Martin v. Martin

• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Heard before WHITE, C.J., BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, and CLINTON, JJ., and WARREN; WARREN
• Citation: Martin v. Martin, 188 Neb. 393, 197 N.W.2d 388 (Neb. 1972)
• Decision Date: 05 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 38203,38203
• Parties: Iola M. MARTIN, Appellee, v. Grant L. MARTIN, Appellant.

Page 388

197 N.W.2d 388

188 Neb. 393

Iola M. MARTIN, Appellee, v. Grant L. MARTIN, Appellant.

No. 38203.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

May 5, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

1. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize settlement agreements closely in divorce actions and to protect against fraud, intimidation, and ignorance and guard against unconscionable results. The Court is required to render a fair and equitable result under all the circumstances.

2. A party who appears pro se is subject to and will receive the same consideration as if he had been represented by an attorney.

3. Stipulations voluntarily entered into between the parties to a cause or their attorneys, for the government of their conduct and the control of their rights during the trial or progress of the cause, will be respected and enforced by the courts, where such stipulations are not contrary to good morals or sound public policy.

4. Courts will enforce valid stipulations unless some good cause is shown for declining to do so, especially where the stipulations have been acted upon so that the parties could not be placed in status quo.

5. Parties are bound by stipulations voluntarily made and relief from such stipulations after judgment is warranted only under exceptional circumstances.

6. Actions in equity on appeal to this court are triable de novo, subject, however to the rule that when credible evidence on material questions of fact is in irreconcilable conflict this court will consider the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying, and must have accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite.

7. The judgment of a trial court fixing the amount of alimony will not be disturbed on appeal unless good cause is shown.

William L. Walker, Earl Ludlam, Lincoln, for appellant.

Beynon, Hecht & Fahrnbruch, Dale E. Fahrnbruch, Lincoln, for appellee.

Heard before WHITE, C.J., BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, and CLINTON, JJ., and WARREN, District Judge.

WARREN, District Judge.

This is a divorce action wherein plaintiff Iola M. Martin was granted an absolute divorce on May 3, 1971, from the defendant Grant L. Martin on gounds of extreme cruelty. Defendant concedes that plaintiff is entitled to a divorce and that plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the property of the parties, but attacks the trial court's division of property and alimony provisions on various grounds.

Plaintiff was 60 years of age at the time of trial, and defendant was 63. They were married in 1935 and their three children were grown and emancipated. They have been in various businesses in and near Lincoln since their marriage, and for the past 5 years have owned and operated a valuable dairy and stock farm a short distance west of Lincoln, consisting of approximately 400 acres. The evidence demonstrated without question that the defendant was a man of violent and surely disposition, an absolute dictator to his wife and children, and a man who was guilty of extreme cruelty, both physical and mental, in every sense of that legal terminology. The plaintiff had admittedly made substantial and continuing contributions to the accumulation of property, both as a farm wife and otherwise. The trial court awarded each party an undivided one-half interest in the farm real estate, subject to defendant's sole use and entitlement to the income therefrom from December 1, 1969, to March 1, 1972, conditioned upon payment of $900 to plaintiff, the payment of real estate taxes for 1970 and 1971, the maintenance of improvements in good condition, and payment of all expenses of operation, maintenance, and improvement of the farm real estate after December 1, 1969. Plaintiff was awarded as her separate property an automobile valued at $1,190 and $3,600 in bank money orders. Defendant was awarded farm machinery, livestock and miscellaneous farm personal property valued by the court at $63,755. The parties had each purchased a $15,000 certificate of deposit in 1968 from the proceeds of a land sale, and each had expended a portion thereof in payment for permanent improvements to the 400-acre farm. After such expenditures, plaintiff was awarded the $10,253.88 balance of her certificate of deposit, and defendant was awarded the truck and farm machinery he purchased with the.$7,457.30 balance of his certificate of deposit funds. Each was allotted a portion of the household goods. Defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff as alimony the sum of $20,000 in three installments, without interest, ending September 1, 1972, together with further alimony of $3,900 payable to plaintiff at $65 per month for 60 months commencing March 1, 1972, with credit to be allowed thereon for any Social Security payments received by plaintiff during that period. Defendant was required to pay all indebtedness incurred before December 1, 1969. Costs were taxed to defendant including an attorney's fee of $4,300 for plaintiff's attorney. The court specifically considered the fact that no temporary support had been paid pliantiff during the 13 1/2 months of litigation.

Until the time of filing his motion for new trial, the defendant acted as his own counsel, despite the repeated suggestions of the trial judge and plaintiff's attorney that he employ counsel. Defendant's stubborn insistence that he act pro se resulted in a trial of 5 1/2 full days duration, a complex record of monumental proportions, a series of debates by defendant with witnesses, and a disruption of the entire trial process. The record demonstrates that the trial judge, exhibiting patience far beyond the call of duty, acted throughout the trial with complete fairness to the defendant, a fact which the defendant acknowledged many times during the trial.

Defendant's first contention is that the court erred in not upholding a written agreement, termed the 'Wilson Agreement,' entered into by the parties on December 1, 1969. Plaintiff testified that defendant had the property settlement agreement prepared on his own, that she was afraid that if she didn't sign it she would forfeit everything, and that she was fearful of physical harm if she did not sign it. The so-called Wilson Agreement provided, among other things, that defendant should have the use of the 400-acre farm and home thereon, and all farm machinery, for 5 years, upon payment to plaintiff of $600 a year rent. The trial court held that plaintiff's execution of the Wilson Agreement was coerced by the defendant, was not entered into freely and voluntarily by plaintiff, was unfair and inequitable in its...