Martin v. Naik
| Decision Date | 15 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | 146.,No. 101,101 |
| Citation | 228 P.3d 1092 |
| Parties | Macie MARTIN, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Curley Martin, Deceased, Appellant, v. Sandip NAIK, M.D., and Specialty Hospital of Mid-America, Appellees. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
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Stephen G. Dickerson, of the Dickerson Law Group, of Olathe, for appellant.
Timothy P. McCarthy, of Gilliland & Hayes, P.A., of Overland Park, for appellee Sandip Naik, M.D.
Roger W. Slead and Richard M. Acosta, of Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellee Specialty Hospital of Mid-America.
Before RULON, C.J., McANANY and LEBEN, JJ.
This appeal presents a couple of deceptively simple questions. First, does the statute of limitations start to run on a medical malpractice claim at the time of injury when the defendant's conduct causes the patient to suffer a coma from which he never recovers? Second, when the patient's heirs bring a wrongful death action following the patient's death, is that claim barred by the statute of limitations if it is not brought within 2 years after the negligent conduct that caused the patient's coma and eventual death? After rambling through a briar patch of somewhat confusing authorities on these issues (a confusion to which we hope we are not adding), we arrive at our answer to each of these questions which is: No.
Macie Martin (Martin) sued Sandip Naik, M.D. (Naik), and Specialty Hospital of Mid-America (Hospital) for the wrongful death of her husband, Curley Martin (Curley). She also brought a survival action as the personal representative of Curley's estate for the injuries and damages Curley sustained prior to his death. The district court ruled these claims were time-barred and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Martin appeals. We reverse and remand.
On appeal we consider de novo Naik's and the Hospital's summary judgment motions. See Central Natural Resources v. Davis Operating Co., 288 Kan. 234, 240, 201 P.3d 680 (2009). In doing so, we apply the same standards applicable to the proceedings before the district court. Further, to the extent this appeal requires statutory interpretation, we construe the relevant statutes de novo. See Double M. Constr. v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 288 Kan. 268, 271, 202 P.3d 7 (2009).
While Naik and the Hospital deny any negligence on their part, the following facts were uncontroverted solely for purposes of resolving the defendants' summary judgment motions.
On March 31, 2004, Curley was admitted to the Hospital under Naik's care. During the evening of April 7, 2004, Martin observed a nurse having difficulty with equipment that provided nutrition and medications to Curley and heard comments from the nurse to this effect. Later that night, Curley's blood glucose dropped to a critically low level, and a nurse employed by the Hospital negligently administered insulin.
By the next morning, April 8, 2004, Curley's condition had deteriorated. He was unresponsive and apparently in a diabetic coma. Curley was transferred to Shawnee Mission Medical Center (SMMC) that morning, but the transfer was delayed due to Naik's negligence.
Curley's condition did not improve. He suffered irreversible brain damage. While treating Curley at SMMC, Dr. Samuel Lehman told Martin and her family that when the Hospital's staff allowed Curley to go into a diabetic coma, they had essentially killed him. Curley later died on October 25, 2004.
On October 25, 2006, 2 years to the day following Curley's death, Martin filed suit on behalf of herself and Curley's other heirs for his wrongful death and as the personal representative of Curley's estate for the survival action. She alleged that the negligence of Naik and the Hospital on April 7 and 8, 2004, caused the injuries that led to Curley's death.
Martin was aware of the defendants' claimed negligent conduct at the time it occurred. On April 8, 2004, Martin was aware of the injurious consequences to Curley when his condition worsened and he slipped into a coma from which he never recovered.
As a preliminary matter, we must be mindful of the distinctions between wrongful death actions authorized by K.S.A. 60-1901 et seq. and survival actions authorized by K.S.A. 60-1801 et seq.
A wrongful death action may be brought by the deceased's heir at law "who has sustained a loss by reason of the death." K.S.A. 60-1902. The action is brought on behalf of all the heirs who sustained a loss. Compensable damages to the heirs in a wrongful death action include pecuniary as well as nonpecuniary damages, such as loss of support, loss of companionship, and mental anguish, sustained by the heirs on account of the decedent's death. K.S.A. 60-1903 and 60-1904.
A survival action, on the other hand, is brought by the personal representative of the decedent's estate in order to compensate the estate for the damages sustained by the decedent prior to death as a result of the defendant's improper conduct. See Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 721, 647 P.2d 1340 (1982).
The outcome of this case is controlled by application of K.S.A. 60-513 to the facts before us. This statute requires:
In considering this statute we are mindful of the nature and purpose of statutes of limitation.
" " Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 132, 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (citing Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 1945).
We also must consider the applicability of K.S.A. 60-515, which provides in part:
"If any person entitled to bring an action..., at any time during the period the statute of limitations is running, is .... an incapacitated person ..., such person shall be entitled to bring such action within one year after the person's disability is removed, except that no such action shall be commenced by or on behalf of any person under the disability more than eight years after the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action."
In its extensive Order Granting Summary Judgment, the district court analyzed various cases which we will discuss further. The court concluded that Martin's "causes of action here for medical negligence in the survival action and the wrongful death claim accrued April 8, 2004." Further, the court found no tolling of the statute of limitations on account of Curley's disability. Thus, the court found that both these causes of action were barred by the 2-year limitation found in K.S.A. 60-513.
Curley's claim of medical negligence survived his death pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1801. K.S.A. 60-513 required Martin to commence an action on this claim within 2 years following the later of (1) the defendants' medically negligent conduct, or (2) when Curley's injury became reasonably ascertainable "to the injured party" if it was not reasonably ascertainable at the time of the defendants' negligent conduct; but in no event later than 4 years after the defendants' negligent conduct. Thus, K.S.A. 60-513 is both a statute of limitations (2 years) and a statute of repose (4 years).
The survival action brought by Martin as the personal representative of Curley's estate is a tort action for negligence. Such a cause of action arises upon the confluence of its time-honored elements: the existence of a duty, the negligent breach of that duty, causation, and damages. Generally speaking, for the purpose of determining when the period of a statute of limitations begins to run, we look to the "time when the plaintiff first had the right to file and prosecute the action to a successful conclusion." Mason, 231 Kan. at 722, 647 P.2d 1340 (citing Yeager v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 205 Kan. 504, 470 P.2d 797 1970). Though all the elements of this cause of action may be present so as to bring it into being and enable an injured party to prosecute it to a successful conclusion, if that party's existing injuries are not reasonably apparent, under K.S.A. 60-513(c) the cause of action is not "deemed to have accrued" until the damages are discoverable for the purpose of commencing the limitation period.
The phrase "reasonably ascertainable" is a bone of contention between the parties. The exact wording of the relevant part of K.S.A. 60-513(c) is as follows:
"... Unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial...
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