Martin v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review

• Decision Date: 06 January 1982
• Citation: 439 A.2d 207,63 Pa.Cmwlth. 629
• Parties: Elaine MARTIN, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 207

439 A.2d 207

63 Pa.Cmwlth. 629

Elaine MARTIN, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 7, 1981.

Decided Jan. 6, 1982.

Joseph Mesar and John Stember, Neighborhood Legal Services Ass'n, Braddock, for petitioner.

Richard Wagner, Gen. Counsel, James K. Bradley and Richard L. Cole, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, Harrisburg, for respondent.

Before MENCER, WILLIAMS and MacPHAIL, JJ.

MENCER, Judge.

Elaine Martin (claimant) has appealed from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which denied her benefits for failing to meet the financial qualification provisions of Section 404 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Act), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 804. We affirm.

Claimant had been employed for 31/2 years by the National Biscuit Company when she was validly separated from employment. She filed an application for unemployment compensation benefits with an effective date of April 22, 1979. Because of sporadic layoffs, claimant averaged approximately 5 months of employment per year. The Board affirmed a determination of the referee finding claimant ineligible for benefits because of insufficient base year wages. This appeal followed.

In determining claimant's eligibility for compensation, the Board referred to the following portions of the Table Specified for the Determination of Rate and Amount of Benefits (Table), Section 404(e)(1) of the Act, 43 P.S. § 804(e)(1):

                 Part A
                 Highest    Part B         Part C
                Quarterly   Rate of      Qualifying   Part D          Part E
                  Wage     Compensation    Wages     Amount of  Compensation
                ---------  ------------  ----------  -----------------------
                . . . 
                2913-2937      119          4680       3094         3570
                2938-2962      120          4720       3120         3600
                2963-2987      121          4760       3146         3630
                2988-3012      122          4800       3172         3660
                . . . 
                3363-3387      137          5400       3562         4110
                3388-3412      138          5440       3588         4140
                3413-3437      139          5480       3614         4170
                3438-3462      140          5520       3640         4200
                

During her base year, ¹ claimant earned wages in the amount of $4,433, with high-quarter earnings in the amount of $2,989. Section 404(a)(1) of the Act, 43 P.S. § 804(a)(1), requires that the employee's weekly benefit rate be computed as "(1) the amount appearing in Part B of the Table Specified for the Determination of Rate and Amount of Benefits on the line on which in Part A there appears his 'highest quarterly wage,' or (2) fifty per centum (50%) of his full-time weekly wage, whichever is greater." Here, claimant's weekly benefit rate is $140, since one-half of her full-time weekly wage ($140) is greater than the rate of compensation that appears on the same line as her high quarterly wage ($122). Section 404(c)(1), formerly 43 P.S. § 804(c)(1), provided, however, that, in order to qualify for the amount of compensation listed in Part D, the employee must earn base year qualifying wages equal to the amount specified in Part C of the Table on the same line in which his weekly benefit rate appears. Claimant did not earn the amount of $5,520 necessary for her to qualify under this method. While Section 404(a)(3), 43 P.S § 804(a)(3), formerly allowed an employee to receive benefits at "any one of the next four lower weekly benefit rates" if sufficient base year wages appeared on the corresponding line in Part C of the Table, claimant nevertheless lacks the necessary amount of qualifying wages at the lower benefit rates.

Although an employee's eligibility can be redetermined under clause (1) if he failed to qualify under clause (2) of Section 404(a)(1), claimant is still ineligible for benefits after such a redetermination. Claimant's high-quarter earnings yield a weekly benefit rate of $122. Her base year wages of $4,433 are insufficient, however, to meet the requisite qualifying amount of $4,800 that appears on Part C of the same line. Again, claimant lacks sufficient qualifying wages to be eligible at "any one of the next four lower weekly benefit rates."

The issue in this case is whether the financial eligibility requirements of the Act violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Claimant argues that employees with "high quarterly wages" exceeding the maximum amount listed in Part A of the Table must earn 20 percent of their wages outside of their high quarter, ² while employees with "high quarterly wages" below the maximum amount must earn approximately 30 to 35 percent of their wages outside of their high quarter. ³ Based upon her high quarterly wage of $2,989, claimant had to have earned 35.1 percent of her income outside of her high quarter to be eligible for benefits, where, in fact, she only earned 32.6 percent of her income outside of her high quarter. Claimant thus submits that Section 404(e) creates an irrational classification by requiring different percentages of wage distribution based upon the amount of high-quarter earnings.

Since no "suspect" classification or fundamental interest is presented here, the financial eligibility provisions must be tested under traditional equal protection analysis, which requires that the "legislative classification must be sustained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1768, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). The Board contends that the financial eligibility scheme was designed to (1) insure that benefits are paid only to those employees who have demonstrated a genuine attachment to the labor force and (2) conserve limited public resources in the administration of the State's unemployment compensation program. We must therefore determine whether the above goals are "appropriate governmental interest(s) suitably furthered by the differential treatment." Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2289, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Certainly, the State has a legitimate interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of the fund and paying benefits only to employees genuinely attached to the labor market. We agree with the Board that these interests are furthered by the differential treatment of employees with high quarterly wages exceeding the Table maximum and employees who fall below that level on the Table.

Upon reviewing the Table, it is clear that claimant has focused her analysis too narrowly by simply examining...