Martin v. Martin

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BURNETT
• Citation: Martin v. Martin, 213 Tenn. 345, 373 S.W.2d 609, 17 McCanless 345 (Tenn. 1963)
• Decision Date: 05 December 1963
• Parties: Rosa MARTIN v. Robert MARTIN. 17 McCanless 345, 213 Tenn. 345, 373 S.W.2d 609

Page 609

373 S.W.2d 609

Rosa MARTIN v. Robert MARTIN.

17 McCanless 345, 213 Tenn. 345, 373 S.W.2d 609

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Dec. 5, 1963.

George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., Thomas E. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for plaintiff in error.

Willard W. Kittrell, Jr., Harriman, for defendant in error.

BURNETT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the State from an order of the Circuit Judge in declaring the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act as unconstitutional because it is said that it contravenes Article I, Section 17 and Article XI, Section 8 of the Constitution of Tennessee upon the ground that it permits the filing of a petition in a court of this State by a non-resident upon a pauper's oath, a right not authorized generally by Sec. 20-1629, T.C.A. This Section of the Code (Sec. 20-1629, T.C.A.) provides for the commencement of suits upon a pauper's oath except for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, slanderous words, and for absolute divorce by residents of this State. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in question here is carried in the Code as Sec. 36-901 et seq., as amended by Chapter 214 of the Public Acts of 1959, and is codified in the Cumulative Supplement of the Code. The particular Section in question is Sec. 36-902(14), T.C.A. This Section authorizes the filing of a petition if certified in accordance with law of a certifying state rather than as required by Sec. 24-619, T.C.A., which provides that records in judicial proceedings of any court in any state, etc., shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.

A petition was filed in the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court in the County of Oakland, State of Michigan, by the Supervisor of the County Bureau of Social Aid, Ora L. Hinckley, to the effect that the respondent, Robert Martin, has failed to comply with an order of that court, dated August 8, 1960, to support his three minor children, since December 21, 1960, and was in arrears at the time the petition was filed in an amount exceeding $1,500.00.

The cause, according to the certificate, was heard before the Circuit Judge of Oakland County, Michigan, in 1962. That court certified in accordance with the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of that state that the petition set forth facts from which it could be determined that the respondent, Robert Martin, has a duty to support his dependent children, therein named, and sufficient for the court designated in the petition, Circuit Court of Roane County, Tennessee, to exercise jurisdiction over the respondent, Robert Martin, and his property.

The Michigan court further ordered true copies of the certified petition and other papers as required by the Act (Sec. 12 of the Michigan Act, Comp.Laws Supp.1956, Sec. 780.162--Sec. 36-913, T.C.A.), be transmitted to the proper court in the responding state. This was apparently done since there is no question herein raised regarding it.

The case first came on to be heard in the Circuit Court of Roane County in January, 1963, upon the petition and testimony of the defendant in error, Robert Martin. The Roane County Circuit Court found that the maximum amount that Robert Martin could pay for the support of his three children would be $15.00 per week, and he ordered Martin to pay $30.00 twice monthly into court for that purpose. Later on February 1, 1963, a conditional forfeiture was entered against Robert Martin and his bondsman because of Martin's failure to appear in court and answer the petition for support.

On August 7, 1963, and order was entered granting a motion of the defendant in error, Robert Martin, to dismiss the petition upon the grounds that it did not comply with the Tennessee Constitution for the reasons set out above.

It is the insistence of the State that the trial judge erred in declaring the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act unconstitutional on the grounds above set forth.

Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that all courts shall be open and every man, for any injury done him and his land, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay. This Section also provides that suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.

Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the Legislature from suspending the general law of the State for the benefit of any particular individual. This provision and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been dealt with by us many times.

In 1954 we had before us the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act which was on the books at that time in the case of Sinclair v. Sinclair, 196 Tenn. 538, 268 S.W.2d 573. In that case we held that this Act did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. We also pointed out that in the case then before us the initial proceedings were instituted in Alabama and then sent to Tennessee as the responding State where service of process was had on the defendant in the case, who answered and offered proof in support of his answer. We also pointed out that it clearly appeared to us in that case that due process was preserved and that the defendant in that case had had his day in court and that judgment was only rendered against him after he had been given an opportunity to offer proof, and that it was only after this that the courts of this State decreed support was due and specified the amount.

In the present case the constitutional objection insisted upon is more specific. It is argued by the defendant in error that this Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act permits the filing of a petition in a court of this State by a resident of another state upon a pauper's oath (Sec. 36-914, T.C.A., Cumulative Supplement), whereas Sec. 20-1629 T.C.A., only permits residents of this State to file suits upon pauper's oaths in certain cases, and (2) it does not require a compliance with Sec. 24-619, T.C.A., relative to the filing of judicial records, etc., of other states in courts of this State.

The test to be applied in such instances has been many times defined by this Court and other courts of last resort in a number of cases. See Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82, 65 S.W. 871; State ex rel. Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 821, 65 S.W. 871; Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S.W. 177, L.R.A.1916F, 177; Tenpenny v. Cannon County, 180 Tenn. 618, 177 S.W.2d 817; and State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S.W. 1033. These cases clearly point out the fact that the true question in each case is, is the classification capricious, unreasonable or arbitrary? This question is very ably answered in the Motlow opinion, at pages 559-560 of our Report [125 Tenn. at pages 559-560, 145 S.W. at page 180, L.R.A.1916F, 177]. From this we reach the conclusion that if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived that would sustain the constitutionality of the Act then the Act must be held constitutional. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is the uniform law which has been adopted by the Legislature of this State as well as that of the State of Michigan (the initiating state). This law is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed with reference to the object to be obtained. This Act in effect is a civil proceeding and is a simplifid, fair and convenient way to cause those who are obligated to support their minor children to do so without having to be extradited to...