Martin v. Davies

• Decision Date: 18 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-2950,88-2950
• Citation: 917 F.2d 336
• Parties: John-Tyronne MARTIN, also known as Michael Chase, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Darlene M. DAVIES and J. Alexander, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 336

917 F.2d 336

John-Tyronne MARTIN, also known as Michael Chase, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Darlene M. DAVIES and J. Alexander, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-2950.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued July 11, 1990.

Decided Nov. 5, 1990.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied Dec. 18, 1990.

Don Sampen, William A. Kummerer, Martin, Craig, Chester & Sonnenschein, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

John-Tyronne Martin, Pontiac, Ill., pro se.

Daniel P. Slayden, Asst. State's Atty., Cecil A. Partee, Paula M. Carstensen, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before WOOD, Jr., MANION and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, John-Tyronne Martin, appeals the district court's dismissal of his amended complaint for damages and equitable relief brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against defendants-appellees Darlene Davies and Verlinda Alexander, two clerks at the Cook County Jail law library. 694 F.Supp. 528. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and because some of Martin's claims were governed by the terms of the consent decree in Duran v. Elrod, No. 74 C 2949 (N.D.Ill. 4/9/82), and could only be resolved by a contempt action to enforce that decree. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

At the time he filed this lawsuit, on October 16, 1987, Martin was a pre-trial detainee at the Cook County Jail in Chicago. Notably, however, his reply brief concedes that he has since been transferred to the Joliet Correctional Center.

Martin's complaint and amended complaint, filed pro se, alleged numerous civil rights violations, all of which concerned his right of access to the courts. His original complaint alleged (1) that defendants would not notarize legal documents that he prepared without reading them; (2) that Cook County jail personnel denied him envelopes and stamps for legal mail; (3) that Davies had instituted a policy at the library preventing pre-trial detainees from assisting each other in the library; and, (4) that he had inadequate access to the jail law library.

In an order entered October 30, 1987, the district court dismissed all but the third claim. Specifically, the court found that claims of inadequate access to the jail law library were covered by the terms of the consent decree in Duran and that violation of the decree could only be remedied by a contempt proceeding in that action. The court also found that under both federal and Illinois law, an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury may substitute for a declaration subscribed and sworn before a notary public. Furthermore, the court held that the allegation regarding denial of stamps and envelopes did not state that it resulted in any prejudice to potential or pending litigation, and thus it failed to state a claim.

Martin filed an amended complaint, containing thirteen pages of allegations. The events which form the factual basis of Martin's amended complaint occurred during July through October 1987. The complaint is short on specifics such as dates and supporting facts; however, the following factual allegations are apparent.

Martin was arrested in April 1987, and was charged with at least five offenses. One of these was a misdemeanor trespass charge in Skokie, Illinois. Martin apparently chose to proceed pro se on the trespass charge, as well as on the other charges--three theft counts and an extradition case.

Martin claims that from July through the beginning of October 1987, he was only permitted access to the law library for six to seven hours. He claims that in September and October, as a result of a "conspiracy" by the defendants, library access was limited because he talked in the library, sought assistance from other pre-trial detainees, and filed a grievance against defendants. He states that in September (date unspecified), he had legal documents that he never mailed because defendants refused to give him envelopes and stamps, again due to his talking and his attempt to get assistance from others. In October (date unspecified, but prior to the fifth), Martin took a legal document (a subpoena) to defendant Alexander for notarization. She would not notarize the document without reading it first. She also would not give him envelopes and stamps because he had not properly prepared the materials. Martin then went into defendant Davies' office. After some discussion and a verbal altercation, Davies notarized the legal papers, gave him envelopes, but not stamps. On October 5, 1987, Martin filed a grievance against defendants. Defendants' response to the grievance, attached to Martin's original complaint, indicated that the reason stamps were not given to Martin was because his mail was destined for courts which were part of the jail's messenger route. Defendants' response denied that there was a no talking rule in the library; rather there is a "no loud talking" policy.

Martin requested to use the law library on a daily basis, but he claims the defendants' conspiracy has been to refuse him access in retaliation for his filing the previously mentioned grievance. Martin also complains that defendants would not allow him access to the library until three days before a court appearance, rather than on an "as needed" basis, thus denying him access to the courts. Martin claims that defendants' policies and conspiracy forced him to plead guilty to the misdemeanor trespass charge in Skokie. Martin also claims that defendants have converted law library materials to their own use.

Martin alleges he was damaged by defendants' actions in that he was required to plead guilty to misdemeanor trespass, could not defend his other criminal charges, and could not prosecute his federal lawsuits by virtue of the denial of access to library facilities.

II. Analysis

Prison officials have an affirmative duty to provide inmates with reasonable access to courts, which includes providing access to adequate libraries (or counsel). DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 446 (7th Cir.1988). The right of access "requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Nonetheless, reasonable access does not mean unlimited access. Hossman v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019, 1021 (7th Cir.1987).

Martin's amended complaint seeks equitable relief in the way of injunction and declaratory relief to restrain defendants from continuing their alleged policies which deny him access to the courts and to the law library. Martin also seeks damages, both actual and punitive, from defendants as redress for defendants' library policies, which he alleges caused his inability to defend and prosecute various court cases. The claims raised in Martin's complaint can be summarized as follows:

1. defendants refused to notarize legal documents, copy, give stamps and envelopes, or mail legal documents without reading them, altering them, and censoring them;

2. defendants refused Martin's request to use the law library on an "as needed" basis which interfered in his preparation of his defense in his pending criminal claims, as well as his prosecution of several civil actions, and he had to plead guilty to a trespass charge;

3. defendants refused to allow Martin to receive legal assistance from other inmates by means of a "no-talking" policy;

4. defendants converted legal material requisitioned for plaintiff's use to their personal use, while denying them for use by Martin;

5. defendants practice law without licenses;

6. defendants conspired to deny Martin access to the courts as retaliation for his filing of administrative grievances against them by denying him library time and legal materials.

These claims can be divided into two groups: those involving access to the courts from the denial of access to the jail law library and those involving access to the courts resulting from the denial of supplies and services. We address each in turn.

A. Denial of Access to the Library.

Martin seeks equitable relief against defendants to restrain them in their alleged practices which deny him access to the Cook County Jail law library. He also claims monetary damages as a result of his having to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge and of his inability to prepare other cases, all due to lack of library time. Judge Bua dismissed these claims because they were governed by the consent decree in Duran v. Elrod, No. 74 C 2949 (N.D.Ill. 4/9/82), and could be enforced only through a contempt action brought under that decree. Martin contends that he is not a member of the class governed by the Duran decree, and that even if he is, dismissal was not appropriate since Duran addresses only equitable claims, and he raises damage claims in addition to his equitable claims. Even with regard to his equitable claims, he suggests his are so particularized that they should be considered independent of the Duran decree. See Hall v. Elrod, No. 74 C 2949, memorandum order at 1 (N.D.Ill. 1/21/85) (individual claims which go beyond terms of Duran should be heard separately under Sec. 1983).

1. Equitable relief.

Although Martin was not in Cook County Jail at the time of the Duran decree (he arrived in 1987; Duran was finalized in 1982), he is clearly a member of the Duran class. The general rule is that a "judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not include the rights of strangers to those proceedings." Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 754, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2184, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989). There are exceptions to this rule, which include class actions. Id. at 2184 n. 2. Because the Duran class action involved the rights of pre-trial detainees and because the consent decree is...