Martin v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Decision Date: 26 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 10470.,10470.
• Parties: James Edward MARTIN, Appellee, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA and C. C. Peyton, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

365 F.2d 549 (1966)

James Edward MARTIN, Appellee, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA and C. C. Peyton, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellants.

No. 10470.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 2, 1966.

Decided July 26, 1966.

Reno S. Harp, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Virginia (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen. of Virginia, on brief), for appellants.

Ivy P. Blue, Jr., Richmond, Va., Court-assigned counsel (Blue, Gordon, Saunders & Neblett, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellee.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF and BOREMAN, Circuit Judges.

SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge:

The Commonwealth of Virginia here appeals from the District Court's order vacating a state court's judgment of conviction and directing a new trial. For reasons to be stated we affirm.

On August 9, 1960, James Edward Martin and two other Negro prisoners escaped from a road gang in Montgomery County, Virginia. Sometime the next evening they came upon the house of Mr. Joseph E. "Ted" Willard, whose automobile was parked in his driveway. As they were pushing the car down the drive into the highway and trying to get it started, the three escapees were chased away by Mr. Willard. Soon afterward they were recaptured and returned to the road camp. While they were at large, the radio broadcast news bulletins every few minutes, and feeling ran high in the community.

On October 3, 1960, Martin and his two fellow prisoners were indicted, tried and convicted for escape and grand larceny.¹ The indictments were handed up by the grand jury between eleven and eleven thirty that morning, and the trial judge appointed an experienced member of the local bar to represent Martin. After discussing the case with Sergeant Reynolds, the officer in charge of the road camp, the attorney spoke briefly with Martin. It is noteworthy that Sergeant Reynolds was present during this conference, at which Martin simply stated that he wanted to plead guilty and "get it over with."

Court was recessed for lunch at twelve o'clock. The appointed counsel sought to negotiate a guilty plea to some lesser charge, but he found the Commonwealth's Attorney "rather bitter because of the situation which created quite a disturbance in our community." At this stage in his representation, the court-appointed attorney had spent less than 30 minutes investigating the case. No change of venue was sought.

After lunch, the attorney talked with several others and conferred again with Martin. Sergeant Reynolds was present at this conference also, and Martin simply repeated his desire to plead guilty. Because of his inability to strike a bargain with the Commonwealth's Attorney, and because in his view — based on his brief acquaintance with the case — there were no possible defenses, the attorney concluded that such a plea would be advisable.

The court reconvened at two o'clock, and Martin and his codefendants were called for trial about three, less than four hours after the indictment. Martin's attorney entered a guilty plea, and several witnesses for the State testified without cross-examination as to the general background of the offenses. Martin was found guilty, and the attorney made a short statement asking for leniency. Although no aggravating circumstances appeared, the court imposed consecutive sentences of five years for the escape (the maximum) and three years for the alleged grand larceny (of a five year maximum). No appeal was taken from these judgments.

In 1965, Martin petitioned the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, to void these convictions. Following a hearing ordered by this court,² the District Court vacated the sentences on the ground that trial on the very day counsel was appointed afforded him insufficient time to investigate the case and reflect on possible defenses to the charges. Judge Butzner articulated his reasoning as follows:

"The Court recognizes that in each of these cases dealing with effectiveness of court-appointed counsel\'s representation the facts were different, but the principles are not different. The appellate courts have insisted that ample time be allowed counsel for preparation. They pointed to possible prejudice in some of the cases, but a showing of actual prejudice is not the basis on which these cases rest. The lack of opportunity for investigation, reflection, conference, and mature consideration which results from trials of felonies immediately after appointment of counsel provides the basis for granting the writ. * * * Courts need not look for specific prejudice. The burden isn\'t on the petitioner to show that he would profit by a trial in which counsel had more time for preparation. Lack of due process is implicit when a felon is tried immediately after the appointment of counsel. * * * To hold otherwise simply invites courts to continue the procedure that leads to pro forma representation. The State can show no compelling reason for indicting a felon, appointing counsel, and trying him all on the same day."³

This condemnation of the one-day indictment, designation of counsel, and trial is in the spirit of earlier decisions in this circuit. See, e. g., Turner v. State of Maryland, 318 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1963); Edgerton v. State of North Carolina, 315 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1963); Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1963). The opinions in these cases recognize that "the act of appointing counsel is not enough if in the circumstances the traverser is not afforded in any substantial sense professional advice and guidance, and this includes an opportunity to prepare for trial." Edgerton v. State of North Carolina, supra 315 F.2d at 678. Thus, when the initial consultation between a court-appointed attorney and his client occurs only a short time before the trial, "normally, in the absence of clear proof that no prejudice resulted, we should be obliged to treat the lawyer's representation as inadequate and the trial as falling short of the standards of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Turner v. State of Maryland, supra 318 F.2d at 854. These and other cases, while differing in their particular facts, establish the principle that a lawyer's duty in representing a person charged with crime may not be discharged perfunctorily or mechanically. Representation is not adequate and a trial does not meet the standard of fundamental fairness if a court-appointed attorney is not afforded an adequate opportunity to investigate and reflect upon his client's case.⁴

In Turner v. State of Maryland, supra, the District Court made detailed findings of fact demonstrating that the inadequate representation had in no way prejudiced the defendant, and on that basis we affirmed dismissal of the petition. The courts have had cumulating experience with the elusive problem of proof in establishing prejudice — or the lack of it — in particular circumstances. On the basis of his experience as a judge in both state and federal courts, Judge Butzner concluded that the inherent danger of prejudice to the client where the attorney allows himself, or is restricted to, such a short time to ready himself for a criminal trial makes additional inquiry futile and unnecessary. He reasoned that when the entire process of indictment, appointment of counsel, and trial is compressed into the span of a few hours, there is grave danger of impairment to the right of adequate representation.

Our analysis of the record persuades us that the District Court did not misapply this reasoning in evaluating the instant case. We find a number of non-frivolous questions that merited thoughtful consideration by counsel. For example, under Virginia law, should the attempted theft of the automobile — for which Martin was sentenced to three years on a grand larceny conviction — more appropriately have been prosecuted as a misdemeanor carrying a sentence that may not exceed twelve months as opposed to a five year maximum penalty for grand larceny?⁵ Also, the strong community feeling over the case, which inhibited the Commonwealth's Attorney from even discussing the offer of a plea to a lesser charge, and which may have influenced the imposition of what appear to be quite harsh sentences, might well have suggested to the lawyer the advisability of seeking transfer of the prosecution to a different county, or a continuance.⁶ Further, if the attorney had not been under the pressure of time he probably would not have thought it prudent to conduct his conferences with the client in the presence of the police sergeant. This was hardly the atmosphere to generate that confidence which should exist between attorney and client, or to invite the kind of free communication between them which is...