Martin v. Fort Wayne Police Dep't

Decision Date28 February 2011
Docket NumberCAUSE NUMBER: 1:09-CV-74-TLS
PartiesANTHONY C. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. FORT WAYNE POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER KINSEY, OFFICER ELMER, OFFICER CLINE, and SERGEANT STRAUSBERGER, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment and Designation of Evidence [ECF No. 47], filed by the Defendants on July 1, 2010, and on a Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Affidavit [ECF No. 53], filed by the Defendants on August 9, 2010.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2009, Anthony C. Martin, the Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se in this matter, filed a verified Complaint [ECF No. 1] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued four Defendants from the Fort Wayne Police Department: Officer Gregory Kinsey; Officer Robert Elmer; Officer Matthew Cline; and Sergeant Thomas Strausborger.1 He also named the Fort Wayne Police Department as a Defendant. His Complaint describes a traffic stop that occurred on March 20, 2009. He alleges that police illegally searched his car, violated his First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendment rights, and harassed and retaliated against him. He also claims "vindictivedemeanors" and violation of the "color blue" or perhaps the color of law. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) On May 27, the Defendants filed an Answer [ECF No. 8] denying the allegations made against them and asserting affirmative defenses.

On July 1, 2010, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Designation of Evidence [ECF No. 47] and a Memorandum of Law in Support [ECF No. 49]. The Defendants designated as evidence the Affidavit of Officer Gregory Kinsey, the Affidavit of Officer Matthew Cline, the Affidavit of Sergeant Thomas Strausborger, the Affidavit of Officer Robert Elmer, and a certified copy of the chronological case summary in State of Indiana v. Anthony C. Martin, cause no. 02D04-0903-IF-003427. The Defendants also filed a Notice of Filing Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 48], which advised the Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 26, the Plaintiff filed a "Reply" [ECF No. 50] (hereinafter "Response") and an Affidavit of Anthony C. Martin [ECF No. 51]. On August 9, the Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 52] as well as a Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Affidavit [ECF No. 53] and a Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 54]. The Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion to Strike.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A motion should be granted solong as no rational fact finder could return a verdict in favor of the party opposing the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Id. at 249-50; Poer v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). To the extent that a verified complaint makes factual assertions consistent with the requirements for affidavits, such as whether the affiant has personal knowledge of the assertions, it may be treated as an affidavit that qualifies as evidence in opposition to summary judgment. See Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1996).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also N.D. Ind. L.R. 56.1(a) (stating that the movant must provide a "Statement of Material Facts" that identifies the facts that the moving party contends are not genuinely disputed). In response, the nonmoving party cannot rest on bare pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed in Rule 56 to designate specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000); N.D. Ind. L.R. 56.1(b)(2) (directing that a response in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must include "a section labeled 'Statement of Genuine Disputes' that identifies the material facts that the party contends are genuinely disputed so as to make a trial necessary"). Rule 56 also states:

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

Although a bare contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, view all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, see Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2000), and avoid "the temptation to decide which party's version of the facts is more likely true, " Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp, 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999). See also Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting the often stated proposition that "summary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants"). A material fact must be outcome determinative under the governing law. Insolia, 216 F.3d at 598-99. "Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute." Harney v. Speedway Super America, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008).

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his filings are entitled to liberal construction and are "not held to the stringent standards expected of... lawyers." McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000). However, even as a pro se litigant, the Plaintiff is required to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the District Court's Local Rules, and he is not excused from complying with his responsibilities as a plaintiff. See Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that although "courts are required to give liberal construction to pro se pleadings[,]... it is also well established that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural rules"); Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that "the Supreme Court has made clear that even pro se litigants must followrules of civil procedure").

FACTS ALLEGED IN THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT

In his Complaint, which is signed under penalty of perjury, the Plaintiff alleges the following facts:

On 3/20/09 at or about 2:15-2:20 p.m., I was driving eastbound on Lake Street when I noticed an unmarked police car following me. I kept driving east on Lake when I noticed a fully marked police car join in on following me but actually got behind me. I drove about a block further when I noticed that his lights were on ordering me to pull over. I pulled over and shut off the truck getting my driver's license and registration for the officer when he got up to the window. When the officer approached he was laughing stating "Mr. Martin, Mr. Martin, I got you for speeding. I asked him how fast was I going. He said that he didn't have a radar and for me to shut the fuck up. He was to ask all the questions." He looked in the backseat and saw my daughter in her car seat so he took my driver's license and registration and walked back to his car which then like 4 officers had arrived. I was still wrote a speeding ticket which before I was able to leave I was asked to search my truck which I said no and Officer Elmer and Officer Kinsey became very vulgar and unprofessional telling me that they could do what they wanted and would make my life a living hell for me. One of the officers stated the camera, the camera, sergeant, like he was alerting them that it was being recorded. I was let go which it wasn't over 30 minutes later and I was pulled over again by the black unmarked car this time and a red skylark or shaped car and two fully police cars, which I was ordered out of the truck, handcuffed and placed in the back of the red vehicle while my truck got searched and a K-9 got ran through it. I had to sit there and hear my daughter screaming because she didn't know the officers holding her while my truck got destroyed and searched for no reason.3

(Compl. 2-3, ECF No. 1.)

FACTS PUT FORWARD BY THE DEFENDANTS

On March 20, 2009, Officer Kinsey was on duty as a Fort Wayne police officer and wasin full police uniform in a marked police squad car. Officer Kinsey was driving westbound on Lake Avenue in an area that has two westbound lanes when he saw a green Blazer traveling in the same direction accelerating and changing lanes without signaling to move around traffic. As he followed the Blazer, Officer Kinsey paced it going forty-five miles per hour in an area where the posted speed limit is thirty miles per hour. Officer Kinsey activated his overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop. The driver of the Blazer, the Plaintiff, made a right turn and stopped on Dearborn Street.

Officer Kinsey approached the Plaintiff, who was the only occupant of the Blazer. The Plaintiff immediately asked Officer Kinsey why he was pulled over and stated that he had done nothing wrong. Officer Kinsey asked for the Plaintiff's driver's license and registration. Officer Kinsey ran a computer check of the Plaintiff and learned that he was a convicted felon and a known resistor and that he had been armed in the past. Based on this...

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