Martin v. Kristensen

Decision Date27 May 2021
Docket NumberNo. 20190797,20190797
Citation489 P.3d 198
CourtUtah Supreme Court
Parties Yvonne MARTIN, Petitioner, v. Frank O. KRISTENSEN, Respondent.

Karthik Nadesan, Salt Lake City, for appellant

R. Stephen Marshall, Kevin M. Paulsen, Salt Lake City, for appellees

Associate Chief Justice Lee authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Pearce, Justice Petersen, and Judge Fonnesbeck joined.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Associate Chief Justice Lee, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Yvonne Martin filed for divorce from Petter Kristensen in 2008. The divorce court awarded Yvonne1 temporary possession of the marital home during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. But the home was owned by Petter's father, Frank Kristensen. Frank served Yvonne with a notice to vacate shortly after Yvonne filed for divorce. When Yvonne refused to vacate, Frank filed an unlawful detainer action against Yvonne. Yvonne claimed that the temporary possession order precluded Frank from seeking the remedies available in an unlawful detainer action. The district court disagreed, found Yvonne in unlawful detainer, and entered a judgment that included a substantial award.

¶2 The court of appeals affirmed. It held that the temporary possession orders entered in the divorce action did not foreclose the unlawful detainer remedies available to Frank by statute. We affirm. We hold that the possession orders in the divorce proceeding functioned like a temporary possession order in an unlawful detainer proceeding—they precluded the tenant's eviction from the property but did not affect the availability of statutory remedies for unlawful detainer.

I

¶3 Yvonne Martin and Petter Kristensen married in Summit County, Utah in 1995. Starting in 1999, they lived together at a home on Quicksilver Drive in Salt Lake City. Yvonne owned the home and Petter retained an interest in any proceeds from its eventual sale.

¶4 Yvonne transferred ownership of the Quicksilver Drive home to Petter's father, Frank Kristensen, in 2004. The couple continued living in the home, however, under a tenancy at will2 —neither Yvonne nor Petter paid any rent or otherwise compensated Frank.

¶5 Petter left the home in May 2008, when Yvonne received a protective order against him after she alleged that Petter had abused her. Yvonne filed for divorce soon thereafter. She then sought and received another protective order in the divorce proceeding—an order granting her the use, control, and possession of the martial home.

¶6 Frank then sought to evict Yvonne in a notice to vacate served on July 1, 2008. Yvonne did not vacate during the five-day period provided in the notice to vacate. Instead, on July 3, 2008, Yvonne filed an amended petition in the divorce proceeding. The amended petition named Frank as a defendant and asserted, among other things, that Yvonne had transferred the home to Frank under duress and that she rightfully owned the home. The next month, on August 1, 2008, Frank filed an unlawful detainer action against Yvonne.

¶7 In the divorce proceeding, Yvonne sought an order granting her possession of the home until the court divided the marital property. After months of motions and argument, the divorce court entered an order awarding Yvonne use and possession of the home pending final resolution of the divorce proceeding.

¶8 Frank remained an absent party during the pendency of the above-noted motions in the divorce proceedings. He never responded despite being named as a party in Yvonne's amended complaint. Eventually he defaulted. After the default, Frank appeared and convinced the divorce court to set aside the default. On the same day, before arguments on Yvonne's temporary possession motion, a commissioner recommended dismissing Frank from the divorce action.

¶9 The recommendation was never implemented—no order was ever entered formally dismissing Frank from the divorce action. But the parties seemingly proceeded as if he had been dismissed. Frank's counsel did not appear that day in the arguments on the motion for temporary possession. And Frank was not listed as a party to the divorce action in subsequent filings and orders.

¶10 Not long after this hearing, Yvonne filed a separate action against Frank seeking to quiet title in the home. Yvonne again claimed that she had transferred the property to Frank under duress.

¶11 Yvonne next sought and received an order that prevented Petter from evicting her during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Frank was incapacitated in Norway at this time, with Petter acting on Frank's behalf through a power of attorney. Yvonne sought to prevent Petter from using the power of attorney to evict her.

