Martin v. Pierce Cnty.

• Decision Date: 27 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21-35251
• Citation: 34 F.4th 1125
• Parties: Jeffery S. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PIERCE COUNTY, a Washington political subdivision; Pierce County, Doe Correction Officers 1–10; NaphCare, Inc., an Alabama corporation doing business in the State of Washington ; Miguel Balderrama, MD, in his official and individual capacity; Janel French, LPN, in her official and individual capacity; Irina Hughes; NaphCare Doe Employees, 1–10; in their individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

34 F.4th 1125

Jeffery S. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.PIERCE COUNTY, a Washington political subdivision; Pierce County, Doe Correction Officers 1–10; NaphCare, Inc., an Alabama corporation doing business in the State of Washington ; Miguel Balderrama, MD, in his official and individual capacity; Janel French, LPN, in her official and individual capacity; Irina Hughes; NaphCare Doe Employees, 1–10; in their individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-35251

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 7, 2022 Seattle, Washington

Filed May 27, 2022

Bardi D. Martin (argued), Boyle Martin Thoeny PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ross C. Taylor (argued) and Jonathan D. Ballard, Fox Ballard PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Jay S. Bybee and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges, and James V. Selna,^* District Judge.

SELNA, District Judge:

This case involves a single issue: does a Washington state law requiring a claimant to file a declaration declining to submit the case to arbitration when filing a medical malpractice suit apply in federal court? We conclude that it does not. Washington's declaration requirement conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, under Hanna v. Plumer , 380 U.S. 460, 470–74, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965), the state rule does not apply in federal court. Because the district court mistakenly applied the state rule in Martin's case, we REVERSE and REMAND .

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-Appellant Jeffrey Martin appeals the district court's dismissal of his state medical malpractice claim for failing to file a declaration declining to submit the case to arbitration pursuant to RCW 7.70A.020.

1. RCW 7.70A.020

Washington requires a plaintiff in a medical-malpractice suit to elect or decline to submit a claim to arbitration at the time suit is commenced. RCW 7.70A.020. If the plaintiff does not elect to submit the dispute to arbitration, the plaintiff must meet the following requirements:

(a) in the case of a claimant, the declaration must be filed at the time of commencing the action and must state that the attorney representing the claimant presented the claimant with a copy of the provisions of this chapter before commencing the action and that the claimant elected not to submit the dispute to arbitration under this chapter[.]

Id.

The Washington state legislature passed this requirement as part of a series of laws directed at curbing medical malpractice lawsuits. Since then, the Washington Supreme Court has struck down several similar provisions, including: (1) RCW 7.70.150 requiring plaintiffs to file a certificate of merit at the time of filing a suit (see Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., P.S. , 166 Wash.2d 974, 216 P.3d 374, 379–80 (2009) (invalidating 7.70.150 as violating the Washington constitution by unduly burdening the right of access to courts and jeopardizing the separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary); (2) RCW 4.16.190 eliminating tolling of the statute of limitations for minors in the context of medical malpractice claims (see Schroeder v. Weighall , 179 Wash.2d 566, 316 P.3d 482, 489 (2014) (en banc) (invalidating RCW 416.190 as violating the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington constitution)); and (3) the 2007 revision of RCW 7.70.100 requiring plaintiffs to give medical malpractice defendants 90-days' notice prior to filing suit (see Waples v. Yi , 169 Wash.2d 152, 234 P.3d 187, 188–89 (2010) (en banc) (invalidating RCW 7.70.100 as violating the separation of powers under Washington's constitution)). To date, no Washington appellate court has considered RCW 7.70A.020.

2. Factual Allegations

Because the district court resolved this case on a motion to dismiss, we assume the truth of the facts as set out in the complaint. See Wojciechowski v. Kohlberg Ventures, LLC , 923 F.3d 685, 688 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019).

