Martin v. City of Glasgow, Case No. 1:11–CV–00064–R.

• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Western District of Kentucky
• Writing for the Court: THOMAS B. RUSSELL
• Citation: 882 F.Supp.2d 903
• Parties: Larry MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GLASGOW, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants.
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:11–CV–00064–R.
• Decision Date: 26 July 2012

882 F.Supp.2d 903

Larry MARTIN, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF GLASGOW, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:11–CV–00064–R.

United States District Court,
W.D. Kentucky,
Bowling Green Division.

July 26, 2012.

[882 F.Supp.2d 905]

Shane C. Sidebottom, Stephen D. Wolnitzek, Wolnitzek & Rowekamp PSC, Covington, KY, for Plaintiff.

Stacey A. Blankenship, Douglas R. Moore Denton & Keuler, LLP Paducah, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
THOMAS B. RUSSELL, Senior District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment by Plaintiff and Defendants (DN 32; DN 33). The parties have fully briefed the motions (DN 35; DN 36; DN 37; DN 38; DN 39) and they now are ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART. This matter is hereby DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Larry Martin (“Martin”) was employed as a police officer with the City of Glasgow, Kentucky (“the City”) until the spring of 2011. A physical altercation between Martin and a prisoner in the Barren Country courthouse led to his termination from the Glasgow Police Department (“GPD”). Martin brings this lawsuit against the City and three of its principal officials: Rhonda Trautman (“Trautman”), the City's mayor, James Duff (“Duff”), a Lieutenant Colonel of the GPD, and Kent Keen (“Keen”), another Lieutenant Colonel of the GPD (collectively “Defendants”). Martin's chief grievance revolves around Defendants' failure to abide by the procedural due process protections that Kentucky law provides police officers before termination of employment.

The undisputed, material facts are as follows. Martin's work as a police officer for the GPD began in September of 2006.¹ On February 24, 2011, officers for the GPD were in the Barren County courthouse supervising criminal defendants and performing other security-related functions. James Owens was scheduled to make an appearance that day before Judge Patton in a criminal matter. Court personnel determined during his hearing that Owens was either intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, prompting the judge to order Martin and other officers nearby to arrest him.

A scuffle ensued when Owens began to hurl racial insults at the African American officers. The officers handcuffed Owens and escorted him to an elevator to transport him to the ground floor. Martin entered the elevator with Owens and two

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other officers. Once inside, Owens began to struggle with the officers anew. In response, Martin removed his police baton and stuck Owens on the arms, in the groin, and on the shoulders. An officer accompanying the group had to order Martin to stop striking the prisoner. Owens was eventually removed to a detention center without having suffered major injury. He did not recall much about the incident given his state of inebriation, nor did he file a complaint with the GPD or municipal government.

Martin met with Duff regarding the episode on March 6, 2011. There, Duff accused Martin of needlessly assaulting Owens. He then suspended Martin with pay and ordered him to turn over his weapon and badge. Duff Depo., DN 23 p. 8. Martin returned to GPD headquarters the next day to meet with Duff and Keen, both of whom were interim co-police chiefs. Duff and Keen informed Martin again that he would be suspended with pay while the GPD investigated the assault on Owens. DN 33–8. The co-chiefs did not present Martin with formal charges and gave no notice of a forthcoming administrative hearing. Between March 7 and March 16, 2011, Duff, Keen, and Trautman met to discuss Martin's future employment and eventually decided to discharge him. Trautman Depo., DN 20 p. 9–10; Duff Depo., DN 23–1 p. 2, 3.

