Martin v. Martin
| Decision Date | 10 May 1930 |
| Citation | 150 A. 338 |
| Parties | MARTIN v. MARTIN et al. |
| Court | New Jersey Court of Chancery |
Syllabus by the Court.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to partition personal property is inherent in the court, and is not based upon statutes.
Syllabus by the Court.
Subject to certain exceptions, the general rule is that compulsory partition may be had in equity of any class of property or any rights held in cotenancy.
Syllabus by the Court.
At the instance of a wife, and against her husband's opposition, partition decreed of money deposited in bank in the joint names of the husband and wife with the right of each to withdraw and the right of each to the whole as survivor.
Syllabus by the Court.
It is within the power of the Court of Chancery to decree the termination of a trust, where all the objects and purposes of the trust have been accomplished, where the interests under it have all vested, and where all parties beneficially interested desire its termination.
Syllabus by the Court.
The Court of Chancery will not terminate a trust, where the effect of the decree will be to override and put an end to an active and irrevocable express, trust, and thus defeat a testator's or donor's intention, if the objects of the trust have not been fully accomplished and the trustee stands ready and able to execute the trust in good faith.
not be partitioned.
Syllabus by the Court.
Partition denied of a trust fund held by a trustee under an irrevocable active express trust in which by the deed of trust the income was directed to be paid to a husband and his wife during their joint lives, and to the survivor for life, and at the death of the survivor the principal was directed to be paid to the legal representatives of the survivor.
Suit by Mary E. Martin against George B. Martin and another for partition. On final hearing.
Decree for complainant for part of relief demanded.
George B. Evans, of Moorestown, for complainant.
Clifford A. Baldwin, of Camden, for defendant Martin.
George Reynolds, of Camden, for defendant Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
LEAMING, Vice Chancellor.
The bill herein has been filed by a wife against her husband, and seeks partition of certain personal property. Defendant husband opposes:
Partition is sought of two separate funds of money. I have reached the conclusion that one of these funds may be partitioned, but that the other may not.
The former fund is $5,795.50 on deposit with defendant Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Company. This money was deposited by the husband in that banking institution and by him and his wife made subject to withdrawal in accordance with the terms of a signature card which was signed by both parties, which card reads as follows:
"The sum entered in this book belongs to us jointly, and we agree and direct that each may withdraw on his or her individual order during their joint lives, and that any balance upon the death of either shall belong to the survivor."
The evidence fully discloses that this deposit was made by the husband with his own money with a defined intent on his part to give to his wife an equal right with himself in the money.
There can be no doubt of the right of the wife to the relief which she now seeks touching that money.
The general rule is that compulsory partition may be had in equity of any class of property or any rights held in cotenancy. 30 Cyc. 175. Certain exceptions to this general rule will be referred to in connection with the other fund embraced in the bill. The common law furnished no instrumentality by which partition of personal property could be judicially effected; but the jurisdiction in equity is unquestioned. 4 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (3d Ed.) § 1391. That jurisdiction is inherent in the court and is not based upon statutes. Grassman v. Badgely, 90 N. J. Eq. 203, 205, 106 A. 373. It will be noted that the rights of the respective parties in this deposit are precisely the same. Each spouse has an equal present right of enjoyment in both the corpus and any accumulated interest, and equal rights by survivorship.
But the other fund sought to be partitioned is of a different nature. That is a fund of $10,000 delivered to Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Company under a trust...
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