judy Martin contends that the City's withdrawal of water from the proposed well will deplete or irreparably damage the water table beneath her farm. She sought to enjoin the drilling of the well, and she appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the City that denied her relief.
Mrs. Martin's former husband, Roy Hereford, and other adjacent landowners sued in 1984 to block the drilling of the test well. At that time, Hereford sought an injunction against the City based upon the American rule of "reasonable use." After that action was filed, ADEM revoked the permit it had issued to the City, and told the City that a permit was not required for a test well and that the City could proceed without one. Hereford and the other adjacent landowners appealed to this Court after the trial court refused to issue an injunction to stop the City from drilling the test well. In Hereford v. City of Linden, supra, this Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case on procedural grounds, concluding that ADEM had erred in revoking the permit for the test well. This Court stated that ADEM had the authority to monitor test wells under §§ 22-23-40 and -41, Ala.Code 1975, and held that the City had violated those statutes by proceeding without a permit. This Court ordered the trial court to enjoin the City from further activity until the City went through proper channels and obtained a permit for the well. After the initial litigation and appeal, the City of Linden began to purchase water from the City of Uniontown. It obtained a permit for the test well, and once a permit was obtained, the City apparently drilled and later capped the test well after obtaining samples.
On March 30, 1991, ADEM issued a permit to the City allowing it to drill a permanent well on the land. After the Environmental Management Commission upheld the issuance of the permit on appeal, the appellant sued ADEM, the Environmental Management Commission, and the City of Linden in Montgomery Circuit Court, pursuant to § 41-22-20, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court took judicial notice of the record of the Hereford trial in its consideration of the parties' motions for summary judgment.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the City of Linden. The trial judge held that Mrs. Martin's action was premature, and that she must wait until the well has been drilled and she can show that she has suffered damages before she could file her action. The trial judge also held that the previous litigation between the parties did not operate as a bar to this action on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel, and he instructed the City to cross appeal for the purpose of determining how the rule of "reasonable use" of groundwater applied under the facts in this case. Both Mrs. Martin and the City concede that the rule of "reasonable use" is applicable in this case.
The initial question this Court must address is whether the previous litigation concerning this matter, Hereford v. City of Linden, 540 So.2d 49 (Ala.1988), bars this action on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel, as the City of Linden contends. This Court agrees with the trial court that neither doctrine is applicable under these facts.
Alabama law requires four elements for the application of the doctrine of res judicata. First, there must be a substantial identity between the parties in the prior and subsequent suits; second, both suits must involve the same cause of action; third, the prior action must have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction; and fourth, the previous adjudication must have been on the merits of the case. If one of these elements is not present, then the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable. Ferguson v. Commercial Bank, 578 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Ala.1991).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when the subsequent suit between the same parties is not based upon the same cause of action.
Adams v. Carpenter, 566 So.2d 236, 242 (Ala.1990).
After examining the briefs and reviewing the arguments of both parties, as well as the record in Hereford, we hold that this action is not barred either by the doctrine of res judicata or by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We note the following exchange, found in the record of the Hereford case, between the appellant's attorney, William G. McKnight, and the trial court:
It is evident from this exchange during the Hereford litigation that the trial court did not rule on the ultimate issue presented in this case; the trial court merely decided the question there presented--whether the test well could be drilled after the permit had been revoked by ADEM. This Court, in deciding the appeal in the Hereford case, reversed the judgment and remanded that case on procedural grounds only; we held that ADEM had erred in declaring that a permit was not needed to drill a test well, and we instructed the trial court to enjoin the City from proceeding until it had obtained such a permit. See Hereford, 540 So.2d at 51. Accordingly, there was no previous adjudication on the merits in the earlier case; therefore, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. There has likewise been no previous resolution of the ultimate issue presented in this case; therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel cannot be invoked.
In reviewing a summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court applies in determining "whether the evidence before the court made out a genuine issue of material fact" and whether the movant was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862, 863 (Ala.1988); Rule 56(c),...
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