Martin v. Houston

Citation226 F.Supp.3d 1283
Decision Date23 December 2016
Docket NumberCASE NO. 2:14–CV–905–WKW
Parties Ricky MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. Randall V. HOUSTON, in his official capacity as district attorney for Chilton County, Alabama, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

226 F.Supp.3d 1283

Ricky MARTIN, Plaintiff,
v.
Randall V. HOUSTON, in his official capacity as district attorney for Chilton County, Alabama, Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:14–CV–905–WKW

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed December 23, 2016


226 F.Supp.3d 1286

Avery C. Livingston, ACLU of Alabama, Randall C. Marshall, ACLU of Alabama Foundation, Inc., Montgomery, AL, Daniel Mach, Heather L. Weaver, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Laura Elizabeth Howell, Office of the Alabama Attorney General, William G. Parker, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. Keith Watkins, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case presents a constitutional challenge to Alabama Code § 45–11–82, the so-called Chilton County Anti–Clustering Law. (See Doc. # 22.) After the denial of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Randall V. Houston ("Houston") (Doc. # 37), the Alabama legislature repealed the Anti–Clustering Law. Houston's second motion to dismiss followed hot on the repeal's trail, and is before the court today. (Doc. # 46.) Houston alleges that the repeal mooted this action, requiring its dismissal and the vacatur of the orders entered in the case to date. He is half-right: Although the repeal compels a finding that this case has become moot, under these facts the court declines to grant the equitable remedy of vacatur.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

At issue is whether this dispute presents a justiciable case or controversy such that the court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion directly challenges the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Gilmore v. Day , 125 F.Supp.2d 468, 470 (M.D. Ala. 2000). "Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be asserted on either facial or factual grounds." Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc. , 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Morrison v. Amway Corp. , 323 F.3d 920, 925 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2003) ). "Facial challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are based solely on the allegations in the complaint. When considering such challenges, the court must, as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, take the complaint's allegations as true." Id. On the other hand, a "factual attack" challenges "jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings." Morrison , 323 F.3d at 925. In a factual attack, "matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered."

226 F.Supp.3d 1287

Lawrence v. Dunbar , 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Houston's motion to dismiss raises a factual attack, as it stems from the Anti–Clustering Law's repeal—a question of fact outside of the pleadings. See Morrison , 323 F.3d at 925. Accordingly, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to [P]laintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Lawrence , 919 F.2d at 1529 (citation omitted). The burden of proving jurisdiction falls on Plaintiff. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Osting–Schwinn , 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010) ("The party commencing suit in federal court ... has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting the existence of federal jurisdiction.").

III. BACKGROUND

The court already detailed the facts and procedural history of this case in the Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Houston's prior motion to dismiss and will expand on them only where relevant to its analysis. (See Doc. # 37 at 3–8); Martin v. Houston , 176 F.Supp.3d 1286, 1290–92 (M.D. Ala. 2016). However, the intervening repeal of the Anti–Clustering Law merits further discussion.

Plaintiff Ricky Martin ("Martin"), the pastor of Triumph Church in Clanton, Alabama, now finds himself free to resume his Christian ministry to homeless sex offenders. On August 30, 2016, Governor Robert Bentley signed into law Alabama Act No. 2016–466 (the "repeal"), an express repeal of the Anti–Clustering Law. (Doc. # 46–1 at 6–7.) The repeal was passed during a special legislative session, spending two days in the Senate and six days in the House before it was signed into law. (Doc. # 54–8 at 2–3.) No legislative history or other "record of deliberation" explains the legislature's motivation in passing the repeal. (Doc. # 54 at 7.) The repeal ended two years of legislative interference with Martin's religious calling.1 Martin may welcome ASORCNA registrants into his congregation once again—and indeed has professed his intent to do so.2 (Doc. # 46–2 at 2.) Some forty-eight hours after the repeal's enactment, Houston filed the motion to dismiss that is before the court today. (Doc. # 46.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Houston claims in his motion that the repeal rendered moot Martin's challenge to the Anti–Clustering Law. (See generally Doc. # 46.) More than just dismissal, Houston urges that the repeal compels the vacatur of the court's prior orders in this case. (Doc. # 46 at 5–9; see Docs. # 37, 45.) For his part, Martin contends that the legislature repealed the Anti–Clustering Law to manipulate the court's jurisdiction and avoid paying his attorneys' fees. (See generally Doc. # 54.) He further claims that vacatur would be improper, both because "there is no judgment to eliminate" and because Houston could have sought review of the orders sought to be vacated. (Doc. # 54 at 8 n.6.) The questions of mootness and vacatur are discussed in turn.

A. Mootness

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction."

226 F.Supp.3d 1288

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Chief among the limits on federal jurisdiction is the Article III edict that federal courts may only pass judgment on "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 559–60, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). "Because the judiciary is unelected and unrepresentative, the Article III case-or-controversy limitation, as embodied in justiciability doctrine, presents an important restriction on the power of the federal courts." Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy , 145 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 1998). The court's decision today rests on one branch of the doctrine of justiciability: mootness.

"There must be a present, live controversy in order to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law. When the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, the case has become moot." Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta , 219 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2000) (alterations, internal citations, and quotation marks omitted). "No matter how vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that precipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute ‘is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs' particular legal rights.’ " Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. , 568 U.S. 85, 133 S.Ct. 721, 727, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013) (quoting Alvarez v. Smith , 558 U.S. 87, 93, 130 S.Ct. 576, 175 L.Ed.2d 447 (2009) ). "Plainly, if a suit is moot, it cannot present an Article III case or controversy and the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it." Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise , 371 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft , 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam )).

It takes no great feat of logic to find that this case no longer presents a live controversy. In his operative complaint, Martin sought only declaratory and injunctive relief vis-à -vis the Anti–Clustering Law; he did not seek even nominal damages. (See Doc. # 22 at 16.) With that law orphaned, there remains no "effectual relief" that Martin may be granted. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000 , 567 U.S. 298, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 2287, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012). And while Martin does ask for attorneys' fees, this alone will not sustain a justiciable claim. Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp. , 494 U.S. 472, 480, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) ("[An] interest in attorney's fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim."). Thus, on first blush it would appear that this case is now moot.

But the analysis does not end there. "[I]t has long been the rule that voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot." Harrell v. Fla. Bar , 608 F.3d 1241, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Nat'l Advert. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2005), (" National II "), 402 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2005) ) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). "Otherwise, a party could moot a challenge to...

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