On March 16, Martin returned to GPD headquarters to meet with Duff and Keen and discuss the results of the investigation. The precise disciplinary charges against Martin were not given to him during the encounter. Trautman Depo., DN 20 p. 11–12. The only documentation provided by Duff and Keen was an “Employee Disciplinary Notice,” which referenced portions of GPD's code of conduct that Martin had allegedly violated. DN 33–10. During the meeting, Duff and Keen asked Martin to resign his post with the GPD, insinuating that it would bode better for his future employment if he left voluntarily. Keen Depo., DN 21 p. 8; Duff Depo., DN 35–1 p. 5. Martin asked to speak with an attorney before deciding what to do, whereupon Duff warned him that if he left the conference room he would be terminated. Duff Depo., DN 35–1 p. 5; Keen Depo., DN 21 p. 8. Martin left the room shortly thereafter, resulting in his termination. Keen Depo., DN 21 p. 9. Duff and Keen executed the Employee Disciplinary Notice after the meeting, which stated that Martin's employment ended on March 16 at 1:15 p.m. DN 33–10.

Later that day, an officer for the GPD arrived at Martin's residence to collect his city-issued equipment and identification. Keen Depo., DN 21 p. 8. Trautman signed the Employee Disciplinary Notice on March 21, 2011, formally authorizing Martin's termination. DN 33–10. In the days following, the City's human resources department issued Martin's final pay check and removed him from Kentucky's retirement system and the group health insurance plan. DN 32–9; DN 32–10; DN 32–11; DN 32–12.

On April 1, 2011, a report appeared in the local media that a criminal complaint had been filed against Martin for impersonating a police officer. The GPD issued a press release four days later informing the public that Martin had been dismissed on March 16 for violations of departmental policy. DN 32–14. The press release recited the generalities of the criminal complaint and was disseminated to local media outlets.

The Kentucky General Assembly has enacted legislation to protect the employment rights of police officers and firemen. These statutes outline procedures that cities and municipalities must abide by when suspending and terminating police officers for cause. SeeKRS §§ 15.520, 95.450.

[882 F.Supp.2d 907]

Section 95.450 governs the employment rights of police officers in third-class cities like Glasgow. According to its provisions, no officer may be terminated for departmental infractions until after written charges are preferred and served on the officer and a hearing is conducted before the city's legislative body. KRS § 95.450(1), (3). The hearing must be scheduled after the charges are levied against the officer, and at least two days before the hearing the officer must be informed of its time and place. Id. § 95.450(3). The officer may compel witnesses to appear and testify on his behalf. Id. § 95.450(4). Dismissal of the officer may only follow once the legislative body finds the officer guilty of the conduct. Id. § 95.450(5).

Defendants acknowledge that the meeting held on March 16 did not satisfy the procedural requirements of KRS § 95.450. On April 14, Defendants realized their mistake and attempted to undo the error. Trautman penned and sent a letter that day rescinding Martin's termination but placing him on suspension without pay. DN 33–12. The letter made the suspension retroactive, effective from March 16 at 1:15 p.m. DN 33–12. It also informed Martin that a hearing would be scheduled before the City's legislative body pursuant to KRS § 95.450. DN 33–12. The letter was personally delivered that day to Martin's residence by a member of the GPD. DN 33–13. Unpersuaded by Trautman's act of contrition, Martin filed this lawsuit the next day. Complaint, DN 1.

Martin's hearing was scheduled before the City Council for May 3, 2011. DN 33–14. On April 18, 2011, the City faxed a copy of the notice of the hearing to Martin's attorney, who in turn emailed it to Martin. On April 29, 2011, Trautman sent another letter to Martin with the administrative charges, the notice of the hearing, and all documents that would be considered by the City Council during the hearing. This package of materials was sent via regular mail, certified mail, and delivered by courier to his residence. It is unclear if Martin received it.

Martin did not attend the hearing and sent no written response. At the hearing, the City Council heard testimony from four witnesses to the event. Afterwards, it unanimously found Martin guilty on the disciplinary charges and terminated his employment.

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

“[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.1989). The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir.1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the plaintiff must present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find for the plaintiff. See id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment: “the mere existence of a colorable factual

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dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir.1996).

DISCUSSION

The...