Martin v. Conway

• Decision Date: 10 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–CV–6189L.,10–CV–6189L.
• Parties: Floyd MARTIN, Petitioner,v.James T. CONWAY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

764 F.Supp.2d 545

Floyd MARTIN, Petitioner,

v.James T. CONWAY, Respondent.

No. 10–CV–6189L.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Feb. 10, 2011.

Floyd Martin, Attica, NY, pro se.Donna A. Milling, Buffalo, NY, for Respondent.

DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID G. LARIMER, District Judge.I. Introduction

Petitioner pro se Floyd Martin (“Petitioner” or “Martin”) has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the constitutionality of his detention in state custody. Martin's incarceration arises from a judgment of conviction entered against him in Erie County Court following a guilty plea on charges of attempted murder and other charges. (Docket No. 1). Respondent has answered the petition and filed a memorandum of law in opposition. Presently pending before the Court is Martin's motion to amend the petition and to have the petition held in abeyance.

For the reasons that follow, the petition is denied and the motion to amend is denied.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

Under Indictment No. 01679–2005, Martin was charged as an accomplice, along with co-defendants Leon Williams (“Williams”) and Arhan Castillo (“Castillo”), with attempted murder in the first degree (New York Penal Law (“P.L.”) §§ 110/125.27(1)(a)(vii), 20.00); attempted murder in the second degree (P.L. §§ 110/125.25(1), 20.00); assault in the first degree (P.L. §§ 120.10(1), 20.00); kidnapping in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 135.20, 20.00); robbery in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 160.15(2), 20.00); unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 165.08, 20.00); criminal use of a firearm in the first degree (P.L. § 265.09(1)(a)); and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree (P.L. § 220.50(2)). The trial court dismissed the charge of criminally using drug paraphernalia.

With the advice of counsel, Martin pleaded guilty as charged to the remaining seven counts in the indictment. Under Indictment No. 02885–2005, petitioner was charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (P.L. § 265.02(3), (4)).

Under another indictment, Indictment No. 02885–2005, he was charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (P.L. § 265.02(3), (4)). Martin pleaded guilty to these counts as well. He was subsequently sentenced as follows on Indictment No. 01679–2005: 15 years to life (attempted murder in the first degree); 10 years, 5 years post release supervision (attempted murder in the second degree); 10 years, 5 years post release supervision (assault in the first degree); 10 years, 5 years post release supervision (kidnapping in the second degree); 10 years, 5 years post release supervision (robbery in the first degree); 2 1/3 to 7 years (unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree); and 10 years, 5 years post release supervision (criminal use of a firearm in the first degree).

With regard to Indictment No. 02885–2005, he was sentenced as follows: 2 1/3 to 7 years (criminal possession of a weapon third degree); and 4 years, 3 years post release supervision. (criminal possession of a weapon third degree). The sentences imposed on both indictments were ordered to be served concurrently. The aggregate sentence was thus 15 years to life, plus 5 years post release supervision.

Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal. His convictions under both indictments were unanimously affirmed in a order of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. People v. Martin, 55 A.D.3d 1236, 864 N.Y.S.2d 582 (App.Div. 4th Dept.2008). Leave to the appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. People v. Martin, 11 N.Y.3d 927, 874 N.Y.S.2d 12, 902 N.E.2d 446 (N.Y.2009), as was the request for reconsideration, People v. Martin, 12 N.Y.3d 855, 881 N.Y.S.2d 667, 909 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y.2009).

This timely habeas petition followed in which Martin has asserted the following grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel's actions at the plea proceeding violated the basic canons of advocacy by presenting at length the weaknesses of Martin's case, amounted in an abandonment of his client at a critical juncture, and resulted in a coerced, involuntary plea; and (2) Martin's post-arrest statements were involuntary and should have been suppressed. See Attachment # 4 to Petition (Docket No. 1).

Respondent answered the petition. (Docket Nos. 6 & 7).

Martin currently has pending a motion to stay the petition and a motion for an extension of time to file a reply memorandum of law. Respondent has not filed opposition papers with regard to either of these motions.

For the reasons that follow, the petition is dismissed. The motion to stay is denied with prejudice. The motion for an extension of time is granted nunc pro tunc.

III. DiscussionLegal Standard of Review

Federal habeas review is available for a State prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Errors of state law are not subject to federal habeas review. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973).

Because Martin's petition, filed in 2010, postdates the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.), AEDPA's revisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 govern the proceeding. Lurie v. Wittner, 228 F.3d 113, 120–21 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322–23, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2061, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir.1998)). The Second Circuit has summarized the requirements placed upon a habeas petitioner by the AEDPA standard as follows:

Under AEDPA, to prevail on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner confined pursuant to a state court judgment must show that the court's “adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “[C]learly established Federal law” refers to holdings of the Supreme Court, as opposed to dicta, as of the time of relevant state court decisions. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74–75, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A decision is “contrary to” federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. An “unreasonable application” occurs when a “state court identifies the correct governing legal principle ... but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the [petitioner's] case.” Id. “Unreasonableness is determined by an ‘objective’ standard.” Gersten v. Senkowski, 426 F.3d 588, 607 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495).

Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 152–153 (2d Cir.2010) (Korman, D.J., sitting by designation).

The Supreme Court has stated that “unreasonableness” should not be conflated with “clear error” because “[t]he gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). “[A] federal habeas court is not empowered to grant the writ just because, in its independent judgment, it would have decided the federal law question differently. The state court's application must reflect some additional increment of incorrectness such that it may be said to be unreasonable.” Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 94 (2d Cir.2001). However, “the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.” Matter of Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[A] ‘state court adjudicates a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits when it (1) disposes of the claim on the merits, and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment.’ ” Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir.2001) (quotation and alteration marks omitted)). Where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “deference [is] mandated under AEDPA,” Sellan, 261 F.3d at 310, in the federal habeas court's review of petitioner's claim. All of Martin's claims have been adjudicated on the merits by the state courts.

IV. Analysis of the PetitionA. Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

1. Overview of the Claim

From the time of arraignment until sentencing, Martin was assigned three attorneys. The first attorney, Nicholas Hicks, Esq. was forced to withdraw due to a conflict of interest, at which time Joseph Terranova, Esq. was assigned to represent petitioner. Attorney Terranova conducted a suppression hearing and engaged in lengthy plea negotiations. A substantial reduction in Martin's sentencing exposure resulted from Attorney Terranova's efforts.

On the morning of jury selection, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Martin had decided to accept an offer to (1) plead guilty to first degree attempted murder under Indictment No. 01679–2005, and (2)(a) either plead guilty to the entire indictment under 02885–2005; or (b) plead guilty to third degree criminal possession of a weapon. See Transcript of Plea Proceeding at 2 (hereinafter “P.” followed by the page number). Defense counsel then proceeded to explain to the trial court the discussions he had with Martin and his family concerning the merits of the...