Martin v. Harris
| Decision Date | 13 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Docket No.: BCD-CV-2014-07 |
| Parties | Barbara T. Martin, Trustee of the MARY LOUISE MIKOLS LIVING TRUST U/T/D October 17, 2012. Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, v. CYNTHIA C. HARRIS, ELIZABETH H. MIKOLS, JULIA A. HARRIS, AND APRIL F. PARRAS, et al. Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
CUMBERLAND, ss
BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT
This Order addresses the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Cynthia C. Harris, Elizabeth H. Mikols, Julia A. Harris, and April F. Parras et al. (collectively the "Harris Defendants") on Counts III and V of the Harris Defendants' Counterclaim, which relate to the terms of Section 6.01 of the Mary Louise Mikols Living Trust dated October 17, 2012 (the "Trust"). This Order also addresses the cross-motions for summary judgment that the parties have filed regarding the no-contest provisions of the Trust.
In 2012, Mary Louise Mikols ("Mary Louise") lived and resided in Eagle Lake, Maine. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 1; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 1.) On or about June 28, 2012, Mary Louise patronized the office of William Smyth of Smyth and Associates, P.A. located in Kennebunk, Maine to discuss and seek legal counsel in the revision of her estate plan. (Supp. S.M.F.¶ 3; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 3.)At the time of her first meeting with Attorney Smyth, Mary Louise was 84 years old. Id. Mary Louise met with Attorney Smyth on three occasions and exchanged a series of phone calls.1 (Supp. S.M. F. ¶ 6; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 6.) During the course of these meetings, Attorney Smyth drafted a new last will and testament, as well as several other estate planning documents. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 7; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 7.) Smyth also drafted an inter vivos trust to dispose of certain real property and accounts held by Mary Louise. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 8.) Mary Louise had concerns that a beneficiary might challenge or contest her estate plan after her death. As a result, Smyth included no-contest provisions in the will and the Trust. (Pl.'s A.S.M.F. ¶ 55; Defs.' Rep. A.S.M.F. ¶ 53.)
The final meeting was held on August 2, 2012. During this meeting, Mary Louise executed the new Last Will and Testament as well as a Durable Power of Attorney naming her daughter, Barbara Martin, as personal representative and attorney-in-fact. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 9; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 9.) According to statements by the parties, the newly executed will was meant to be a temporary document in place only until the Trust and pour-over will were implemented.
On or about September 1, 2012, Mary Louise travelled to Kentucky to visit her other daughter, Judith Montoya, and to undergo a routine endoscopy procedure during the visit. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 10; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 10.) However, Mary Louise suffered a reaction from the procedure and fell into a coma. On September 5, 2012, Ms. Martin contacted Attorney Smyth and requested that he send the executed estate planning documents so she could bring them to Kentucky.2 (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 11; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 11.) Smyth responded by emailing Ms. Martinall of Mary Louise's estate planning documents, including the unexecuted Trust instrument. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 14; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 14..) In said email, Attorney Smyth instructed Ms. Martin how to execute the document if Mary Louise was unable to sign on her own. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 15; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 15.)
Between early September and October 17th, 2012, Mary Louise regained consciousness, but did not execute the Trust document.3 (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 16; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 16.) On October 15, 2012, Mary Louise began to fail rapidly. On or about October 17, 2012, Ms. Martin requested another copy of the unexecuted Trust instrument.4 (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 18; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 18.) Attorney Smyth sent a second email to Ms. Martin instructing her how the Trust should be executed if Mary Louise was unable to sign on her own. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 20; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 20.) Thereafter, on the same day, Barbara Martin executed the Mary Louise Mikols Living Trust on Mary Louise's behalf.5 (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 21.) Mary Louise passed away on October 20, 2012. (Supp. S.M. F. ¶ 23; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 23.)
The Trust was to be funded with various real property and bank accounts held by Mary Louise. However, most of the accounts were either joint accounts or payment on death accounts, which benefited a number of heirs.6 (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 22.) Upon Mary Louise's death only three pieces of real property were transferred to the Trust including: the Imperial Beach, California property; a home in Eagle Lake, Maine; and land in Oroville, California. (Supp.S.M.F. ¶¶ 32, S3; Opp. S.M.F. ¶¶ 32, 33.) Because the bank accounts failed to transfer into the Trust, the Trust has limited funds to operate.7 (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 34; Opp. S.M. F. ¶ 34.)
