Martin v. Colvin

Decision Date04 November 2014
Docket NumberNO. 3:14-0209,3:14-0209
PartiesSUSAN G. MARTIN v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
TO: Honorable Kevin H. Sharp, Chief District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

By Order entered January 30, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 3), the Court referred the above captioned action to the Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.

Presently pending is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 24), to which the plaintiff has filed a response in opposition. See Docket Entry No. 31. Also before the Court is the Defendants' reply (Docket Entry No. 34) and the plaintiff's sur-reply (Docket Entry No. 36).1 For the reasons set out below, the Court recommends that the Defendants' motion be granted and that this action be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 27, 2014, the pro se plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint and request for injunctive relief against the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint adding the Attorney General of the United States as a defendant to the action. See Docket Entry No. 22.

The plaintiff asserts that she is a 62 year old female "member of a heterosexual marital tax unit" who has filed a joint tax return with her spouse during all the 40 years of their marriage. See Amended Complaint (Docket Entry No. 22), at 5. The plaintiff contends that she "met with the SSA" regarding what she believes are inequities in the manner in which the Social Security and Medicare taxes deducted from her and her spouse's combined wages over the years were allocated between herself and her spouse with respect to the earning of SSA credits and the payment of anticipated Social Security benefits to her spouse and herself. Id. Essentially, it appears that the plaintiff complained that, despite the payment of joint taxes by her spouse and herself, she was not being given SSA credits for the time she spent over the years as a wife and mother who was not receiving an earned income but was contributing to the marital household by enabling her spouse to earn income and pay taxes. The plaintiff asserts that she was told that she needed to work and pay additional taxes or "get the law changed because that's the way it's always been done," or the benefits she and her spouse could receive would be significantly reduced or eliminated. Id.2 She contends that the record keeping practices of the SSA are archaic and discriminatory against married women. Id. at 2.

The plaintiff further contends that she has been discriminated against because the SSA does not treat members of same-sex marriages in a similar manner to members of heterosexual marriages and has retroactively processed widows' and widowers' claims arising from same-sex marriages.Id. at 3. She complains that the United States government's administration of tax laws and benefits with respect to same-sex couples adversely impacts her receipt of "benefits of taxation" and her right to "live in health and safety" and is forcing "Republican Party officials" in states that do not recognize same-sex marriages to validate same-sex marriage licenses from other states. Id. at 10-12.

The plaintiff asserts that she has standing "as an aggrieved married female taxpayer and grandmother," id. at 3, and brings claims against the Defendants based on several constitutional provisions and federal statutes, including the First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments to United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988, and the Revenue Act of 1948. Id. at 14-16. The plaintiff asserts that jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340, 1343, 1356, 1361, and 1391 and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988. Id. at 1. She seeks "actual and punitive damages, costs, fees, penalties, and all other amounts in equity and law," Id. at 14, as well as the following forms of injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to:

1) "equally divide the combined taxable income (including wages and net income/loss from self employment) and taxes taken from wages of legally married spouses for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 414(a)(2), §§ 413(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii), and § 403(f)(5)(A);"
2) refrain from "denying legally married females the same number of QC's as their spouses, and from using record-keeping practices that deprive legally married females and heterosexual male widowers in legal "marital tax units" of benefits, equal protections, privileges, privacy and Due Process;"

3) refrain from applying "'purported marriage' and 'duration of marriage' rules (similar to 42 U.S. Code § 416 (h)(1)(B)(ii), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(1)(E)), to same sex purported marriages, and from retroactively giving marriage validity and taxpayer benefits to members of purported marriages consummated with the knowledge that the license contradicted Federal laws and could be used only in the state that sold it as a special license without reciprocity between states at the time it was sold;" and

4) refrain "from using record-keeping practices that interfere with, aggrieve, and deprive both Single females and females in legal 'marital tax units' from freely exercising religious rights, freedoms, beliefs, privacies, and practices related to education and child-bearing."

Id. at 15-6.

The Defendants seek dismissal of the action under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The Defendants contend that the plaintiff has not shown that she has suffered any type of actual injury that satisfies the case and controversy requirement and thus fails to show that she has Article III standing for her claims. The Defendants further argue that, even if Article III standing is established, principles of sovereign immunity limit the jurisdiction of the Court. The Defendants assert that judicial review of actions by the Commissioner regarding benefits under the SSA is specifically limited by 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 405(h) to review of final decisions of the Commissioner, and that the plaintiff's own allegations do not show that she has filed a claim or request for benefits, let alone received a final decision, that permits judicial review of her complaints about the calculation of her benefits. The Defendants argue that the several other statutes to which the plaintiff refers in her Amended Complaint do not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, the Defendants contend that the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the various civil rights statutes set out in her complaint and seek dismissal of these claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case is a threshold issue. See New Hampshire Co. v. Home Sav. & Loan Co. of Youngstown, Ohio, 581 F.3d 420, 423 (6th Cir. 2009). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Lewis v. Whirlpool Corp., 630 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2011). Failure to satisfy this burden requires dismissal of the action. Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 505 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2007). See also Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed under the standard that the Court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint, resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor, and construe the complaint liberally in favor of the pro se plaintiff. See Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006); Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999); Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11-12 (6th Cir. 1987). However, although the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must provide the grounds for his entitlement to relief and this "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations supplied must be enough to show a plausible right to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-61. The Court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001).

III. CONCLUSIONS

The Court presumes as true that the plaintiff holds sincere personal beliefs in both the sanctity of marriage between only a man and a woman and in the value that non-wage earning spouses, who have historically been females, play in the family household and in society at large. The plaintiff is obviously upset and frustrated with 1) certain aspects of the benefits system provided by the Social Security Act that do not jibe with her beliefs, and 2) the current trend toward giving legal recognition to same sex marriages and the resulting ramifications of that recognition. Her frustration has led her to pay $400.00 to file the instant lawsuit...

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