Martin v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 January 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 89-CV-73193-DT.
• Citation: 753 F. Supp. 1347
• Parties: Dennis MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CPC-Pontiac Plant, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

753 F. Supp. 1347

Dennis MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CPC-Pontiac Plant, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 89-CV-73193-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

January 2, 1991.

Gregory Kenny, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiff.

George Velez, Detroit, Mich., for defendant.

AMENDED¹ OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

ROSEN, District Judge.

This matter is presently before the Court on Defendant General Motors Corporation's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted. The Court has reviewed the same, the Plaintiff's response thereto, the Briefs of the parties, and the record in this case. The Court finds that a hearing and oral argument is not necessary to the Court's resolution of the instant motion and therefore orders its submission on the briefs filed by the parties, pursuant to Local Court Rule 17(l)(2).

FACTS:

The Plaintiff, Dennis Martin, filed this case in state court to obtain benefits under Defendant General Motors' Special Separations Program. The original complaint stated various state law causes of action. General Motors removed the case to this Court on the grounds that the Special Separations Program is an employee benefits plan governed by the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., and that Martin's state law claims were consequently preempted by ERISA. This Court's predecessor, the Honorable Richard F. Suhrheinrich, denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand the case to the state court because the determination of the Martin's claims would require the Court to interpret the terms of the Special Separations Program pursuant to the provisions of ERISA. Martin's claims therefore arose under the statutes of the United States, and this Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (March 19, 1990, Memorandum Opinion and Order, p. 3).

Subsequently, Martin was granted leave to file his First Amended Complaint to state whatever claims he could under the provisions of ERISA. The First Amended Complaint, filed April 16, 1990, contains nine separate counts, including a claim for benefits (Count 7), breach of ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements (Counts 1-2, 4, 8), breach of fiduciary duty (Counts 5-6), breach of ERISA's claims procedure requirements (Count 3), and interference with Martin's rights, in general, under ERISA, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1140.

Martin was employed by General Motors at its CPC Pontiac plant in Pontiac, Michigan for several years beginning on March 21, 1977. His last position was a salaried position as General Supervisor. According to the First Amended Complaint, Martin first requested a 90-day leave of absence from General Motors in May, 1986. This request was made to the Plaintiff's supervisor, Doug Goimarac. It is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether this request was definitively denied. Goimarac allegedly returned to Martin during the last part of July, 1986 and asked whether Martin was still interested in a leave of absence. Martin responded affirmatively and was granted a 60-day leave beginning August 1, 1990 and continuing through September 30, 1990.

From Martin's deposition testimony, it is apparent that he took this leave of absence to look for other work because the General Motors facility where he was employed was scheduled to be closed. (Martin Dep., pp. 43-44). Martin understood that there was a risk of his not having a job when he returned from his leave of absence. (Martin Dep., p. 46). He ended up getting a job with his brother in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Martin Dep., p. 44).

During the period of his leave of absence, between August 20, 1986 and August 22, 1986, General Motors approved and announced a program to bring about a 25% reduction in General Motors' salaried employees, the Special Separations Program under which Martin seeks benefits in this action. The intent of the Special Separations Program is to provide selected employees with incentives for early retirement.

On or after August 22, 1986, the existence of the Special Separations Program was communicated to General Motors' salaried employees. On September 19, 1986, Martin telephoned General Motors' employee, Nancy Savage, to find out whether he was eligible to receive the lump-sum severance payments and extended health benefits available under the Special Separations Program. According to the First Amended Complaint, Savage informed him that he would not be eligible because he was a "key employee." Martin also requested "literature," which she denied. (Martin Dep., p. 15).

On October 1, 1986, Martin telephoned Goimarac, his supervisor, and informed him that he voluntarily quit his job. He also asked Goimarac whether he would be eligible for the Special Separations Program benefits. Goimarac did not know. (Martin Dep., pp. 17-18).

The Plaintiff claims in the First Amended Complaint that the Special Separations Program was communicated to all salaried employees via a written announcement:

18. Sometime on or after August 22, 1986, person or persons presently unknown communicated said employee benefit plan to all units of Defendant General Motors Corporation's salaried non-union employees.

19. The notice communicated to all salaried employees stated that:

"The separation program applies to employes fitting either of the following situations during the period 9/186 sic through 8/31/87:

* Employes who are age 53 or older for whom retirement will apply, or;

* Employes under age 53 (or over age 53 with less than 10 years or credited service) who are not eligible for an incentive retirement."

* This program will be administered on a mutually agreeable basis to both management and the employe. An employee may volunteer for the separation offer or the separation offer can be initiated by management.

The title on General Motors Corporation's notice read as follows:

"SEPARATION PROGRAM FOR REGULAR SALARIED EMPLOYES"

(First Amended Complaint, Pars. 17-18) (emphasis added). However, this notice was not sent to Martin. Instead, he obtained a copy for himself from a friend. (Martin Dep., p. 16).

The actual terms of the Special Separations Program are set forth in a 9-page memorandum, dated August 29, 1986, distributed to all General Motors personnel directors — North America Groups, Divisions, and Staffs, and attached as Exhibit 1 to General Motors' Motion to Dismiss. In pertinent part, the memorandum provides:

IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

The implementation guidelines for the program are:

* The program must be administered on a mutually agreeable basis. Management will select which individuals it wishes to approach, but the offer must be agreed to by the employe in writing. Employes are not barred from consideration if they, on their own initiative, indicate an interest, but, in such cases, management has the final decision as to whether it is in GM's best interest to separate the employe.

(Exhibit 1 to Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 5) (emphasis added).

Absent from the First Amended Complaint and the other papers filed by Martin is any allegation that he was ever offered or selected for participation in the Special Separations Program. Indeed, it is clear from the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint, that Martin was not selected.

DISCUSSION:

A. IS MARTIN A "PARTICIPANT" IN THE SPECIAL SEPARATIONS PROGRAM?

The central issue in this case is whether Martin has standing to bring this action. As argued by General Motors, Martin's claims all rest on the presumption that he was a "participant" in the Special Separations Program, and Martin, in fact, alleges that he was a "participant" in the First Amended Complaint. Persons who are not "participants" in an employee benefits plan are generally not entitled to benefits or disclosure of plan documents from the plan administrators.

"Participant" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7):

§ 1002. Definitions

For purposes of this subchapter:

* * * * * *

(7) The term "participant" means any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (Supp.1990).

Before 1989, the judicial construction of this definition was subject to differing interpretations among the circuit courts of appeal. For example, the Sixth Circuit construed "participant" broadly, to encompass all persons "who are, or claim they are, entitled to receive a benefit from a pension plan":

The United States district courts are not courts of general jurisdiction, of course, and before a federal court can decide a claim for relief, the court must be satisfied that Congress has empowered it to do so. While it is conceivable that plaintiffs in the case at bar may have meritorious claims arising under state law, in order to pursue those claims in federal court, they must demonstrate that they and their claims come within the terms of the statutory provisions they rely upon in their complaint as giving rise to federal court jurisdiction.

Standing

ERISA authorizes a "participant" to commence a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). A participant may also sue to enforce provisions of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)(ii)....

* * * * * *

In determining who is a "participant," for purposes of standing, the definition found in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) must be read in the context of traditional concepts of standing, not in the context of adjudicating the ultimate issue of the merits of plaintiffs' claim

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