Following Mary Louise's death, Ms. Martin, as successor trustee under the terms of the Trust, retained Attorney Smyth to assist in the implementation of the Trust. (Pl.'s A.S.M.F. ¶ 61; Defs.' Rep. A.S.M.F. ¶ 61.) Section 5.02 deems the Trust to be in an administrative phase "for a reasonable period of time necessary to complete [] administrative tasks." See Mary Louise Mikols Living Trust § 5.02. Section 6.01 of the Trust appoints Mary Louise's daughter, Cynthia Harris, as Trustee of the Imperial Beach, California property. In April 2013, Ms. Martin changed the locks on the Imperial Beach property and refused to provide keys to Ms. Harris who intended to occupy the premises pursuant to Section 6.01 of the Trust instrument.8 (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 35; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 35.) Ms. Martin explained to Ms. Harris and her other siblings that she believed the Trust to be in an administrative phase until the Trust could be adequately funded. (Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 39.) On May 7, 2013, Ms. Martin again contacted her siblings and beneficiaries under the Trust and explained that the Trust still did not have enough liquid assets to satisfy its obligations. Ms. Martin recommended that the Imperial Beach property be put on the market and sold.9 (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 43; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 43.)
Ms. Martin asserts that because the Trust is still in the administrative phase pursuant to Section 5.02 of the Trust instrument, the Harris Defendants are not entitled to occupation oruse of the real property held by the Trust. The Harris Defendants claim that the provisions of the Trust are not contingent on completion of the administrative phase and allege that the trustees of the sub-trusts were entitled to the trust property immediately upon the death of Mary Louise.
M.R. Civ. P. 56(c) instructs that summary judgment is warranted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact set forth in those statements and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." To survive a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must produce evidence that, if produced at trial, would be sufficient to resist a motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 1997 ME 99, ¶ 8, 694 A.2d 924. For purposes of summary judgment, "[a] material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573 (citing Kenny v. Dep't of Human Services, 1999 ME 158, ¶ 3, 740 A.2d 560); see also McIlroy v. Gibson's Apple Orchard, 2012 ME 59, ¶ 7, 43 A.3d 948. A genuine issue exists when sufficient evidence supports a factual contest to require a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial. See Prescott v. Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 250, ¶ 5, 721 A.2d 169 (citing Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990)).
A party wishing to avoid summary judgment must present a prima facie case for each element of a claim or defense that is asserted. See Reliance Nat'l Indem. v. Knowles Indus. Services, 2005 ME 29, ¶ 9, 816 A.2d 63. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute must be resolved through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 784 A.2d 18. When the court rules on a motion for summary judgment, "'[it] is to consider only the portions of the record referred to, and the material facts set forth, in the Rule 7(d) statements.'" Handy Boat Serv., Inc. v. Prof'lServices, Inc., 1998 ME 134, ¶ 16, 711 A.2d 1306 (quoting Gerrity Co. v. Lake Arrowhead Corp., 609 A.2d 293 (Me. 1992)). The court will view the evidence in light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Steeves v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A., 1998 ME 210, ¶ 11, 718 A.2d 186. The parties in this case agree that the Mary Louise Mikols Living Trust is governed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Maine.
The Harris Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment focuses on Count III of their Counterclaim, alleging breach of trust pursuant to Maine Revised Statutes §§ 801-813, and Count V of their Counterclaim, seeking a declaration that Cynthia Harris's interest as trustee in the Imperial Beach property vested immediately upon the death of the grantor and that Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant ("Barbara Martin" or "Ms. Martin") lacks authority to sell the property.
During the briefing process, Barbara Martin and the Harris Defendants have also asserted cross-motions on the no-contest provisions of the Trust and will. The two issues are addressed in the order just framed.
The crux of the parties' legal dispute lies in their differing interpretations of how the Trust operates. The Harris Defendants suggest that the Trust instrument unambiguously vested title to the Imperial Beach, California property in Cynthia Harris immediately upon Mary Louise's death. Conversely, Ms. Martin contends that Section 5.02 of the...
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