In March 2017, Martin was charged with and pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and related offenses and was remanded to serve his sentence for that infraction and deferred sentences on prior charges. Upon beginning his incarceration at Pierce County Detention Center, Martin's vision was "better than 20/20, and he had no history of eye ailments." But within two months, Martin began experiencing severe pain, dryness, and itchiness in his eyes for which he requested medical attention. Defendants waited several days to examine Martin's eyes and several more days before providing him with over-the-counter eye drops. Martin's eye condition progressively worsened and he was ultimately diagnosed with severe ocular hypertension

.

Despite knowing of Martin's medical needs, Defendants denied him adequate medical care while he was detained at the Pierce County Detention and Corrections Center. As a result, Martin suffered permanent damage to his vision.

3. Procedural Background

Based on these allegations, Martin filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, asserting two claims: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and (2) a state tort claim for medical malpractice arising under Washington law. Martin brought these claims against Defendants Pierce County, John Doe corrections officers, Miguel Balderrama, MD, NaphCare Inc., Irina Hughes, NP, and Janel French, LPN. Martin did not file a declaration electing or declining to submit his dispute to arbitration in accordance with RCW 7.70A.020(2).

Defendants NaphCare, Inc., Irina Hughes, NP, and Janel French, LPN (collectively, "Appellees") subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In part, Appellees argued that Martin's state medical malpractice claim should be dismissed for failure to comply with RCW 7.70A.020, the Washington state law requiring that a plaintiff elect or decline arbitration when commencing a medical malpractice claim. In response, Martin filed a First Amended Complaint, thereby mooting portions of Appellees' then-pending motion to dismiss. Appellees then answered Martin's First Amended Complaint.

On March 4, 2021, the district court granted Appellees' motion, dismissing Martin's state medical negligence claims for failing to comply with RCW 7.70A.020. Finding no reason for delay, the district court entered final judgment as to Martin's medical malpractice claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Martin timely appealed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court had original jurisdiction over Martin's § 1983 claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and supplemental jurisdiction over his state medical malpractice claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because the district court entered partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), we have jurisdiction to review the district court's dismissal of Martin's medical malpractice claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Jewel v. NSA , 810 F.3d 622, 627–28 (9th Cir. 2015).

We review de novo a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss. Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC , 852 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2017).

III. DISCUSSION

To determine whether RCW 7.70A.020 applies in this action, we employ a multistep choice-of-law analysis. First, under Hanna v. Plumer , we decide whether the state law conflicts with a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 380 U.S. 460, 470–74, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). In other words, we determine whether the Federal Rules answer the "same question" as the state rule. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 559 U.S. 393, 398–99, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010) ; see also Hanna , 380 U.S. at 470–74, 85 S.Ct. 1136.

If the Federal Rules do conflict with the state law, they control unless the Federal Rule is invalid under the Constitution or Rules Enabling Act. Shady Grove , 559 U.S. at 398, 130 S.Ct. 1431. To determine whether a federal rule applies under the Rules Enabling Act and relevant constitutional standards, we ask whether the federal rule is a "general rule[ ] of practice and procedure" that does "not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" and is "procedural in the ordinary use of the term." Shady Grove , 559 U.S. at 418, 423, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).

If the Federal Rules do not answer the same question as the state rule, the Court follows the Erie doctrine to determine which law applies. Id. at 468, 85 S.Ct. 1136.

A. Washington's Declaration Requirement Conflicts with Federal Rules

We first consider whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure answer the same question as RCW 7.70A.020 : whether a plaintiff must file a declaration electing or declining arbitration when filing a medical malpractice suit. See Shady Grove , 559 U.S. at 398–99, 130 S.Ct. 1431. There are multiple Federal Rules that provide an answer to this question.

1. Rule 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (" Rule 8") provides that a pleading must include: "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction ... ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

While federal circuit courts have not yet addressed a declaration requirement exactly like Washington's, various cases involving state "certificate-of-merit" requirements provide a useful analogy. Although certificate-of-merit requirements vary in their details, they generally require plaintiffs to file a declaration with the pleadings containing some reassurance, usually by an expert, that the claim has merit. See, e.g., Corley v. United States , 11 F.4th 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2021) (describing Connecticut's requirement that medical malpractice claimants "must affix to the complaint ‘a certificate ... [stating] that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action" and "must also...