Martin v. Martin, No. 4987.
Docket Nº | No. 4987. |
Citation | 270 A.2d 141 |
Case Date | October 20, 1970 |
Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
v.
Lucy P. MARTIN, Appellee.
Robert H. Reiter, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Kurt Berlin, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and KELLY and NEBEKER, Associate Judges.
NEBEKER, Associate Judge:
This appeal results from an order of the trial court on our remand in Martin v. Martin, D.C.App., 240 A.2d 363 (1968). We directed the trial judge to conduct a hearing on the merits of appellant's prayer to declare a constructive trust over monies allegedly belonging to him which were received by the wife-appellee during their marriage. If warranted by the evidence, an accounting was to be rendered by appellee with payment to appellant of such monies as may be due. The trial court concluded that appellant requested or ratified all actions taken by appellee relative to receipt and expenditure of the funds and, therefore, appellee had no funds belonging to appellant and that no accounting was necessary.1 Accordingly, the request to declare a constructive trust and for payment of money assertedly due was denied. During the hearing appellant was also adjudicated in contempt and sentenced to ten days' imprisonment or, in lieu thereof, a $25 fine. We reverse the contempt adjudication. As to the order relating to the request to declare a constructive trust, we reverse and remand with instructions as outlined below.
The facts reveal that appellant, a veteran, was committed to a mental institution on October 12, 1962, by order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C.Code 1961 §§ 21-311, -314 and -315. As a result of his military service, he was entitled to disability benefits.
The parties were married while appellant was on weekend leave from the hospital. Thereafter, the wife requested the Veterans Administration to pay her a portion of his disability benefits pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 3107(a) (1964)2. The Veterans Administration, pursuant to statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3001(a) (1964),3 supplied the requisite form,4 a Declaration of Marital Status. It required her marital history including the birth of children resulting from this marriage or any prior marriages. Completion of the form required the signature of the veteran-husband. Appellee submitted the form to the Veterans Administration and payments were promptly made to her. Upon the birth of a child fathered by another man, appellee requested and received additional benefits in the form of a dependent's allowance. In addition to the previous remand proceedings, the earlier appeal resulted in an annulment of the marriage.
The remand proceedings concluded in a trial court finding that all representations made by the wife to the Veterans Administration were at the request of the husband
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or ratified by him and that he authorized the wife to sign his name on the benefit form. It was also found that appellee committed no fraud or forgery regarding the signature. The court further found that appellant acknowledged the child as being in loco parentis.
We cannot sustain the foregoing findings of the trial court because of appellant's adjudicated incompetence at the crucial times. Appellant, while under that status, was incapable of executing contracts, deeds, powers of attorney, or other instruments requiring volition and understanding. Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 9, 20, 21 L.Ed. 73 (1873); Sullivan v. Flynn, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 396, 401 (Super.Ct.1892).5 The record before us is completely lacking in evidence that appellant was of sound mind or had the requisite mental capacity to execute any documents, ratify any acts of another, or authorize rize the signing of his name. Therefore, the previous adjudication of incompetence is presumed to be of continuing validity during the critical period. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Herrmann, D.C.Mun.App., 35 A.2d 828, 829 (1944). Accordingly, the findings regarding the validity of appellant's actions resulting in payments to appellee cannot stand. In addition, the finding that appellant acknowledged...
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Hernandez v. Banks, Nos. 08–CV–1571
...two parties on the land being transferred.” Black's Law Dictionary 27 (9th ed. 2009). 10.Sullivan was followed in Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C.1970) (“Martin II ”). In Martin II, this court refused to sustain the findings of the trial court—that requests for disability benefits ......
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718 Associates v. Banks, Nos. 08–CV–1571
...of Columbia, first stated in Sullivan v. Flynn, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 396, 401 (1892), and subsequently followed in Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C.1970) (“ Martin II ”), is no longer applicable because it is contrary to the rule [21 A.3d 978] followed in a majority of the states. 1 T......
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Desser v. Woods, No. 40
...See Bergin v. State, 1 Md.App. 74, 227 A.2d 357 (1967). See also Willis v. James, 284 Ala. 673, 227 So.2d 573 (1969); Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141 (D.C.App.1970); English v. Shivers, 219 Ga. 515, 133 S.E.2d 867 The recurring allegations in regard to 'convalescent leave' and 'convalescent ......
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718 Associates v. Banks, No. 08-CV-1571 & 09-CV-744
...of Columbia, first stated in Sullivan v. Flynn, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 396, 401 (1892), and subsequently followed in Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C. 1970) ("Martin II"), is no longer applicable because it is contrary to the rule followed in a majority of the states.1Therefor......
-
Hernandez v. Banks, Nos. 08–CV–1571
...two parties on the land being transferred.” Black's Law Dictionary 27 (9th ed. 2009). 10.Sullivan was followed in Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C.1970) (“Martin II ”). In Martin II, this court refused to sustain the findings of the trial court—that requests for disability benefits ......
-
718 Associates v. Banks, Nos. 08–CV–1571
...of Columbia, first stated in Sullivan v. Flynn, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 396, 401 (1892), and subsequently followed in Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C.1970) (“ Martin II ”), is no longer applicable because it is contrary to the rule [21 A.3d 978] followed in a majority of the states. 1 T......
-
Desser v. Woods, No. 40
...See Bergin v. State, 1 Md.App. 74, 227 A.2d 357 (1967). See also Willis v. James, 284 Ala. 673, 227 So.2d 573 (1969); Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141 (D.C.App.1970); English v. Shivers, 219 Ga. 515, 133 S.E.2d 867 The recurring allegations in regard to 'convalescent leave' and 'convalescent ......
-
718 Associates v. Banks, No. 08-CV-1571 & 09-CV-744
...of Columbia, first stated in Sullivan v. Flynn, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 396, 401 (1892), and subsequently followed in Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C. 1970) ("Martin II"), is no longer applicable because it is contrary to the rule followed in a majority of the states.1Therefore, we are ......