¶12 The divorce court granted Yvonne's motion in June 2012. It entered a preliminary injunction preventing Petter from evicting Yvonne. And, perhaps contemplating that Frank might evict Yvonne when he regained capacity, the district court required Petter to "make arrangements for comparable housing for" Yvonne if she were evicted. The elements of the June 2012 order were reinforced in a subsequent order entered in September 2012. That order again enjoined Petter from interfering with Yvonne's possession and declared that Petter would be responsible for providing comparable housing if Yvonne were evicted.

¶13 Two years later, after Yvonne had requested several delays, a trial was held in the unlawful detainer and quiet title actions—which by then had been consolidated. At trial, a jury rejected Yvonne's assertion that she had transferred the property to Frank under duress. On that basis, the district court concluded that Frank was the rightful owner of the property and that Yvonne was guilty of unlawful detainer starting on July 6, 2008—five days after Frank filed the notice to vacate. See UTAH CODE § 78B-6-802(1)(b)(ii) (2008) (providing that "in cases of tenancies at will," tenants are guilty of unlawful detainer while they "remain[ ] in possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five calendar days").

¶14 The original four proceedings—for fraudulent transfer, unlawful detainer, quiet title, and divorce—were then consolidated. After consolidation, the district court initially ordered a new trial in the unlawful detainer and quiet title actions. In so doing, the court declared that "no one may interfere with Yvonne Martin's right to stay in the ... home during the pendency of the suit."

¶15 That order was set aside, however, after the case was transferred to a new judge. Upon transfer, the district court vacated the order for a new trial and ordered a new trial only on the damages in the unlawful detainer action. The district court affirmed the prior determination on the unlawful detainer issue. It held that Yvonne was in unlawful detainer and Frank was entitled to possession of the property.

¶16 Shortly thereafter, on October 12, 2015, Yvonne vacated the home. Several months later, the court convened a new trial on damages in the unlawful detainer action. In that proceeding, the district court found that Yvonne was in unlawful detainer from July 6, 2008 (five days after the notice of unlawful detainer) to October 12, 2015 (when she vacated the property). Based on evidence of fair market rental value for the property, it also concluded that Frank's damages were in the amount of $224,534.10—an amount that in the court's view was required to be trebled under Utah Code section 78B-6-811(3).

¶17 The district court acknowledged the sizable nature of the treble damages award at stake. But it also noted that the unlawful detainer statute includes a "significant safety valve that is designed to protect against excessive damages for unlawful detainer"—in section 78B-6-810, which "allows a person to request a hearing or trial within 60 days and/or otherwise provides for expedited proceedings." In the district court's view, "[t]hat should have happened here but it did not." Instead, there were "machinations" that resulted in an "unreasonable delay in the resolution of th[e] case" that took "a relatively manageable amount of damages to an enormous amount of damages." And because "the statute requires" an award of treble damages, the court held that "the total amount awarded to Frank Kristensen [was] $673,602.30, plus attorney fees in an amount to be determined." The fee amount and other costs were calculated in a subsequent proceeding, and set at $227,060.96. The resulting final judgment was for $900,663.26 in Frank's favor.

¶18 Yvonne challenged that judgment on appeal, asserting that Frank had no right to seek remedies for unlawful detainer where her possession was lawful under orders awarding her temporary possession in the divorce action. The court of appeals affirmed. See Martin v. Kristensen , 2019 UT App 127, 450 P.3d 66. It held that the temporary possession orders did not render Yvonne's detainer lawful because (1) the divorce court's orders were not entered until after Yvonne "had unlawfully remained on the Property for nearly ten months," id. ¶ 37 ; (2) the temporary orders did not "definitively adjudicate" Frank's rights, and thus authorized Yvonne's lawful possession at most vis-à-vis Petter, id. ¶ 38 ; and (3) statutory remedies for unlawful detainer are available notwithstanding an order of temporary occupancy, id. ¶ 40.

¶19 Yvonne filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. "In reviewing the court of appeals’ decision we apply the same standard of review that it would apply in reviewing the decision of the district court." Est. of Faucheaux v. City of Provo , 2019 UT 41, ¶ 9, 449 P.3d 112. The case primarily raises questions of law—as to the effect of temporary possession orders on the availability of remedies for unlawful detainer. And we decide those questions de novo , affording no deference to the lower courts’ analysis. See Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.) , 2012 UT 35, ¶ 41, 308 P.3d 382.

II

¶20 Yvonne does not defend the lawfulness of her...

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