Martin v. Martin

• Citation: 173 Ala. 106,55 So. 632
• Parties: MARTIN v. MARTIN ET AL.
• Decision Date: 11 May 1911
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

55 So. 632

173 Ala. 106

MARTIN v. MARTIN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 11, 1911

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1911.

Appeal from City Court of Anniston; Thomas W. Coleman, Jr., Judge.

Bill by Gussie Martin against Ance Martin, as administrator of the estate of M. J. Martin, deceased, and others, for the removal of the estate from the probate to the chancery court, and for other purposes. From a decree for respondents, complainant appeals. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

The case made by the bill is substantially as follows: The complainant is alleged to be the widow of one M. J. Martin who died intestate on the 6th day of February, 1910, at which time he was an inhabitant of Calhoun county. He left surviving him several children, and the complainant in the bill, claiming to be his widow, and he died possessed of real and personal property in this state, and his estate is in the course of administration in the probate court of Calhoun county. It is further alleged that on June 16, 1906, an original bill was filed in the Cleburne county court by M. J Martin, praying for a divorce from the complainant on certain statutory grounds, and that on the 29th day of August, 1906 a final decree was entered in said cause, divorcing said M J. Martin from said Gussie Martin. It is alleged that at the time of the filing of said bill in Cleburne county the said M. J. Martin, as well as the said Gussie Martin, were both residents of Pope county, Ga., and not residents of Cleburne county, Ala., and that the complainant had not resided in the state of Alabama for one year next before the filing of the bill, and it is alleged that for that reason the Cleburne county court acquired no jurisdiction to render the decree of divorce, and hence it is void. The administrator of the estate of M. J. Martin, the heirs at law, and the sureties on the administrator's bond are made parties defendant, and it is prayed that Gussie Martin be allowed dower rights and a distributive share out of the estate of said M. J. Martin. The demurrers of the administrator raise the points decided in the opinion. Hanson and Studdard, sureties on the bond of the administrator, interposed demurrers because of improper joinder of parties defendant. The other facts sufficiently appear from the opinion.

Blackwell & Agee, for appellant.

Knox, Acker, Dixon & Blackmon, for appellees.

McCLELLAN J.

The jurisdiction of courts of equity to dissolve the bonds of matrimony is purely statutory. Nelson on Div. §§ 10, 17, 18, 19; 1 Pom. Equity Jur. §§ 98, 112 (subd. 10); 14 Cyc. pp. 581, 582; 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 726. Accordingly, the power to grant divorce a vinculo is not of the general jurisdiction of courts of equity; but they are in that respect, courts of limited and special jurisdiction. "Where a special authority, in derogation of the common law, is conferred by statute on a court of general jurisdiction, it becomes quoad hoc an inferior or limited court." State v. M. & G. R. R. Co., 108 Ala. 29, 18 So. 801; Goodwater Warehouse Co. v. Street, 137 Ala. 621, 34 So. 903; Gunn v. Howell, 27 Ala. 663, 62 Am. Dec. 785.

With respect to the judicial acts of courts exercising special and limited jurisdiction, the existence of jurisdictional facts is not inferred from the mere exercise of jurisdiction, but must affirmatively appear from the record. Goodwater Warehouse Co. v. Street, 137 Ala. 621, 625, 34 So. 903, and authorities there cited. In such cases "a compliance with the requisitions of the statute is necessary to its jurisdiction, and must appear on the face of its proceedings." State v. M. & G. R. R. Co., supra. It follows, as of course, that such jurisdiction cannot be obtained or conferred by the proclamation thereof, positively or by invited necessary inference, in the order or decree of a court assuming to exercise a limited special authority. Neville v. Kennedy, 125 Ala. 149, 28 So. 452, 82 Am. St. Rep. 230; Pollard v. Hanrick, 74 Ala. 334.

On collateral attack of a judgment or decree, no presumption of the existence of jurisdictional facts can be indulged. Whitlow v. Echols, 78 Ala. 206; Pollard v. Hanrick, supra. But, where the judgment or decree is collaterally assailed, every reasonable intendment, as a matter of construction only, will be made in favor of the validity thereof. King v. Kent, 29 Ala. 542, 554; Pollard v. Hanrick, supra; Whitlow v. Echols, supra. On such an inquiry, the determination of the question whether the pleading contained the averment of jurisdictional facts will be undertaken with a motive, in construction, favorable to the validity of the judgment or decree; and where the pleading is reasonably susceptible thereof, that construction will be adopted that will support the judgment or decree, guarding, of course, against the supplying thereby of omitted essential averments. King v. Kent, supra. The pleading will be understood "as it is reasonable to infer that the party who made it and the judge who acted upon it did understand it, and not as they were bound to understand it." King v. Kent, supra; Whitlow v. Echols, supra.

Code 1896, § 1494 (Code 1907, § 3802), provides: "When the defendant is a nonresident, the other party to the marriage must have been a bona fide resident of this state for one year next before the filing of the bill, which must be alleged in the bill and proved." (Italics supplied.) Residence within the state, the powers of the courts of which are invoked to grant divorce, of at least one of the parties to the marriage, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid decree in the premises. Nelson on Div. § 21, and notes; Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 21 S.Ct. 551, 45 L.Ed. 804, among others. The provision of the quoted statute, with respect to the residence of the complainant, in cases within the requirement of the statute, establishes a bona fide residence in this state "for one year next before the filing of the bill" as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid decree of divorce. 14 Cyc. p. 663; Pate v. Pate, 6 Mo. App. 49; Collins v. Collins, 53 Mo.App. 470; Cheatham v. Cheatham, 10 Mo. 296; Kruse v. Kruse, 25 Mo. 68; 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 732, and notes; Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 12 N.H. 200; Batchelder v. Batchelder, 14 N.H. 380.

The adoption in the pleading of the exact terms of the statute in this regard is not essential. It is sufficient if the averments convey the same idea in equivalent terms. Needles v. Needles (Tex. Civ. App.) 54 S.W. 1070; Collins v. Collins, supra; 14 Cyc. p. 663.

In the bill for divorce a vinculo, filed by M. J. Martin against Gussie Martin in the then existing county court of Cleburne county, Ala., these allegations, comprising all of them presently pertinent to the inquiry submitted for review here appear: "Your orator, M. J. Martin, a resident of Cleburne county, Ala., over the age of 21 years, respectfully shows unto your honor: That on or about May 3, 1906, orator intermarried with said Gussie Martin, in the state of Georgia, Polk county, and that they lived together until about June 4, 1906, as man and wife, most of the time residing in Cleburne county, Ala., and orator has been a bona fide resident of Cleburne county for more than three years. * * * That Gussie Martin is over the age of 21 years and resides in the state of Georgia, but her particular place of residence is unknown to orator," etc. The decree of divorce to which that cause progressed is collaterally assailed by the bill inceptive of the cause now appealed from; a decree...