Martin v. Lumpkin

Decision Date21 January 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 2:19-CV-166-M-BR
PartiesKENYA ABDULE MARTIN, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

LEE ANN RENO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Kenya Abdule Martin, a Texas prisoner, petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Martin challenges his 2015 Potter County conviction for capital murder and life sentence. For the reasons set forth below, Martin is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief or a Certificate of Appealability from this court.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Indictment

In December 2014, a Potter County grand jury indicted Martin on a charge of capital murder, to wit, fatally shooting Edward Pendleton on or about May 1, 2013, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the robbery of Pendleton.

B. Trial

Martin's jury trial commenced on February 17, 2015. Danielle Luce testified that: (1) Edward Pendleton was the father of her two children and a drug dealer known on the streets as “ATX”; (2) on the morning of May 1, 2013, she and Pendleton were awakened by loud noises in their house at 823 Kentucky; (3) Pendleton ran into their living room and shortly thereafter she heard two gunshots; (4) when she looked, she saw two men standing over Pendleton's body, one of whom shot Pendleton again; (5) the man who shot Pendleton was black, taller than 5'8” and dressed in a dark hoodie and dark pants; (6) the two men forced their way into her bedroom and demanded money; (7) when she pointed to her purse in a basinet and a pair of pants on the floor, they hit her with a gun; (8) after the two men left, she went to Pendleton, who was able to talk and kept saying what she initially thought was “Morris” but later realized was “Damarrus”; (9) she called 911 and later went to the police station; and (10) she was unable to identify either of the two men who broke into her home that morning. S.F. Trial, Vol. 2/6, at 211-23, 231-46 [ECF no. 5026].

Andrea Brown testified in pertinent part that: (1) she drove Martin (whom she identified as going by the moniker “K”), Stevon Polk, and Polk's friend “Morris” to the neighborhood where Luce and Pendleton's home was located, i.e., near the intersection of Kentucky and Line Streets; (2) the three men exited her vehicle and were gone for a few minutes; (3) when the three men returned, “Morris” had a bag in his hand (which was later identified as Luce's purse) and Martin had a gun in his hand; (4) the three men looked tense; (5) more specifically, Polk looked like he was in shock, “Morris” appeared scared, and Martin appeared angry; (6) Martin said “I clapped that nigger, ” and “Morris” replied “I can't believe you did that”; (7) her boyfriend Marquis Wilkins was home when they returned to Brown's apartment; (8) the three men told Wilkins what happened, during which discussion Martin explained that he thought the man had a gun, said that he shot the man again after he fell to the floor, and he was pretty certain the man was dead; (8) Martin also said that he pointed his gun at the woman and told her to stop screaming; (9) prior to leaving her apartment that day, Brown witnessed Martin loading his gun; (10) Brown admitted that her first statement to police was only partially accurate and explained that she returned to the police on May 7 to give a full and complete statement; and (11) she had been charged with aggravated robbery in connection with the crime in question and had received a five-year sentence as part of a plea bargain in exchange for her truthful testimony against Martin. S.F. Trial, Vol. 3/6, 151-217 [ECF no. 50-27].

Two witnesses who were at the apartment of Andrea Brown and Marquis Wilkins in the hours immediately after Pendleton's murder testified that they heard Martin admit he had killed someone.[1]

A forensic pathologist testified that Pendleton died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds.[2]

The jury also heard extensive testimony from a variety of law enforcement officers who either collected evidence at the crime scene, collected or identified the murder weapon, or collected evidence from Brown and Wilkins' apartment.[3]

A pair of law enforcement officers identified a recording of a telephone conversation between Martin and someone Martin identified as his sister recorded while Martin was an inmate at the Potter County Jail during which Martin described Pendleton's murder and identified Stevon Polk and Demarrus Ary as the other two persons involved in the robbery/murder.[4]

A firearm and toolmark expert testified that three shell casings and three bullets were recovered during the investigation of Pendleton's murder - one bullet at autopsy and two bullets from the crime scene at 823 Kentucky - and that while one of those bullets had insufficient characteristics for comparison, two of the bullets in question and all three of the shell casings found at the crime scene had been fired by the handgun recovered during the search of Andrea Brown's vehicle.[5]

On February 20, 2015, the jury found Martin guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment against him.[6]

C. Direct Appeal

Martin appealed his conviction.[7] The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed Martin's conviction in an unpublished opinion. Martin v. State, no. 07-15-00079-CR, 2017 WL 1090613 (Tex. App. - Amarillo Mar. 15, 2017).[8] The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Martin's petition for discretionary review on August 23, 2017.

D. State Habeas Proceeding

Martin filed his pro se application for state habeas corpus relief on January 16, 2018, asserting ten grounds for relief.[9] The state trial court held an evidentiary hearing on June 25, 2018 on Martin's Batson claim during which Martin's lead prosecutor, Audrey Mink, testified regarding her reasons for striking three members of the jury venire.[10] In findings and conclusions issued July 26, 2018, the state trial court recommended denial of Martin's state habeas corpus application.[11] The Texas Court of Criminal of Appeals denied Martin's state habeas corpus application without written order on September 12, 2018.

E. Proceedings in this Court

Martin filed his original petition in the Eastern District of Texas on July 22, 2019 (ECF no. 1). After transfer to the Amarillo Division of this Court, Martin filed his amended petition on September 18, 2019 (ECF no. 26), asserting ten grounds for relief, including a freestanding claim of actual innocence, multiple complaints of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, a conclusory Batson claim, complaints of ineffective assistance by his state appellate counsel, multiple claims of prosecutorial and police misconduct, and an assertion the state trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal proceeding against Martin.

Respondent filed his answer on February 28, 2020 (ECF no. 40), arguing in part that Martin had failed to allege specific facts in support of many of his claims, pointing out Martin failed to make a timely Batson objection, and arguing many of Martin's claims were conclusory in nature.

On May 11, 2020, Martin filed a reply brief (ECF no. 46) in which he argued the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over his person, in part because his is not a “true living man, ” the state habeas court's denial of his Batson claim was “plain error, ” and he is actually innocent of Pendleton's murder because Marquis Wilkins did it and testified falsely at trial.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Martin filed this federal habeas corpus action after the effective date of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), this Court's review of his claims for federal habeas corpus relief is governed by AEDPA. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). Under the AEDPA standard of review, this Court cannot grant Amero federal habeas corpus relief in connection with any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Supreme Court has concluded the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) have independent meanings. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant relief if (1) the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or (2) the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Brown, 544 U.S. at 141; Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (“A state court's decision is ‘contrary to' our clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases' or it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.'). A state court's failure to cite Supreme Court authority does not, per se, establish the state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law: “the state court need not even be aware of our precedents, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decisions contradicts them.' Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16.

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