Martin v. Patel
| Decision Date | 06 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 17-CV-916 JLS (WVG) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | LANCE R. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. R. PATEL, et al., Defendants. |
ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS; (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT; (3) DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; (4) DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT; AND (5) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO STRIKE
Presently before the Court are a variety of motions, which the Court addresses individually below. The Court vacated all hearings on the motions and took them under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF Nos. 38, 48, 53.) Having considered the parties' arguments and the law, the Court rules as follows.
On May 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks to hold several Defendants liable for their alleged deficient medical care of Plaintiff. (See id.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants, who are medical professionals at the "Neighborhood Clinic-El Cajon," failed to properly treat him for two medical injuries: first, an alleged cervical injury causing extreme pain and suffering and partial paralysis; second, an internal injury causing constant and bloody urine and abdominal pain. (Id. at 7.)1 For these alleged wrongs Plaintiff seeks "declaratory judgment [that] defendants committed medical malpractice on Plaintiff and damages (including punitive damages) totaling $2 million. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff failed to pre-pay the filing fee and moved to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). (ECF No. 2.) The Court granted his motion, but dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint under the mandatory screening required for all IFP motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (ECF No. 7.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint for two reasons. First, Plaintiff could not bring a § 1983 claim against Defendants because Plaintiff did not show Defendants acted under color of state law. (Id. at 4.) Second, without a viable § 1983 claim against Defendants, Plaintiff did not show why this Court would have subject matter jurisdiction over what appeared to be state law medical malpractice claims. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, which sought to cure the defects identified by the Court. (ECF No. 11.) The Court again dismissed Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) because Plaintiff did not show how Defendants acted under color of state law. (ECF No. 12, at 3.) Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, which again sought to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court. (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 13.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants acted under color of state law because they have "a California state billing contract funded through Med Cal to . . . El Cajon neighborhood Health Clinic." (Id. ¶¶ 5-8.) The Court found those accusations sufficient to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). (ECF No. 19, at 4.) The resulting deluge of motions soon followed.
After Plaintiff filed his SAC, but prior to the Court allowing Plaintiff's SAC toproceed beyond the IFP screening, the Clerk of Court's office issued summons to Plaintiffs on November 16, 2017, (ECF No. 14). That summons was issued prematurely; the Court had not granted Plaintiff the right to use the United States Marshal to effect service of process. Subsequently, the Court authorized the United States Marshal to effect service on January 4, 2018 and an amended summons was issued the same day, (ECF No. 21). The resulting confusion, through no fault of the parties, has created issues in service, which the Court will address below with regard to Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment as well as those Defendants who raised service-related issues.
Several Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the Court addresses these arguments first. These Motions include Defendant United States of America's2 Motion to Dismiss, ("United States MTD," ECF No. 40), and Defendant Vafadaran's Motion to Dismiss, ("Vafadaran MTD," ECF No. 49). Plaintiff filed a Request for Judicial Notice, ("RJN," ECF No. 47), in which he opposes the United States' substitution in the place of Defendant Patel. Plaintiff also filed a Response in Opposition, (ECF No. 55), to Defendant Vafadararn's Motion to Dismiss.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as such have an obligation to dismiss claims for which they lack subject-matter jurisdiction. Demarest v. United States, 718 F.2d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). Because the issue of standing pertains to the subject-matter jurisdiction of a federal court, motions raising lack of standing are properly brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing he has standing to bring the claimsasserted. Takhar v. Kessler, 76 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 1996); see also In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008) ().
Rule 12(b)(1) motions may challenge jurisdiction facially or factually. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Id. "In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id. Conversely, when resolving a facial attack, a court assumes the truth of the plaintiff's factual allegations, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)).
As a threshold issue, the Court first addresses whether the United States properly substituted itself for Defendant Patel. Plaintiff named Defendant Patel in his SAC. (SAC ¶ 5.) The United States substituted itself for Defendant Patel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)-(n). (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff filed a Request for Judicial Notice in which he argues that the United States was improperly substituted for Defendant Patel. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the U.S. Attorney and Defendant Patel have improperly applied the law because 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2671, and 1346(b) confer jurisdiction when a federal department or agency is a defendant, but does not apply to a contractor with the United States. (RJN 1.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant Patel admitted that he was a contractor with the Public Health Service and Neighborhood Health Center and Defendant Patel'sstatus as a federal contractor precludes substitution of the United States as defendant. (See id.)
The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233, extends tort protections for medical malpractice to certain entities and their employees, officers, and certain contractors. § 233(a). Section 233(b) mandates the United States Attorney General defend any civil action against a Public Health Service employee. If an entity is deemed to be a Federally Qualified Health Clinic ("FQHC") "and certified to be acting within the scope of their employment, the organization receives the same coverage under the [Federal Tort Claims Act] as commissioned officers and employees of the Public Health Service." Pediatric & Family Med. Found. dba Eisner Pediatric & Family Med. Ctr. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. CV1700732SJOASX, 2017 WL 8220596, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C § 233(c), (g); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et. seq.) Thus, when an entity qualifies under § 233 and is sued for medical malpractice, the United States is substituted in as defendant on behalf of the entity. § 233(c).
Section 233(g) defines the application process for a person to qualify as an employee of the Public Health Service. An entity must submit an application to the Secretary of Health and Human Services verifying that it satisfies the requirements of the statute. § 233(g)(1)(D), (h). An entity includes "a public or non-profit private entity receiving Federal funds" under 42 U.S.C. § 254(b). 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(4). As relevant here, the definition of employee includes "an entity described in [§ 233(g)(4)] and any officer, governing board member, employee, or contractor (subject to paragraph (5)) of such an entity." § 233(g)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Section 233(g)(5) prescribes the hour limits for contractors employed by entities defined in paragraph 4.
Defendant United States filed a "Certificate of Scope of Employment" certifying that Defendant Patel was an employee or qualified contract of the Public Health Service. (ECF No. 39-1.) Under the statutory framework described in the Federally Support Health Centers Assistance Act, the United States was authorized to determine that Defendant Patelacted within the scope of his employment and, therefore, qualify as a Public Health Employee. This is true even if Defendant Patel is a contractor. See § 233(g)(1)(A). The United States determined that Defendant Patel was an employee of the Public Health Service from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016. (ECF No. 39-1, at 1.)
Once a person is deemed to be an employee of the Government, then the Westfall Act mandates the...
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