Martin v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company

• Decision Date: 17 August 1961
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 7763.
• Parties: Vester MARTIN v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY and Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

197 F. Supp. 188

Vester MARTIN v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY and Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees.

Civ. A. No. 7763.

United States District Court W. D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division.

August 17, 1961.

LeRoy Smallenberger, Smallenberger, Eatman, Tooke & Lynch, Shreveport, La., for plaintiff.

Arthur R. Carmody, Jr., Wilkinson, Lewis, Madison & Woods, Shreveport, La., Leonard L. Lockard, Booth, Lockard, Jack, Pleasant & LeSage, Shreveport, La., Mulholland, Robie & Hickey, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

BEN C. DAWKINS, Jr., Chief Judge.

This action is brought by a citizen of the State of Louisiana against The Kansas City Southern Railway Company, a Missouri corporation (Railroad), and the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (Brotherhood), an unincorporated association of individuals residing in the State of Louisiana and all other States of the Union. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for his allegedly wrongful discharge by the Railroad in purported violation of a collective bargaining agreement and for failure on the part of Brotherhood to properly negotiate with the Railroad for an adjustment of his grievance. In his original complaint he sought damages, reinstatement and back pay. After hearing on a motion to dismiss by the Railroad, plaintiff was allowed to amend his complaint so as to non-suit the claim for reinstatement and back pay, leaving only the claim for damages outstanding.

Presently before the Court are the following defensive motions:

1. A plea of want of capacity of the defendant Brotherhood to stand in judgment in an action in tort for damages.

2. A joint motion for summary judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

3. Motions to dismiss by the Railroad and Brotherhood for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, lack of jurisdiction by this Court over the controversy, failure of plaintiff to exhaust his remedies within the Brotherhood, and other reasons hereinafter discussed.

The first motion is clearly without merit, and it is overruled and denied. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. United Mine Workers, 227 La. 1109, 81 So.2d 413; Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v. Chaisson et al., 227 La. 146, 78 So.2d 673; Hanson v. International Union of Operating Engineers, La.App., 79 So.2d 199; Teamsters Local Union, etc. v. Tasty Baking Co., La.App., 124 So.2d 355.

Plaintiff's allegations and argument are these:

On or about May 19, 1945, plaintiff became an employee of the defendant Railroad and, consequently, a member of the defendant Brotherhood, which was then acting as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all employees similarly situated. Under the collective bargaining agreement then in force, all employees were placed in one of three working groups and plaintiff was designated a member of "Group Three," a category consisting primarily of laborers and nonclerical employees. In the month of April, 1956, the Railroad posted a notice relative to a relief job available in "Group Two." The proposal of the Railroad was to work an employee for three days per week as a laborer or "Group Three" employee and two days per week as a relief employee in "Group Two." Plaintiff contends that this combination of "Group Two" and "Group Three" employment was in violation of the collective bargaining agreement as known by the representatives of the Brotherhood who advised him to that effect. Moreover, plaintiff was informed by the Brotherhood representative that when a worker is employed in relief work there is no assurance of continuation of employment. As a consequence of this, plaintiff did not bid on the relief work and another employee, Elmo J. King, who held less seniority than plaintiff, bid for and began working in the "Group Two" position although King was classified as a "Group Three" worker. On or about October 31, 1957, plaintiff's active employment with the Railroad was terminated due to unavailability of work and a force reduction. Plaintiff further alleges that notwithstanding his higher seniority as a "Group Three" employee over King, the latter was allowed to continue working as a "Group Three" employee for three days per week and plaintiff was denied employment. Believing this to have been done in violation of the grouping and seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, plaintiff requested that Brotherhood commence negotiations with the Railroad in his behalf. Although Brotherhood complied with plaintiff's request, no progress was made due to the allegedly negligent manner in which the grievance was handled. Plaintiff was subsequently informed by the Brotherhood representative that although he believed the action taken by the Railroad was in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, he saw no reason why "two men should starve." He contends that this action by Brotherhood, through its representative, was a violation of a duty owed plaintiff by Brotherhood as imposed by the Protective Laws of the union. These Laws, he asserts, require Brotherhood representatives to see that agreements are strictly enforced without violation by the carrier or by the employees. When grievances are not properly adjusted, there is a provision for striking against the employer. Notwithstanding the duty imposed upon Brotherhood by the Protective Laws, he claims it failed to properly negotiate with the Railroad in plaintiff's behalf and as a result plaintiff has been unable to obtain representation or negotiate directly with the Railroad because of Federal law. By virtue of the Protective Laws of the Brotherhood and the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.), plaintiff contends he has an implied Federal right to have his claim properly negotiated and to be properly represented. Through the combined efforts of the Brotherhood and Railroad, he alleges, plaintiff has been denied employment and preference has been shown to other employees, all in violation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the Railroad and Brotherhood. Plaintiff says he was informed on January 11, 1960, that his name had been removed from the seniority list as of January 1, 1960, and plaintiff has been informed that workers with less seniority than plaintiff have been employed by the Railroad, all of this being in violation of the agreement. Plaintiff claims he has sustained damages to date of approximately $9,600 and will sustain damages in the future of approximately $10,000.

Turning to plaintiff's assertion that this Court has jurisdiction over the claim against the defendant Railroad and that his claim is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., it is noted that plaintiff's alleged cause of action is not of the type contemplated in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 1950, 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795, that is, an action based on a statute or the common law for damages for wrongful discharge in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. This action more closely resembles the situations in Hundley v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 6 Cir., 1959, 272 F.2d 752, and Rose v. Great Northern Railway Co., 8 Cir., 1959, 268 F.2d 674, 675, where employees were simply reduced to inactive or furloughed status and were not discharged in the sense that all employer-employee relationships terminated by virtue of the actions complained of, and alleged to be in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.

In the affidavit of D. E. Farrar, Assistant to the President of The Kansas City Southern Railway Company, is found a statement that on October 31, 1957, plaintiff was still in possession of his employee status although he was temporarily laid off due to a force reduction within the company. This assertion is not denied by the pleadings or by any affidavits filed by plaintiff. It is clearly shown by the record that the dispute directly concerned seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement and was not over a discharge of plaintiff by the Railroad. In plaintiff's brief in answer to motions filed by defendants, he states that it does not matter whether he was "discharged" or "furloughed," and contends that the only issue is whether the contract was violated and the extent of damages suffered. In this connection, we note that in Rose v. Great Northern Railway Co., supra, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he

"* * * entered the employ of the defendant on or about the 10th day of September, 1928, and thereafter worked in various capacities until March 3, 1954, at which time he was laid off by defendant in the reduction of forces. That thereafter he sought to continue his employment with the defendant railway company and to exercise his seniority rights accorded him by virtue of collective bargaining agreements in force at that time and accrued under prior agreements but the plaintiff has been denied and refused his rights to employment and he has been wrongfully discharged."

In interpreting the meaning of these allegations, the Eighth Circuit stated:

"* * * He claimed under these allegations that although he was at the time of his lay off and had been for many years working as a `boiler-maker helper' following his promotion from his job as `laborer' and had been carried as boiler-maker helper on all rosters, he still had seniority rights as `laborer' which entitled him to have the railroad `bump' a laborer with less seniority and let plaintiff take over the laborer's work. By the allegation that he had been wrongfully discharged plaintiff did not mean to assert that while he was working as a laborer the company fired him from that job, but that the company's denial of his claim to have seniority rights as a `laborer' and its refusal to bump some employed laborer, constituted an

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