Martin v. Montgomery
| Decision Date | 01 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-01400-MGL |
| Parties | KAREEM MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF WILL MONTGOMERY; DEPUTY SAMANTHA DEMIRTAS; SERGEANT TIMOTHY INMAN; SERGEANT CHRIS DARNER; and FAIRFIELD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF REMAINING FEDERAL CLAIMS
Plaintiff Kareem Martin (Martin) filed this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. (SCTCA), in the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas against Sheriff Will Montgomery (Montgomery), Deputy Samantha Demirtas (Demirtas), Sergeant Timothy Inman (Inman), Sergeant Chris Darner (Darner), and the Fairfield County Sheriff's Office (Fairfield) (collectively, Defendants).
Martin's Section 1983 claims seek damages for violations of his First, Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights against Montgomery, Demirtas, Inman, and Darner in their individual capacities. His SCTCA claims seeks damages against Fairfield for negligence and gross negligence. Defendants removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
This matter is before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (Report) of the United States Magistrate Judge recommending the Court deny Martin's motion for partial summary judgment and grant Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommends Martin's Section 1983 claims against Montgomery, his Section 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against Demirtas, Inman, and Darner, and his SCTCA claim against Fairfield, all be dismissed. The Report was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court need not conduct a de novo review, however, “when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the [Magistrate Judge's] proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
The Magistrate Judge filed the Report on August 31, 2021, Martin filed his objections on September 21, 2021, Defendants filed their objection the same day, and Defendants replied, on January 11, 2022, to the Court's text order regarding certain arguments made in Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the objections, but holds them to be without merit. It will therefore enter judgment accordingly.
This case arises out of the arrest of Martin by Demirtas, Inman, and Darner on the evening of February 10, 2018. Martin lives on Martin Road in Winnsboro, South Carolina, and various family members own lots surrounding his property. One of those lots is owned by Martin's grandmother, Minnie Lee Martin (Minnie), who allows Martin's cousin, Jaida Martin (Jaida), to reside in her residence.
On February 10, 2018, Jaida called the police to report harassing and threatening text messages she received from certain individuals. According to Jaida, some of the text messages included a threat to shoot-up Minnie's house, with the specific goal of killing Minnie. Demirtas, the responding officer to Jaida's call to the police, arrived at Minnie's house around 6:45 PM, when it was pitch-black dark outside. When Demirtas arrived at Minnie's home, she began taking a statement from Jaida in the driveway. Minnie stood next to Jaida as she provided her statement to Demirtas. And, Demirtas's, Inman's, and Darner's body cameras recorded and captured all the events as set forth herein.
As Jaida provided her statement to Demirtas, the sound of five gunshots, in quick succession, came from behind Minnie's house. Demirtas asked Jaida and Minnie whether they knew about the source of the gunfire, and they responded no. Demirtas then informed dispatch of the gunshots, drew her gun and flashlight, cautiously walked toward the source of the gunfire behind Minnie's home, entered Minnie's backyard, and noticed two male individuals with guns: Martin and his cousin Keenan Martin (Keenan), who were standing in a lot behind Minnie's backyard.
Demirtas asked Martin and Keenen whether they were firing a weapon and ordered them to show their hands, drop their guns, interlace their fingers behind their heads, and kneel on the ground. Martin and Keenan complied with Demirtas's orders without incident.
Demirtas asked them what they were shooting at, and Martin responded he was shooting on his property. Martin proceeded to ask whether shooting on his property was an illegal act, and Demirtas responded shooting on one's land after dark, when an officer was attempting to take a statement from someone in close proximity, such as Jaida, was illegal.
Demirtas asked Martin and Keenan to provide their names, but they refused. Demirtas handcuffed Martin and moved him and Keenan to stand beside a nearby vehicle. Jaida and Minnie approached, and Demirtas asked if Martin and Keenan were related to them. Jaida told Demirtas that Martin and Kennan were her cousins, and Minnie opined Martin was her grandson and Keenan was her nephew.
Demirtas asked whether Jaida and Minnie knew Martin and Keenan were shooting on the property behind Minnie's home. Jaida responded no, but Minnie answered yes. According to Minnie, Martin and Keenan had been shooting into the air earlier in the day. Minnie also expressed to Demirtas they were shooting on property owned by Martin.
Demirtas asked Martin and Keenan for identification, and indicated to them she was detaining them until they could be identified. Martin asked the justification for their detention, and Demirtas stated she needed to verify their identity and ascertain their age. Demirtas walked Martin and Keenan back to the front of Minnie's house, at which time Inman and Darner arrived and assisted in the handcuffing of Keenan. The deputies proceeded to ask Martin and Keenan to identify themselves, but they refused.
Inman and Darner told Martin it was illegal to refuse to identify oneself to a law enforcement officer who requires to see his identification. They further informed Martin they had reasonable suspicion to detain him because he discharged a firearm at night and they wanted to see his identification to confirm he had the legal authority to possess a firearm. Martin, at Minnie's urging, provided Inman his name and date of birth. Jaida also provided Martin and Kennan's names and dates of birth to Demirtas.
Demirtas revealed to Martin and Kennan she was taking them to jail. Minnie asked Demirtas why she was taking them to jail, and Demirtas responded they were being unsafe when they discharged a firearm in the dark and refused to identify themselves. Martin and Keenan were officially charged with breach of peace in violation of South Carolina common law.
As noted above, Martin brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages against Montgomery, Demirtas, Inman, and Darner, in their individual capacities, for violations of his First, Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Martin also brought claims of negligence and gross negligence against Fairfield pursuant to the SCTCA.
Both parties object to the Report, and the Court will address Martin's objections first. Although Martin lists numerous objections to the Report, a number of them consist of alleged factual clarifications that fail to direct the Court to a specific error in the Report. See e.g., Martin's Obj. at 5, Number VII ( the Magistrate Judge incorrectly used the word “decline” as opposed to “denied” when citing to a conversation captured on Demirtas's body camera). After reviewing Martin's objections that direct the Court to a specific error in the Magistrate Judge's Report, it identifies three.
As to the first, Martin objects to the Magistrate Judge's determination Demirtas, Inman, and Darner “are entitled to qualified immunity [for Martin's Fourth Amendment claim against them] because the controlling law did not clearly establish that they lacked probable cause to arrest Martin for breach of peace.” Report at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
Qualified immunity shields “[g]overnmental officials . . . from liability for money damages so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or [C]onstitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). “Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Id.
Determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity generally requires a two-step inquiry. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). In particular, courts considering whether to dismiss a complaint based on qualified immunity should consider both “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a [C]onstitutional right” and “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.” Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
“When a court addresses qualified...
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